



**'We don't want you to think criminal thoughts'**

*a sociological exploration of prison-based cognitive behavioural programmes in Denmark*

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# **‘WE DON’T WANT YOU TO THINK CRIMINAL THOUGHTS’**

**A SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLORATION OF PRISON-BASED  
COGNITIVE BEHAVIOURAL PROGRAMMES IN DENMARK**

**BY  
JULIE LAURSEN**

**DISSERTATION SUBMITTED 2016**



**AALBORG UNIVERSITY**  
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## CV

I hold a Master of Arts Degree in Educational Anthropology from the University of Aarhus (2012). I began this PhD project in 2013 at the Institute of Sociology and Social Work, Aalborg University. My PhD project is embedded in the larger research project Education in Social Skills and Emotional Training (ESSET) and I have been connected to the research group CASTOR. During my PhD, I have taught and supervised Masters level students in Criminology at the Institute of Sociology and Social Work. Furthermore, I have been a Visiting Scholar at the University of Oslo, University of California, Berkeley and at the University of Cambridge. Besides working on my PhD project, I have been a volunteer in the counselling center 'Kompasset' for homeless migrants in Copenhagen since 2013.





# ENGLISH SUMMARY

This article-based dissertation explores cognitive behavioural programmes in Danish prisons. I am interested in current problem definitions of criminality as essentially a choice, and the result of a lack of social and interpersonal skills, and in the consequent solutions proposed, which, in this context, are cognitive behavioural programmes. The analyses are based upon ethnographic fieldwork conducted in three different prison settings; one 'open' (minimum-security) and two 'closed' (maximum-security) prisons. The ethnographic data consists of field notes from (participant) observation in two different cognitive behavioural programmes, Anger Management and Cognitive Skills, as well as focus group and individual interviews with the participants and the instructors.

This dissertation consists of an introductory frame and four articles. The dissertation is embedded in a larger research project, but has its own research questions. The theoretical framework consists of Michel Foucault's conceptualizations of discipline and power, Nikolas Rose's further development thereof, and theories on social control developed by Stanley Cohen and David Garland. Besides these, I draw upon three supplementary analytical frameworks: cultures of prisons, subcultural theory, and friction.

This dissertation is an alternative to quantitative studies on the effect of cognitive behavioural programmes, and a contribution to the existing research on how these programmes unfold and are experienced in practice. The core finding and conclusion of this dissertation is that crime is essentially framed as a *choice* in cognitive behavioural programmes, with the offender being seen as a rational actor who freely chooses whatever actions he finds most appropriate. Criminal behaviour is thus firmly placed within the individual and thereby decontextualized from the individual's social and structural realities. The instructors walk a tightrope, because they have to respect the individuals' own rationality while essentially having to change and correct the 'wrong' types of thoughts and behaviour. This results in ongoing clashes between the participants and the instructors. The participants draw upon subcultural notions of respect and honour in order to explain their criminality, but these understandings are reframed as 'cognitive distortions' that need to be changed. The participants do not readily accept the programmatic goals, but are happy to pay lip service in order to complete the programme. They use humour as a tool to disrupt the lessons and to create and enforce boundaries between them and the instructors. I have found that this friction or resistance cannot be explained away as simply a confirmation of the productiveness of power, but rather that it shows the limits of power in this rehabilitative setting.

The first article, *'Caught between Soft Power and Neoliberal Punitiveness – An Exploration of the Practices of Cognitive-Behavioral Instructors in Danish Prisons'*, is concerned with the practices and self-understanding of cognitive behavioural instructors. Although the Danish Prison Service brought in cognitive behavioural programmes twenty years ago, no Scandinavian research has been conducted either on the implications of these programmes for the prison climate or on the roles, aims and self-understanding of the instructors. This article seeks to address this gap by discussing the motivations, practices and sentiments of instructors in prison-based cognitive behavioural programmes. It also contributes to research on the implementation of penal policies and the changing occupational roles for professionals at the soft end of the correctional system. I show how punitive-risk thinking and penal welfarism have become strange bedfellows in a 'late modern hybrid' (Kolind et al. 2015) that has implications for the instructors' motivations, the realities they face in prisons, and the concrete workings and content of the programmes. Finally, I point to the wider implications of the tensions between neoliberal rehabilitation and the penal-welfare state, by highlighting how previous holistic understandings of prisoners seem to be overshadowed by an exclusive focus on the individual.

The second article, *'Man begynder jo ikke at smadre en købmand": Perspektiver på vold i vredeskontrolprogrammet Anger Management'* [*"You Wouldn't Beat up the Grocery Guy!" Perspectives on violence in the prison-based cognitive behavioural programme Anger Management'*], revolves around the treatment of violence and aggression in the prison-based cognitive behavioural programme Anger Management. The empirical data point to the fact that the participants' and instructors' perspectives, understandings and rationales on violence diverge in significant ways. These discrepancies, and the participants' norms for masculine respect, result in ongoing clashes of horizons and struggles in which the rationality of violence is at play. The participants' understandings of and perspectives on violence are not seen as legitimate, because the instructors define all violence as unacceptable and deem it to be a result of erroneous thinking styles. The belief that violence is a result of pure choice, cognitive distortions and erroneous thinking styles excludes contextualized, social and structural explanations. The participants, on the other hand, do not readily accept the kind of decontextualized conceptions of violence, conflict and aggressiveness, and the focus on choice, that are embedded in the programmes. The article concludes by suggesting that a treatment programme more attuned to the participants' own narratives and reasoning would perhaps work better.

The third article, *'Honour and Respect in Danish Prisons – Contesting "Cognitive Distortions" in Cognitive Behavioural Programmes'*, is co-authored with PhD student Ben Laws from the University of Cambridge. We consider how prisoners' subcultural capital shapes their responses to demands for 'cognitive self-change'. We argue that accounts of 'respect' in the prior literature fail to capture how

prisoners react to these programmes, and that a discussion of honour (and what we term ‘respect plus’) needs to be incorporated. By attempting to create accountable and rational actors who ‘self-manage’, the therapeutic ethos neglects participants’ life experiences and subcultural capital. Open expressions of moral values by prisoners (such as displays of honour and respect) are considered to be *cognitive distortions* that are dismissed by the instructors, while alternative and ‘correct’ thinking styles are prescribed. Our findings advance understandings of the meanings of honour and respect in prisons in general and in cognitive behavioural programmes in particular.

The fourth article, ***‘(No) Laughing Allowed – Humorous Boundary-making in Prison’***, examines humour in prison-based cognitive behavioural programmes. The empirical data from fieldwork in four different programme settings illuminates how the social interactions in the lessons are, surprisingly, saturated with humour. Humorous interactions and jocular stories serve as a lubricant in the lessons, but they also function as disruptions and boundary-making between the participants and the instructors. To that end, humour becomes a medium and a tool that prisoners can use to preserve autonomy and dignity despite the infantilizing nature of the programme curriculum. My findings advance understandings of the meaning of humour in prisons in general, and in cognitive behavioural programmes in particular, while showing the limits of soft power in therapeutic settings.



# DANSK RESUME

Denne artikelbaserede afhandling undersøger kognitive færdighedsprogrammer i danske fængsler. Jeg interesserer mig for løsningsmodeller, som i denne optik er tanke og handlingsrum for håndtering af problemer. Jeg er interesseret i aktuelle problemdefinitioner af kriminalitet som et *valg*, og som et resultat af mangel på sociale og interpersonelle færdigheder, samt de deraf foreslåede løsninger, som i denne sammenhæng, er kognitive færdighedsprogrammer. Analysen er baseret på etnografisk feltarbejde udført i tre forskellige fængsler; et åbent og to lukkede. De etnografiske data består af feltnoter fra (deltager) observation i to forskellige kognitive færdighedsprogrammer, Anger Management og det Kognitive Færdighedsprogram, samt fokusgruppe og individuelle interviews med deltagere og instruktører.

Afhandlingen består af en indledende ramme og fire artikler. Afhandlingen er indlejret i et større forskningsprojekt, men har sine egne forskningsspørgsmål. Den teoretiske ramme består af Michel Foucaults teoretiseringer af disciplin, subjektivering og magt, Nikolas Rose videre udvikling heraf, og teorier om social kontrol udviklet af Stanley Cohen og David Garland. Desuden tager afhandlingen afsæt i tre supplerende analytiske greb: fængselskulturer, subkulturel teori og friktion.

Denne afhandling er et alternativ til kvantitative undersøgelser af effekten af kognitive færdighedsprogrammer og et bidrag til den eksisterende forskning om, hvordan disse programmer udfolder sig og opleves i praksis. Afhandlingens fund er, at kriminalitet betragtes som et valg i kognitive færdighedsprogrammer, hvor lovovertræderen ses som en rationel aktør, der frit vælger, hvilke handlinger han finder mest hensigtsmæssige. Forklaringer på kriminel adfærd er individualiserede og dermed dekontekstualiseret fra den enkeltes sociale og strukturelle forhold. Instruktørerne arbejder indenfor en svær balancegang, fordi de skal respektere den enkeltes egen rationalitet, mens de søger at ændre og rette "forkerte" typer af tanker og adfærd. Dette resulterer i kontinuerlige sammenstød mellem deltagerne og instruktørerne. Deltagerne trækker på subkulturelle forestillinger om respekt og ære for at forklare deres kriminalitet, men disse forståelser omformuleres som "kognitive mangler", der skal ændres. Deltagerne accepterer ikke umiddelbart programmets mål, men de går gerne med på præmisserne i mindst muligt omfang for at gennemføre programmet. Deltagerne bruger humor som et redskab til at forstyrre lektionerne og skabe og håndhæve grænser mellem dem og instruktørerne. Afhandlingen argumenterer for, at denne modstand eller friktion ikke blot kan bortforklares som en bekræftelse på magts produktivitet men snarere, at denne friktion viser grænserne for magt i denne rehabiliterende kontekst.

**Artikel nummer et, 'Caught between Soft Power and Neoliberal Punitiveness – An Exploration of the Practices of Cognitive-Behavioral Instructors in Danish Prisons',** beskæftiger sig med instruktørernes praksis og selvforståelser. Selvom den danske Kriminalforsorg implementerede kognitive færdighedsprogrammer for tyve år siden, findes der ingen skandinavisk forskning, der omhandler konsekvenserne af disse programmer for fængselsmiljøet eller instruktørernes roller, mål og selvforståelser. Denne artikel søger dermed at undersøge og diskutere instruktørernes motivationer, praksis og selvforståelser. Artiklen bidrager også til forskning i implementering af policies på straffuldbyrdsområdet og de deraf forandrede roller for professionelle i den bløde ende af fængselssystemet. Jeg viser, hvordan risiko tænkning og tidligere velfærdsideal er fusioneret i en "senmoderne hybrid" (Kolind et al. 2015), som har betydning for instruktørernes motivationer, arbejdsforhold, og den konkrete praksis og indhold af programmerne. Endelig peger artiklen på bredere konsekvenser af spændingerne mellem neoliberal rehabilitering og tidligere velfærdsideal ved at fremhæve, hvordan tidligere holistiske forståelser af indsatte synes at blive overskygget af et intenst fokus på individet.

**Artikel nummer to, 'Man begynder jo ikke at smadre en købmand' Perspektiver på vold i vredeskontrolprogrammet Anger Management',** knytter an til antropologisk voldsforskning ved at inddrage deltagerne perspektiver og positioneringer og fokusere på henholdsvis instruktørernes og deltagerne forståelser af vold og konflikt. Det bærende spørgsmål i artiklen er dermed, hvordan vold fremstilles og forhandles i programmet Anger Management. Afledt af dette spørgsmål viser artiklen, hvordan deltagerne positionerer sig efter bestemte maskulinitetsnormer, som står i opposition til programmet. Deltagerne og instruktørernes forskellige perspektiver på vold i Anger Management ender i kontinuerlige horisontsammenstød, hvor definitionen af henholdsvis legitim og ikke-legitim vold er på spil. Deltagerne forsøger at definere nogle former for vold som legitime, mens de i andre situationer tager afstand fra vold. Instruktørerne stempler derimod al form for vold som uacceptabel og som resultat af fejlagtige tankemønstre, hvilket udelukker kontekstuelle, sociale og strukturelle forklaringer. Artiklen konkluderer, at sammenstødet mellem forskellige rationaliteter og instruktørernes insisteren på at arbejde med konstruerede eller irrelevante situationer fra fængslet kan være en begrænsning for programmernes mulighed for at 'behandle' og forebygge vold.

**Artikel nummer tre, 'Honour and Respect in Danish Prisons – Contesting 'Cognitive Distortions' in Cognitive-Behavioural Programs',** er forfattet med ph.d.-studerende Ben Laws fra University of Cambridge. Vi diskuterer, hvordan fængernes subkulturelle kapital former deres reception af krav om "kognitiv selvforandring". Vi hævder, at tidligere forskning om betydningen af "respekt" overser, hvordan deltagerne reagerer på disse programmer, og at en diskussion af ære (og hvad vi kalder "respekt plus") kan være produktiv i den kontekst. Ved at forsøge at skabe ansvarlige og rationelle aktører, som "styrer sig selv", negligeres deltagerne

livserfaringer og subkulturelle kapital. Deltagernes udtryk for betydningen af moralske værdier (såsom ære og respekt) anses for at være kognitive mangler, som afskrives af instruktørerne, mens de forsøger at lære deltagerne alternative og "korrekte" tænkestile. Artiklens fund bidrager til forståelsen af betydninger af ære og respekt i fængsler i almindelighed og i kognitive færdighedsprogrammer i særdeleshed.

**Artikel nummer fire, *‘(No) Laughing Allowed – Humorous Boundary-making in Prison’***, undersøger humor i kognitive færdighedsprogrammer. De empiriske data fra feltarbejde i fire forskellige programforløb belyser, hvordan de sociale interaktioner i lektionerne er fyldt med humor og jokes. Humoristiske interaktioner og spøgefulde historier tjener som et glidemiddel i lektionerne, men de fungerer også som forstyrrelser og grænsedragning mellem deltagerne og instruktørerne. Deltagernes humor bliver dermed et medium og et værktøj, som de kan bruge til at bevare autonomi og værdighed i den til tider barnliggørende undervisning. Artiklen bidrager til forståelser af betydningen af humor i fængsler i almindelighed og i kognitive færdighedsprogrammer i særdeleshed, samt viser grænserne for blød magt i fængselsbaseret rehabilitering.

'WE DON'T WANT YOU TO THINK CRIMINAL THOUGHTS'



# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is a shame that it is customary to write these lines in the final hectic and worrisome days before the dissertation is submitted because these past three years have been nothing but wonderful. I hope my gratitude shines brighter than my tiredness.

I wish to express my gratitude towards a number of people. First and foremost, I wish to thank the prisoners and cognitive behavioural programme instructors who so willingly and positively accepted my presence in the groups. Thank you for letting an outsider to both the prison and cognitive behavioural programmes in and for your generosity with your time and energy. This dissertation would not have come to be without you. I also wish to thank Susanne Clausen from the Directorate of the Danish Prison Service for granting me access to prisons and for her large interest in the PhD project. I also wish to thank Ninett Haubjerg, Anders Thal Rønnerberg, Ingeborg Dige Thorsen and Anita Rønning from various parts of the Danish Prison Service for their never ending interest, openness and enthusiasm.

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University of Cambridge where I had the pleasure of being a Visiting Scholar for five months during winter and spring of 2015. Your openness, kindness and generosity made my stay absolutely wonderful. As you are well aware, no one is more sceptical about Scandinavian exceptionalism than Nordic prison researchers. Thank you for inviting me to be part of research teams in HM Prison Brixton and HM Prison Peterborough – these experiences made at least one Nordic scholar less sceptical. Ruth Armstrong and Amy Flowers, thank you for letting me supervise in 'Learning Together'. It was a very rewarding and fulfilling experience that made a lasting and deep impression on me. I also wish to thank Ben Laws, Aiden Cope and Alice Ievins for many shared laughs and intellectually stimulating conversations. Crew 55 - Serena and Giulia – thank you for being the best officemates and friends one could ever wish for.

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# LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

## ARTICLE 1

Laursen, J (In review) 'Caught between Soft Power and Neoliberal Punitiveness – An Exploration of the Practices of Cognitive-Behavioral Instructors in Danish Prisons'. *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology*.

## ARTICLE 2

Laursen, J (2015) "Man begynder jo ikke at smadre en købmand": Perspektiver på vold i vredeskontrolprogrammet "Anger Management". *Tidsskriftet Antropologi*, 71: 69-91.

This article is translated into English: "You Wouldn't Beat up the Grocery Guy!" Perspectives on violence in the prison-based cognitive behavioural programme Anger Management".

## ARTICLE 3

Laursen, J & Laws, B (In press) 'Honour and Respect in Danish Prisons – Contesting "Cognitive Distortions" in Cognitive-Behavioural Programmes'. *Punishment & Society*.

## ARTICLE 4

Laursen, J (In review) '(No) Laughing Allowed – Humorous Boundary-making in Prison'. *British Journal of Criminology*.

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‘We are not interested in those stupid crimes that you have committed. The Party is not interested in the overt act: the thought is all we care about’ (Orwell 1949:203).





# CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

- Instructor: What could you do instead of resorting to violence if you were to use the ‘before, during and after’ techniques?
- Makin<sup>1</sup>: Ridicule the other person.
- Instructor: We don’t agree on this one. Maybe he loses control if you ridicule the other person.
- Makin: Cool!
- Instructor: We are not supposed to think about instrumental violence, we should think about consequences. We don’t want you to think criminal thoughts.
- Makin: Well, we always do.
- Instructor: You’re consciously choosing a negative behaviour, you’re choosing to start a fight.
- Makin: You’re interrupting, you cannot understand it if you interrupt. It is context dependent. If I don’t have any power in my hands, here in prison in relation to the guards, I will try to gain some control of the situation by removing my pants in a slow manner [during the cell search]. It was just an example, but you’re interpreting it as the whole story. I don’t like to subject myself to anyone I don’t like to submit to.
- Jesper: It’s a matter of self-respect.

The above field note extract derives from an Anger Management lesson in ‘Techniques to control anger, Part two – Thoughts during an episode’. The

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<sup>1</sup> All participants, instructors and prisons have been anonymized throughout this dissertation and the four articles embedded herein. The participants and instructors are anonymized in a manner that reflects their respective ethnic backgrounds.

condensed point of the lesson is that 'the participants can control their thoughts, thus change the way they think and thereby change the way they react'<sup>2</sup> (DfK 2001:3.17). The example illustrates several points of interest in regards to this dissertation. It illustrates the emphasis on *thoughts*, *rationality* and *choice* embedded in prison-based cognitive behavioural programmes. The embedded *normativity* in the programmes is also visible, in the sense that the instructor is aiming to stop 'criminal thoughts' and to guide the participants towards a more 'proper' or constructive way of thinking and reacting. Importantly, the example also illustrates the participants' *resistance* or *friction* (Rubin 2015) towards the programmatic goals; they do not readily accept the premises for the programmes. On the contrary, the participants often emphasize other concepts of importance to them such as (self-) respect. Lastly, the example illustrates the importance of the context for cognitive behavioural programmes, namely prisons as particularly powerful institutional and social contexts (Haney 2009).

Cognitive behavioural programmes have come to play a central role in the current rehabilitative efforts of the Danish Prison and Probation Service. Following Canadian and North American research (e.g. Ross, Fabiano & Ewles 1988), new rehabilitative interventions aimed at targeting offending behaviour spread to England and Wales and rapidly evolved from ad hoc and uncoordinated experimentation to importable programmes; these reached Denmark in 1994 (Robinson 2008:431; Smith 2006). Since the first cognitive behavioural programme was implemented in Ringe State prison (Philip 1996), the programme portfolio has grown, and prisoners and probationers are now offered six different cognitive behavioural programmes. Cognitive behavioural programmes 'are structured interventions that aim to develop and train offenders' behavioural competencies – e.g. handling of anger, problem-solving and communication – which research has shown are some of the most important factors to focus on in crime-preventive interventions' (DfK 2013:1, own translation). The emphasis on the individual causes of crime is evident in the cognitive behavioural programmes. The programmes are based upon a cognitive-psychological model of criminal conduct that has an explicit focus on thinking styles that control (or do not control) 'criminal' behaviour. This model seeks to replace what are considered to be rigid and erroneous thinking styles with cognitive skills that can increase pro-social behavioural choices. The model aims, in particular, to teach 'criminals' to reflect better instead of solely reacting, to show better foresight and to plan better in relation to future problems, and, in general, to teach them to be more flexible, open-minded, reasonable and thoughtful in their behaviour (DfK 2012:9, own translation). As described by some of the Canadian 'founding fathers' of cognitive behavioural programmes:

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<sup>2</sup> This is a condensed and translated version of the description of the lesson. The manuals are protected by copyright, so I will just refer to them in this manner throughout the dissertation.

A considerable number of offenders have deficits in the ability to conceptualise the consequences of their behaviour and are unable to use means–end reasoning to achieve their goals. Often the offender is concretistic, action oriented, non-reflective and impulsive. Many offenders have not progressed beyond an egocentric state of cognitive development and are unable to understand the behaviour, thoughts and feelings of other people (Ross, Fabiano & Ewles 1988:30).

This understanding is also found in Henning Jørgensen’s article in the popular-scientific journal *From a Psychological Point of View* [*Psykologisk set*]. Jørgensen writes that ‘criminals’ are often ‘rigid, dogmatic and inflexible in their thinking styles, with difficulties in understanding concepts which they cannot touch, smell, taste or see. A concept like “responsibility” does not exist to them or is very blurred. Their world is made up of absolutes and black and white conceptions of right and wrong. Thus, they are unable to understand the finesses and complexity of sociality and communication, but they do not comprehend the social handicap that follows from this lack of social skills’ (Jørgensen 1999:15, own translation). In essence, offenders are seen as ‘autonomous, rational actors who made poor decisions because of distorted thoughts and values’ (Fox 1999b:440).

The above descriptions are interesting because they illustrate how certain problems are interpreted, formulated and presented, as well as illustrating the solutions that follow them. In this context, the understanding of criminal behaviour ‘defines the element that will constitute what the different solutions attempt to respond to’ (Foucault 1989:421 in Borch 2015:7). The anthropologists Steffen Jöhncke, Mette Nordahl Svendsen and Susan Reynolds Whyte (2004) describe how ‘problems’ are often shaped by the offered solutions [løsningsmodeller]. This means that problems are shaped by certain understandings and descriptions of, for example, responsibility and thereby irresponsibility, which again leads to certain solutions that might solve or at least remedy these problems (2004:385). In this respect, the rationality of the solutions shapes what seems to be possible and worth knowing about the problems and, not least, the carriers of these problems. The carriers of specific problems are thus specific groups, categories or individuals, in this case prisoners, who are characterized by the problem that the solutions can capture, handle and contain. This often results in hegemonic descriptions of these groups or individuals who are categorized into risk categories, diagnoses, etc. (Jöhncke, Svendsen, & Whyte 2004:393). A fruitful framework for analysing how the connections between techniques,<sup>3</sup> moral perspectives and social actors appear in specific contexts is to understand solutions as ‘social technologies’. The concept of social technologies helps to illustrate what appears natural, necessary, useful and

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<sup>3</sup> Here, a technique is understood as a ‘practical art’, or how something should be done (Hacking 1996:80). This includes concrete tools (technical equipment, medicine, etc.) and metaphorical ones (therapies, counselling, etc.).

neutral (Shore & Wright 1997:87), and thus helps to portray the values and ideologies, social norms, cultural models and ideals that are at stake. Although it may seem like an obvious choice, an analysis of problems and solutions in the shape of social technologies need not be a Foucauldian identification of dominating descriptions and rationales on the discursive level (Jöhncke, Svendsen, & Whyte 2004:386). This is not my aim, at least. In contrast, I aim to provide an empirically derived description of how dominating definitions of problems and solutions play out in practice. In this regard, the analysis will often point to the relationship between dominating descriptions of problems and solutions and lived experience. This means that I will draw attention to the various ways in which the prescribed solutions are not always followed and the rationalities behind them are not always adopted in the cognitive behavioural programmes as they are implemented in practice.

Social technologies unfold in social relations, and often in institutional settings such as, in this case, prisons. In this context, problems and their solutions are intimately bound up with theories of offending, and these theories will guide what sort of intervention is seen to be needed (Raynor & Robinson 2005:5). As Stanley Cohen argues:

[each] system of thought is connected with a corresponding system of power. That is to say, the stuff of what the theory speaks, represents certain real social 'deposits'. The metaphor of a deposit [...] conveys a dual meaning: it is something which is *left behind* and something which is *drawn upon* (Cohen 1985:89).

The descriptions, definitions of problems and consequent solutions in the theoretical model of cognitive behavioural programmes thus leave 'something' behind and draw upon 'something', and the 'something' is a particular understanding of criminal behaviour or 'criminal' thought processes. In this particular framework, which partially draws on rational choice theory, crime occurs because of choice, the opportunity to commit crimes, and low levels of social and self-control (Hannah-Moffat & Shaw 2000). This narrative and the consequent practices leave behind many other explanations that are of great interest to me, and that are examined thoroughly in the four articles and also in the different theoretical and analytical concepts presented in this dissertation. My aim is to analyse how cognitive behavioural programmes are experienced, used, challenged, and rejected and/or accepted. The empirical foundation for this analysis is my ethnographic fieldwork in Cognitive Skills and Anger Management in three Danish prisons and focus group, as well as individual interviews with participants and instructors in these programmes. Before I move on to present the research questions, I will briefly present the wider framework for this dissertation.

My PhD project is embedded in a larger research project called Education in Social Skills and Emotional Training<sup>4</sup> (ESSET) financed by The Danish Council for Independent Research | Social Sciences. In ESSET, we examine new tendencies related to the normative regulation of social interaction, and, in particular, educational efforts aimed at developing social skills and preventing or stopping behaviour that is considered antisocial (Prieur 2012). Cognitive behavioural programmes, or at least manual-based programmes developed to improve social skills and prevent ‘anti-social’ behaviour are not just used in the Danish Prison and Probation Service, but can be seen across a range of different fields investigated in ESSET. Thus, a central interest in ESSET as well as in this dissertation is what we understand as a new ‘specific outlook at behaviour, interaction and handling of emotions, followed by an invitation to self-surveillance and by new technologies for surveillance’ (Prieur 2012:2). The project is divided into four sub-projects and draws on document analysis, interviews and ethnographic fieldwork.<sup>5</sup>

Professor Annick Prieur has conducted a genealogy of the concept of social skills, and examines them in police work; she has also made a study of professionals’ judgements of the social skills of children and young people. Furthermore, assistant professor Oline Pedersen examines manual-based programmes in kindergartens and schools, while associate professor Sune Qvotrup Jensen examines agencies preparing the unemployed for work. The collaboration in ESSET has so far led to several publications (Laursen 2015; Jensen & Prieur 2015a; Pedersen forthcoming; Prieur et al. forthcoming; Prieur 2015), with several other publications in process. One of the forthcoming articles is a collaboration between Oline Pedersen and me

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<sup>4</sup> See the full project description for ESSET here:

[http://www.esset.aau.dk/digitalAssets/150/150778\\_essetendelig\\_beskrivelse\\_annick.pdf](http://www.esset.aau.dk/digitalAssets/150/150778_essetendelig_beskrivelse_annick.pdf)

<sup>5</sup> The research questions for ESSET are:

1. How has the idea of the importance of social skills (and the related notions of cognitive and communicative skills) emerged and gained importance?
2. What kinds of behaviour are found appropriate and inappropriate today, and for whom are they appropriate or not (depending on age, gender, class, ethnicity etc.)?
3. What is demanded of the self in the literature about social skills and in training programmes? What is the balance between care for oneself and care for others? What is the balance between emotional control and expression of individuality?
4. How can the social demands be related to gender, class and ethnicity? Are ideas about social skills biased towards the feminine (e.g. in the understanding of emotions), towards middle-class standards (e.g. in emphasis on verbalization), or towards the ethnic majority (e.g. in individualistic ideals)? Are social skills a new form of cultural capital?
5. Does training in social skills lead to inclusion or to exclusion of the socially vulnerable?

in which we discuss a curious finding, namely that our very different fields of study yield similar findings. We analyse how manual-based programmes in kindergartens and schools share some of the logic, characteristics and goals of the cognitive behavioural programmes in the Danish Prison and Probation Service. We show how newer programmatic efforts aimed at regulating behaviour seem to have merged with older ideals in both settings, and discuss how these play out in practice and how they are experienced by the children and the prisoners. The PhD project has thus been a truly collaborative effort in the sense that we have discussed our findings, analysis and writings as a research group. However, my PhD project, and thus this dissertation, stands alone and has its own research questions, which I will present in the following.

## RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Since I am not conducting an evaluation of cognitive behavioural programmes, I am not particularly interested in forming an evidence-based view of whether they 'work' or not. Rather, I am interested in the *content* and concrete *workings* of the programmes. I have consequently examined the following: the messages that the programme instructors send and the messages that the participants receive; the normative implications of the programmes; the values that are communicated; and the conceptions of social competencies that are highlighted and valued in the programmes. Mirroring the above, the following research questions are divided into one overarching question and four sub-questions. This dissertation consists of an introductory frame plus four articles which have their own sub-themes, and these sub-themes are reflected in the four sub-questions below. While my overarching aim was to examine 'what goes on' in the cognitive behavioural programmes, narrower central concepts and ideas grew from the empirical material. These concepts and ideas are described in the following to give the reader a sense of how the following research questions reflect these findings. A fuller elaboration of the data analysis process can be found in Chapter 6 of this dissertation.

Even though there has been a wealth of quantitative meta-analyses of cognitive behavioural programmes, 'in all of the meta-analytic number-crunching [...] readers rarely get a glimpse of what 'actually' goes on in rehabilitation programs themselves' (Ward & Maruna 2007:18). My aim is, thus, to show 'what goes on' in Cognitive Skills and Anger Management and how the instructors and, especially, the participants resist as well as invest in or interpret these. My main research question is: *How do prison-based cognitive behavioural programmes' problem definitions and suggested solutions play out in concrete practice?*

While there have been claims that neoliberal policies hinder a close relationship between staff and prisoners (Crewe 2011:464), no Scandinavian research has been conducted on the implementation of cognitive behavioural programmes or the possible changing relationships between correctional professionals and prisoners. I

became interested in exploring the instructors' work trajectories, motivations, practices, sentiments and self-understanding in order to discuss whether we could observe a tension between older and newer rehabilitative ideals in their practices and self-understanding. Using the narratives and practices as a point of departure, it became possible to tease out and point to the wider implications of the tensions between neoliberal rehabilitation and the penal-welfare state. The first sub-question thus asks: *How do cognitive behavioural programmes affect and transform the instructors' self-perceptions, work-trajectories and their understanding of the programmatic goals?*

After the analysis of the instructors' practices, it became clear that a central point of analytical interest to me was the participants' reception of the programmes. This interest resulted in an attempt to analyse the understanding, interpretation and negotiation of violence and choice that is embedded in the programmes, particularly in Anger Management. There seemed to be an insurmountable divide between the instructors' cognitive-psychological understandings of violence, and the participants' which was grounded in social and contextual explanations. I thus seek to investigate how this tension results in ongoing clashes of horizons between the two parties and how a rational choice model of behaviour potentially fails to take the context and sociality of violence and choice into account. My analytical interest in these themes led to the second sub-question: *How is criminality explained and rationality and choice understood, negotiated and interpreted in the cognitive behavioural programmes?*

When analysing the participants' social, contextual and structural explanations for their behaviour, as laid out above, it became clear that respect and honour were central and important concepts or values to them. I was interested in exploring these moral concepts and situating them in the subcultural context to which they seemed to belong. However, the participants' expressions of the value of honour and respect seemed to be interpreted as 'cognitive distortions' by the instructors. While these concepts are important to the participants and thus influence the lessons, they also seem to obstruct the programmatic goals. These observations resulted in the third sub-question: *How do the participants' subcultural belonging influence the working of the programmes?*

The obstruction and interruption of lessons has been a continual theme in my field notes and interviews. Some of these interruptions present themselves as humorous interactions between the participants and, in some cases, between the participants and the instructors. It surprised me that humour seemed to saturate the lessons, and I became interested in the uses and abuses of humour and, in particular, how humour was a tool for boundary-making between the participants and, though more rarely, the creation of positive relationships between the participants and the instructors. This interest resulted in the fourth sub-question: *How does humour saturate the lessons and what uses does humour have in the programmes?*

The above analytical themes and research questions serve as the analytical framework for this dissertation and as such they have guided the theoretical framework as well.

## STRUCTURE

The introductory frame of this dissertation is structured as follows. In the following chapter, **Chapter 2**, I will present the theoretical framework for the dissertation, and supplementary analytical concepts of importance to this dissertation. The format of the articles does not allow for detailed explanations of theories, and for this reason the broader theoretical inspiration of the articles are presented here. **Chapter 3** describes the present-day Danish Prison Service and its rehabilitative ideals, and situates these in a historical context. This chapter thus provides a contextual frame for this dissertation. **Chapter 4** presents the origins of cognitive behavioural programmes internationally as well as in the Danish context. Here, the Cognitive Skills and Anger Management programmes are described, as well as the selection and screening of instructors and participants. In **Chapter 5**, I present previous Anglophone and Scandinavian research on cognitive behavioural programmes. This research is divided into three subgroups; research that asks whether the programmes *work*, research that asks how the programmes are *experienced*, and lastly, a scholarship that asks how we can or should *understand* this phenomenon in relation to overall societal trends and transformations. **Chapter 6** introduces the methodology and methods. The methods, which were mainly ethnographic fieldwork and qualitative interviews, will be presented and discussed, together with ethical considerations that arose throughout the research process, and the ways in which the data were analysed. Finally, **Chapter 7** summarizes, concludes and discusses the core findings of the dissertation.

The four articles are presented in the Appendices of this dissertation. **Appendix 1** presents the first empirical study in which I explore the practices and self-understanding of the instructors, who are, I argue, caught between soft power and neoliberal punitiveness. The second empirical study, **Appendix 2**, explores how violence is understood and interpreted in Anger Management. As will be clear, the participants' and instructors' perspectives, understandings and rationales about violence diverge in significant ways. These discrepancies, and the participants' norms for masculine respect, result in ongoing clashes of horizons, and struggles in which the rationality of violence is at play. The third empirical study, **Appendix 3**, focuses on perceptions of honour and respect in cognitive behavioural programmes. The study elucidates how, by attempting to create accountable and rational actors who can self-manage in an efficient manner, the therapeutic ethos neglects participants' contextualized conceptions of their lives. The expression of moral values such as honour and respect are deemed to be an example of a cognitive distortion which the instructors seek to modify into efficient and 'correct' thinking styles. The fourth empirical study, **Appendix 4**, illustrates the function of humour in



cognitive behavioural programmes in particular, and in prison-based rehabilitation more broadly. I show how humorous interactions and jocular stories sometimes serve as a lubricant and a tool for nurturing positive relationships between the instructors and the participants, but that they also function as disruptions and boundary-making for the participants. To that end humour becomes a medium and a tool for prisoners to preserve their autonomy and dignity when faced with the infantilizing nature of the programme curriculum. **Appendix 5** is a translation of article number two into English and **Appendices 6, 7 and 8** are interview guides.

## CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The following should be seen as an overarching meta-theoretical framework that corresponds to the analytic aspects of the different articles. The format of the articles does not allow for detailed explanations of theories, and for this reason the broader theoretical inspiration of the articles often remains implicit. Two theoretical frameworks are needed in this dissertation, namely a broad explanatory framework that considers the larger societal changes, trends, and formations, and a meso-level framework that is able to grasp and explain the participants' reception of cognitive behavioural programmes. I draw on theories of *social control*, *punitiveness discipline* and *governmentality* in the following. The relevance of these concepts is teased out afterwards, and I also point out some problems. While it is important to situate the programmes in larger societal developments, they are applied in specific contexts, prisons, which has consequences for the way in which they are received. In order to analyse the context for, and the reception of, the cognitive behavioural programmes, I draw on three supplementary concepts below: *cultures of prisons*, *subcultural capital*, and *resistance or friction*. These concepts can help to understand the context in which the programmes play out, while the cultures upon which prisoners draw and in which they navigate can help shed light on the way the programmes are received. For instance, prisoners' efforts to 'maintain autonomy and self-esteem ... [are] often reactions to, or coping mechanisms for dealing with, the prison environment' (Brown and Clare 2005:59). The concept of friction is beneficial because it can shed light on individuals' actions that render power incomplete (Rubin 2015). Friction illustrates the many ways in which participants reject the programmatic goals and attach value to their own self-perceptions and understandings of 'proper' behaviour.

### SOCIAL CONTROL AND PUNITIVENESS

Foucault's genealogies of the mentalities of government that arose in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries – and the rationalities and technologies that shaped our present – have influenced prisons scholars as well as the broader social sciences immensely (Garland 1997:195).<sup>6</sup> Foucault describes how a central feature of modern prisons was that they replaced psychical punishment. In the short time span between 1750 and 1825 'the entire economy of punishment changed' and went

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<sup>6</sup> However, see Smith (2003:39) for a critique of Foucault's history writing and selective use of historical sources. For a more general critique, see Garland (1997:193, 194) for a critical discussion of unclear and problematic concepts in Foucault's and his followers' writing.

from public torturous punishment to a highly disciplined prison regime (Foucault 1991:7). For Foucault, society became saturated with the disciplining techniques that the prison cultivates; like surveillance and with it, normalization became one of the great instruments of power in the end of the classical age:

The art of punishment, in the régime of disciplining power, [...] brings five quite distinct operations into play [...]. The perpetual penalty that traverses all points and supervises every instant in the disciplinary institutions compares, differentiates, hierarchizes homogenizes, excludes. In short, it *normalizes*’ (Foucault 1991:182,183).

Here, a scale of disciplining techniques which unfolds across a wealth of otherwise diverse fields (e.g. poorhouses, asylums, schools, hospitals and factories) - creates simultaneously a scale of deviancy. This close-knit net across a range of societal fields also helps explain why the prison, despite its shortcomings and flaws, is such a solid institution. Prisons produce differentiated and specified types of deviance which serves to legitimize its practices despite the fact that punishment in the shape of imprisonment is inefficient; prisons do not work and do not reduce recidivism. On the contrary the conditions to which the free prisoners are subjected necessarily condemn them to recidivism because they are under the surveillance of the police and have great difficulty in obtaining a livelihood when released (Foucault 1991:265-268). Prison, in fact, produces delinquents because it ‘makes possible, even encourages, the organization of a milieu of delinquents, loyal to one another, hierarchized, ready to aid and abet any future criminal act’ (Foucault 1991:267).

In the late 1970s, Foucault moved from a focus on discipline and punishment to a focus on the government of others and the government of self. Central for Foucault is power – and its relationship to the subject. Foucault (1978) theorizes power not as something to be possessed, but as a relation. It is not held, but is ‘exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of non-egalitarian and mobile relations’ (Foucault 1978:94). Power is productive, flowing through the language we use, how we come to understand ourselves and the practices of governance (Raby 2005:160). Foucault analysed two poles of governance, namely the form of rule used by authorities to govern populations, and the self-technologies deployed by individuals to shape their own subjectivity (Garland 1997:175). Foucault is thus concerned with a particular form of power that:

[...] applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power which makes individuals subjects. There are two meanings of the word subject:

subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge (Foucault 1982:781).

Governmental power is thus not *objectifying*, but *subjectifying* because it is exercised through an active subject. Foucault analyses three types of struggles against power or subjectification; first, a struggle against domination, secondly a struggle against exploitation and lastly, a struggle against subjection and forms of subjectivity and submission. The third is of most interest in this context as it concerns struggles of power that 'ties the individual to himself and submits him to others in this way' (Foucault 1982:781).

Following Foucault, Cohen describes a dispersal of social control 'through "hundreds of tiny theatres of punishment"' where the offender is 'observed, judged, normalized' (1985:85). Cohen describes how a psychology of classification have emerged in which the 'mind, not the body, the actor, not the act becomes the judicial object. The offender is examined, assessed and normalised – his "soul" is brought before the court' (1985:194). This involves a process of professional expansion, namely the creation of new categories of deviance and social problems which defines more people as belonging to a special population. Drawing on Bottoms (1977), Stanley Cohen analyses the bifurcation of crime control:

From the foundation of the control system, a single principle has governed every form of classification, screening, selection, diagnosis, prediction, typology and policy. This is the structural principle of binary opposition: how to sort the good from the bad, the elect from the damned, the sheep from the goats, the amenable from the non-amenable, the treatable from the non-treatable, the good risks from the bad risks, the high prediction scorers from the low prediction scorers; how to know who belongs in the deep end, who in the shallow end, who is hard and who is soft (Cohen 1985:86).

Each individual in the above system represents and creates the principle of bifurcation. Cohen argues that in the 'heart of the "what works" debate and real ideology of system expansion, lies in the ideology of *classification* [...] where results 'would be better if only we could find the right match between type of offender, type of treatment method, type of treatment setting and type of professional' (Cohen 1985:182). Cohen foresaw a change in the methodology and philosophy of rehabilitation; a move away from a Freud-inspired style of rehabilitation into a style of rehabilitation resting on behavioural modification. He explained this development by highlighting the virtue of the lesser ambitions of the latter style, and its probable superior efficiency wherein 'economically feasible, quick and administratively efficient' interventions would produce 'sullen citizens, performing their duties, functioning with social skills', but without any insight (Cohen 1985:144,151). Here, there is 'no reason to view the inmate as a poor, sick

person who needed love, care, warmth or understanding', but importantly, no need for a harsh regime in its own sake. Instead, a 'scientifically managed programme of behavioural change' (Cohen 1985:144) was needed. Cohen understands the new behaviourism as 'an uneven move away from internal states to external behaviour, from causes to consequences, from individuals to categories or environments' (1985:154).

Rose (e.g. 2000; Miller & Rose 2008; Rose & Miller 1992) has restated and developed Foucault's ideas in a range of fields including crime and control. Rose is largely occupied with analyses of governing-at-a-distance, and a major topic here is neoliberalism and the way this particular type of governance shapes behaviour (Garland 1997:183). Rose argues that a governmentality approach to crime and control enables the identification of new languages of description that make certain problems thinkable and governable, thus creating new models of the individuals to be governed:

[...] the pervasive image of the perpetrator of crime is not one of the juridical subject of the rule of law, nor that of the bio-psychological subject of positivist criminology, but of the responsible subject of moral community guided – or misguided – by ethical self-steering mechanisms (Rose 2000:321).

Rose argues that cognitive behavioural programmes can be understood as a therapy of normality and that 'behavior modification, once the *bête noire* of progressives, thus becomes consonant with the liberating theologies of self assertion' (Rose 2000:241). Prisoners are thus expected to become 'subjects of responsibility, autonomy and choice' (Rose 1996 in Hannah-Moffat 2000:511). Rose (2000) has suggested that, in order to bring about this self-regulation, the allied discourses of 'choice' and 'empowerment' are consistently mobilized. As Rose sees it, the beauty of this type of empowerment is:

[...] that it appears to reject the logics of patronizing dependency that infused earlier welfare modes of expertise [...]. Autonomy is now represented in terms of personal power and the capacity to accept responsibility (Rose 2000:202).

The essential feature of this type of empowerment is to learn not to blame others but to recognize one's own collusion and flaws. In this line of reasoning the task is thus to realize one's shortcomings and to overcome them, whereafter it allegedly becomes possible to achieve responsible autonomy and personal power.

David Garland (2001:179) describes a paradigmatic change in penal fields wherein control theories have come to shaped official thinking and action. Penal welfarism, characterized as community based solutions to crime, treatment programs,

indeterminate sentences and individualized sentencing, was dominating in the Western world from the 1890s and especially after World War Two up until the 1970s (2001:28). However, a governmental style organized around economic forms of reasoning – in contrast to legal and social forms otherwise dominating most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century – has become dominant. This economic rationality relies on ‘an analytical language of risk and rewards, rationality, choice, probability, targeting and the demand for supply and opportunities’ (Garland 1997:185). Garland suggests that the governmentality literature offers a powerful framework for analysing how crime is problematized and controlled because:

It is focused upon the present, and particularly upon the shift from ‘welfarist’ to ‘neo-liberal’ politics [...]. It aims to anatomize contemporary practices, revealing the ways in which their modes of exercising power depend upon specific ways of thinking (rationalities) and specific ways of acting (technologies), as well as upon specific ways of ‘subjectifying’ individuals and governing individuals (Garland 1997:175).

Governmentality studies often aim to subject contemporary practices, for instance in relation to crime and control, to a genealogical analysis that traces their historical lineage and in effect problematizes their apparent ‘naturalness’. Nowadays, crime and delinquency are seen as problems not of deprivation, but of inadequate control (social, situational, self-control), which has led to a view of the offender as ‘more and more abstract, more and more stereotypical, more and more a projected image rather than an individuated person’ (Garland 2001:179). Neoliberalism and the governmentality of crime control have resulted in a rethinking of the dynamics of crime and punishment in pseudo-economic terms, organized around economic forms of reasoning (Garland 1997:185). This has led to a changed view of the rehabilitation of offenders:

The rehabilitation of offenders is no longer viewed as a general all-purpose prescription, but instead as a specific intervention targeted towards those individuals most likely to make cost-effective use of this expensive service. [...] If the official aim of penal-welfare was the promotion of social welfare the overriding concern today is, quite unashamedly, the efficient enhancement of social control (Garland 2001:176).

According to Garland, the prison regime characterizes the criminal subject as an entrepreneurial character, and makes a determined effort to assimilate individual prisoners by means of new ‘technologies of the self’, insisting that the individual must address his/her criminal actions and take responsibility for them. Garland further argues that:

instead of assuming that all adult individuals are ‘naturally’ capable of responsible, self-directed action and moral agency, contemporary penal regimes treat this as a problem to be remedied by procedures that actively seek to ‘subjectify’ and to ‘responsibilize’ individuals (Garland 1997:191).

In this line of reasoning, governmentality rests upon the willingness of individuals to exercise a “‘responsibilized” autonomy’. Hence, they are governed to pursue their interest and desires in ways which are socially approved and legally sanctioned (Garland 1997:180).

In order to tease out the relevance of the above theoretical perspectives for this dissertation, I will turn to Garland. He argues that a Foucauldian approach enables us to address the substances of discourses and the practical programmes they support, by carefully examining what they say, how they say it, and what makes it ‘sayable’ in the first place. Such an analysis is a critical, sociological account of contemporary practices and of how the agents, knowledges, powers and techniques are assembled into a specific apparatus that makes new ways of thinking into practical ways of acting (Garland 1997:186). Put more simply, I am inspired by Foucault’s genealogical approaches to the ‘history of the present’ and his ideas of power and subjectification. I also draw on Foucault in the fourth article, where I critically examine the limits of ‘soft power’, which does not constrain, command or suppress the individual as much as stimulate subjectification. The first article draws on Garland’s call to examine configurations in the penal field, and ‘new technologies of the self’ in present-day rehabilitation. I will draw on Rose throughout the dissertation to describe and analyse how responsible and autonomous subjects are produced and desired, but this interest is especially present in the second article. I am inspired by Cohen’s analysis of the expansion of social control and his focus upon new behaviourist modes of treating deviants.

Notwithstanding the importance of the above perspectives, and bearing in mind that all analytical frameworks are partial and cannot (and should not) explain everything, there are some problems embedded in these ideas. For instance, there is a vast difference between the behavioural methods that Cohen described and the *cognitive* behavioural methods deployed today, which have an explicit focus on the morality, thoughts and values of offenders as opposed to their behaviour alone (Robinson 2008:437). Also, Foucault has been criticized for lacking an agentic perspective, or, as Cohen (1985:10) puts it, ‘his structuralist denial of human agency’. Foucault also tends to treat resistance as a black box that is only considered at a conceptual level in relation to power (Brownlie 2004:516). Garland points to another problem embedded in the governmentality literature, namely that it has:

[...] little to say about the question of how particular personal styles come to be adopted by particular social groups [...]. The governmentality literature doesn't tell us much about who 'chooses' particular identities, and why, or about the process of 'choosing' and the limits of choice. Nor does it have anything to say about the durability of these internalized dispositions in the absence of the external rituals and processes that sanction and reinforce them (1997:198).

Garland points to the need to analyse messy implementation and possible corruption in practice. Thus, we need to study 'the pragmatics of programme-implementation and the process through which rationalities come to be realized (or not) as actual practices' if we want to understand the penal field (Garland 1997:200). Ironically, Garland (as well as Rose) has been criticized for presenting too sweeping an image of punishment and social control, where 'bulldozer' concepts such as governmentality tell us little about everyday life on prison landings (Crewe 2015). Garland has also been criticized for presenting a 'dystopia' in his version of the punitive turn (Zedner 2002).

## CULTURES OF PRISONS

Arguably, and as pointed out by Sparks and colleagues (1996 in Crewe 2009:4), no such thing as '*The Prison*' or, I may add, '*The Prison Culture*' exists. Nonetheless, 'imprisonment entails some more-or-less "intrinsic" pains, deprivations and conditions, and these factors influence the prison's culture and social organization' (Crewe 2009:4). I begin with classic studies on prisoner roles, norms and leadership, while side-stepping the fierce debates in the sociological study of prisons between proponents of the 'deprivation theory' (Sykes 1958; Sykes & Messinger 1960), in which behaviour is a reaction to the pains of imprisonment, and proponents of the 'importation theory' (Irwin 1970; Irwin & Cressey 1962) in which prisoners' pre-carceral identities and socio-demographic characteristics shape their conduct (Rubin 2015:28). In the context of current concerns, it is sufficient to argue that prisoners do 'import' street-based notions of proper conduct, while the meanings of this conduct are inseparable from the social context and culture of the prison.

Donald Clemmer's *The Prison Community* ([1940] 1958), was a pioneering book in the realm of prison research. From empirical material collected over a three-year period in an American prison, Clemmer observed a certain process through which the prisoners went in the course of their imprisonment, and he coined this *prisonization*. He defines prisonization as: 'The taking on in greater or lesser degree of the folkways, mores, customs and general culture of the penitentiary' (Clemmer 1958:299). Clemmer thus sees prisonization as a process in which the prisoners adapt to certain norms or rules of the prisoner culture (such as avoiding 'snitching', doing your 'own' time, being a 'proper' man, etc.). Even though Clemmer



described these norms or rules as fluctuating and non-universal, he nonetheless described a stable set of norms between the prisoners to which they learn to adhere. For Clemmer, prisonization does not only affect people when they are imprisoned, but reaches beyond the punishment as well, and thus affects the possibilities for rehabilitation and a life without crime when released (1958:315). Following Clemmer, Stanton Wheeler (1961) published an influential quantification of *prisonization*. Wheeler found a ‘U-curve’ in the prisonization process, according to which prisoners adhere strongly to conventional values at the beginning of their sentences, least strongly in the middle phases of their imprisonment, and strongly near the end of their sentences. Wheeler copied this study in fifteen Scandinavian prisons, but found no evidence of a U-curve there (Cline & Wheeler 1968).

Gresham Sykes’ seminal and still widely influential book *The Society of Captives* (1958) represents a structural-functional theoretical lens on imprisonment. Sykes coined five pains of imprisonment: 1) deprivation of liberty, 2) deprivation of goods and services, 3) deprivation of heterosexual relationships, 4) deprivation of autonomy, and 5) deprivation of security. Sykes argued that the pains of imprisonment ‘carry a more profound hurt as a set of threats or attacks which are directed against the very foundations of the prisoner’s being’ (Sykes 1958:79). Sykes argued that prisoners developed subcultural norms and values as resistance and protection against these pains. Sykes’ insights relate to the flow and defects of power in prison, the structure of social relationships, the problems of balance and equilibrium, and the role of dynamic security (Liebling 2015:6). Sykes also illustrated the tensions embedded in the prison culture and discussed how prisons might be superficially calm, but highly charged (Crewe 2011:484) social contexts because of the forced interactions between prisoners:

The society of prisoners [...] is not only physically compressed; it is psychologically compressed as well, since prisoners live in an enforced intimacy where each man’s behaviour is subject both to the constant scrutiny of his fellow captives and the surveillance of the custodians. It is not solitude that plagues the prisoner but life en masse (Sykes 1958:4).

Sykes showed that the most respected prisoner in this context is he who remains loyal, generous and tough without being provocative. Sykes’s conceptualizations of ‘the pains of imprisonment’ have shed light on a dialectical relationship between conditions and culture in the context of imprisonment (Young 2011:85) and continue to inspire prisons scholars (e.g. Crewe 2011; Shammas 2014).

Stanley Cohen and Laurie Taylor authored the classic book *Psychological Survival – The Experience of Long-Term Imprisonment* (1972:58) on a longitudinal study of the psychological reactions of a small group of prisoners in a high-security environment in the United Kingdom. Their interest lies in ‘how, under extreme

conditions, people cope with universes changing, machineries being sabotaged and pictures being blurred or wholly obliterated'. Cohen and Taylor's work could be seen as a critical response to otherwise functionalistic theories of the inner life of prisons because they 'stress the conscious, creative nature of the subculture rather than seeing it simply as a set of prescriptions or a network of roles' (Cohen & Taylor 1972:57). Cohen and Taylor (1972:72) argue that in prison 'there is little role segregation, little opportunity for the presentation of different selves in different contexts', which carries profound implications for sociality in prison. Despite beliefs to the contrary about highly controlled maximum-security wings, Cohen and Taylor were able to identify five distinct forms of prisoner resistance, namely; 1) self-protection, 2) campaigning, 3) escaping (or talking about escaping), 4) striking and 5) confronting. Self-protection is of particular interest to me as it encompasses the ways 'the inmate beats off the unfavourable definitions offered to him' (Cohen & Taylor 1972:135). The concept of self-protection mirrors Goffman's (1961) ideas on the 'secondary adjustments' which inmates in 'total institutions' deploy in order to protect a sense of self which is 'systematically, if often unintentionally, mortified' (Goffman 1961:23). The inmates deploy an informal economy of behaviour that does not directly challenge the staff, but grants access to forbidden goods or allowed goods by forbidden means. Secondary adjustments are thus meaningful attempts to fight off contradicting or not corresponding institutional selves in order to preserve previous self-conceptions.

As the reader will notice, there is a time gap between the publication of the classics and the present day. Wacquant (2002a:385) has described how, just when it was most needed because of the unprecedented rise in incarceration rates, prison ethnography went into an eclipse. In 2009, Ben Crewe revived and contributed to prison ethnography with his study of *The Prisoner Society*, based upon fieldwork in a medium-security English prison. Crewe (2009:3) examines *power* and *adaption* in this specific context. Crewe examines how power is deployed by the institution and how it is experienced by the prisoners, but he does not assume that the prisoners are rendered docile despite the potency of power. Instead he points to a 'struggle by the one side for order and compliance and by the other for autonomy, influence and self-assertion' (Crewe 2009:7). Thus, he investigates the adaptation of prisoners, and how their behaviour is shaped by both the institution and the values and orientations that they carry with them (Crewe 2009: 8). Crewe aims to investigate a particular point in time from the viewpoint of prisoners and staff, namely the 'late-modern' or 'managerial' era of prison governance, and because of this he follows recent accounts of modern penalty (Garland 2001, Pratt 2002, Wacquant 2000, 2001 in Crewe 2009:9). Crewe points to the fact that the prisoners nowadays have to participate in their own 'carceral management', something they find 'deeply oppressive'. As one prisoner explains:

In the old days, they could fuck you up with their fists. Now they can fuck you up with their pen. [...] The power of the pen is really mighty in

prison nowadays. Psychologists have taken over prisons (Prisoner in Crewe 2009:115).

I take a leap from the above studies to the Nordic context. Thomas Mathiesen's (1965) pioneering ethnographic examination of everyday life in the Ila psychiatric prison in Norway has become a classic. Drawing on Sykes (1958) and other structural-functionalist examinations of life in prison, Mathiesen points to a range of 'defences of the weak', and thus seeks to investigate the opportunities for weak groups to defend themselves in prison. Despite a widespread belief that weak or oppressed groups would show peer solidarity among themselves, Mathiesen found that this was not the case. One reason for this lack of peer solidarity can be ascribed to the special population of Ila prison, where prisoners did not sympathize or readily identify with their fellow prisoners' crimes. Mathiesen analyses how 'censoriousness' was a functional alternative to peer solidarity (1965:14). He understands censoriousness as a 'defence of the weak', a weapon against the staff's distribution of important benefits and burdens, including legitimate rewards and punishments. For instance, Mathiesen shows (1965:148) how humour is embedded in the 'defences of the weak' and may help to alleviate the pains of imprisonment. Thus, humour in prison may serve to release tensions, avoid aggression and create an easier life day-to-day. Despite the impact of this ethnography, fifty years were to pass before another ethnographic examination of everyday life in a Norwegian prison would be published, in the shape of Thomas Ugelvik's (2014) rewriting of his doctoral dissertation into the book 'Power and Resistance in Prison - Doing Time, Doing Freedom'. As the title implies, and with inspiration from Foucault, Ugelvik analyses power and resistance in a remand wing in Oslo prison. He is interested in the various ways that prisoners resist and object to being subjugated, and he examines small but significant acts of resistance such as illicit food practices and decorations of cells to make them fit better with subjective standards of what a 'home' should look and feel like. Ugelvik shows that everyday resistance in this prison should be understood as identity work for the prisoners; by 'doing' decent fatherhood, cooking a particularly sophisticated dish in the cell, resisting rules and regulations or working out in order to shape strong and 'capable' bodies, they actively tackle the challenges embedded in their predicaments as prisoners.

The culture of prisons in Denmark might be different from the culture in other penal fields because, among other reasons that will be explored in Chapter 3, there is an emphasis on positive relationships between prisoners and officers, and a strong emphasis on dynamic security. The training of Danish prison officers (which lasts three years) puts a strong emphasis on teaching the prospective officers communication, psychology and conflict resolution. The latest survey of general satisfaction<sup>7</sup> amongst Danish prisoners (Lindstad 2016:30ff) also points to a positive relationship between staff and prisoners although the survey also shows

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<sup>7</sup> The response rate was 64 per cent.

some contradictory results. According to this survey, 78 per cent of prisoners in open prisons and 71 per cent in closed prisons state that they have a positive relationship with staff in their own wings. 86 per cent of prisoners report that they have a good relationship with other prisoners and 79 per cent feels safe when they are in association areas of the prison. However, the survey also yields more bleak results. For instance over half of the prisoners in closed prisons (58 per cent) and 70 per cent of prisoners in open prisons have been threatened by fellow prisoners (Lindstad 2016:43) while 19 per cent in closed prisons have 'rarely/sometimes/often' been assaulted by staff in comparison to 10 per cent in open prisons. Most (78 per cent) of the prisoners have not reported this. 55 per cent of the prisoners across regimes disagree with the statement 'if I am assaulted by another prisoner, I will report it to staff' while 68 per cent agrees that 'if I report it, I will be called a snitch' (Lindstad 2016:43, own translation). As explored below, Minke (2012ab) and Nielsen's (2012) work point to the fact that, despite the positive characteristics of Danish prisons, they display the same 'pains' and frustrations as those elsewhere.

Danish prison ethnography has been characterized by its scarcity. However, Mathiassen (2004) has examined subjective experiences of incarceration in the Herstedvester psychiatric prison, and female prisoners' experiences of incarceration (e.g. Mathiassen 2015). Kolind and colleagues have conducted many studies of drug rehabilitation and treatment wings in Danish prisons (e.g. Kolind et al. 2015). Ulla Bondeson has studied common normative codes and prisoner argot in Sweden (1968) and across Scandinavia (1989). She draws upon Clemmer (1940) in order to discuss argot knowledge, which she argues can be an indicator of criminal socialization. Bondeson (1989) confirmed her hypothesis that there is no difference in the detrimental effects across types of prisons (minimum- or maximum-security), but that the damaging effect of prison is caused by stigmatization, alienation and the deterioration of the prisoner's life outside the prison, and drug abuse and criminality inside. Bondeson (1989) shows that prisoners with the most argot knowledge (and thereby the most 'prisonized') had higher rates of recidivism than the control group.

Much later, Linda Kjær Minke (2012a, 2012b) carried out an ethnographic study of prisonization processes in a Danish prison, and a cross-sectional quantitative survey in twelve Danish prisons. Minke found that prisoners are socialized into a prison culture that emphasizes a conflicting attitude towards officialdom and society in general. She emphasizes that this prisonization is a consequence of the imprisonment in itself and occurs in both open and closed prisons (2012b:42). She analysed how prisoners' attempts to avoid 'snitching' are a result of fear of collective punishment by the whole wing or prisoner group. However, avoiding telling the officers when one had witnessed violence, for example, resulted in an emotional 'numbing' of the prisoners (Minke 2012, see also Liem & Kunst 2013:335).

Malene Molding Nielsen (2010, 2011, 2012) has examined humour, ontological insecurity and staff–prisoner relationships in Danish prisons from an anthropological perspective. She examines prisoners’ adaptive strategies vis-à-vis institutional routines, aims and expectations, and shows that everyday life in a Danish prison is painful, uncertain and difficult to navigate. She shows how both prisoners and staff are aware of, accept and act accordingly in regards to the importance of creating respect and defending a certain position and reputation in the prisoner social hierarchy (Nielsen 2012:137). This means that while ‘penal institutional life clearly is sought to stimulate individuals to proactively take responsibility for their own development and improved moral performance, the stimulation mostly, does not imply moral or normative compliance. Prisoners rather use available stimuli as means to other ends’ such as securing a livelihood after release or establishing strong social networks inside prison in order to stay safe (Nielsen 2012:137).

While the ‘pains of imprisonment’ seems present across diverse penal fields, some of the drivers behind cognitive behavioural programmes have been quite critical of the ‘outrageous promotion of sociology and the disregard for evidence so apparent in mainstream criminology’ (Andrews & Bonta 1994:iv; Zamble & Porporino 1990). Bonta and Gendreau (1990:366) criticize classic prison studies (such as Cohen & Taylor 1972; Goffman 1961; Irwin & Cressey 1962; Sykes 1958) for their ‘methodological simplicity’ and for only studying the ‘informal organization’ of prisons and not their effects (Bonta & Gendreau 1990:348). For instance, they find that Goffman provides no evidence for the consequences of the ‘total institution’ in regards to an inmate’s self, and that Cohen and Taylor fail to provide empirical evidence for psychological or behavioural deterioration (Bonta & Gendreau 1990:348). The authors are not convinced that imprisonment is universally painful, and suggest that a ‘variety of cognitive-behavioral and/or skills training programs could assist prisoners in dealing with their experiences in the most constructive manner possible’ (1990:355). However, and as we shall see below, most prison scholars agree that imprisonment indeed entails certain ‘pains’, and that these foster specific prison cultures that may work as a strong force against cognitive behavioural programmes. As argued by Haney (who took part in the classic Stanford Prison Experiment, see Haney & Zimbardo, 1998):

Prison is itself a powerful social context that can have destructive, even criminogenic, consequences on the persons confined there. The failure to fully appreciate these negative effects is one of the unfortunate legacies of psychological individualism and the belief that, just as they would be in the freeworld, prisoners are fully autonomous free agents who are largely impervious to their surroundings (Haney 2009:161).

In this regard, 'the "normal adaptations" employed to counter the "abnormal" prison environment may have adverse effects' (Haney 2003 in Hulley et al. 2015:21).

This dissertation contributes to the above studies by examining a particular phenomenon, namely prison-based cognitive behavioural programmes. However, my examination also goes beyond the particularity of these programmes, and in the first article contributes to debates about 'late-modern' penal policies and their influence on professionals and the prison context, where I am particularly inspired by Kolind and colleagues (2015) as well as Crewe (2011). The second article draws (more or less implicitly) on all of the above studies in order to provide a framework for analysing violence and conflict in prison. The third article particularly contributes to debates about the cultures of prisons and how the subcultures of the prisoners shape and influence their experiences in the programmes. The fourth article draws on Sykes (1958), Mathiesen (1965) and Crewe (2011) in order to show how humour can be interpreted as a 'defence of the weak' and as a weapon against the pains of imprisonment and the soft power embedded in cognitive behavioural programmes. I will thus continuously, but not exclusively, draw on the above ethnographies of the culture of prison in the four articles.

## **SUBCULTURAL CAPITAL**

The lineage of subcultural theory can be traced through the Chicago School of the 1930s, which emphasized that people's behaviour is shaped by their surroundings (Priour 1994:33). Chicago was growing rapidly at that time, with a heterogeneous population and many deprived areas as a consequence. Thrasher's (1927) pioneering studies of gangs showed how youths were left to fend for themselves and thus formed gangs or street-based cultures based upon shared values. In this respect, Thrasher saw conflicting values or a lack of opportunities to obtain mainstream values as the drivers behind the formation of gangs (Priour 1994:34). However, subcultural theory was established in earnest with Albert Cohen's ([1955] 2005) book *Delinquent Boys* (Jensen 2010). Cohen argued that the middle classes defined the values to which the working classes were supposed to aspire, but that the working classes reject these values out of a sense of exclusion from them. In this perspective, deviance is seen as a meaningful attempt to solve problems faced by the group or the individual, and is thus not understood as meaningless pathology:

Status problems are problems of achieving respect in the eyes of one's fellows. [...] If we lack the characteristics of capacities which give status in terms of these criteria, we are beset by one of the most typical and yet distressing of human problems of adjustment. One solution is for individuals who share such problems to gravitate towards one another and jointly to establish new norms, new criteria of status which define as

meritorious the characteristics they *do* possess, the kinds of conduct of which they *are* capable' (Cohen [1955] 2005:55).

Departing from American classics<sup>8</sup>, the Birmingham School (e.g. Cohen 1972; Hall & Jefferson 1975; Willis 1978) developed British subcultural criminology in the 1970s and 1980s from a Marxist and hence antagonistic view of society. The Birmingham school understood subcultures of the working class as both resistance and cultural 'answers' or 'solutions' to class and generational problems (Jensen 2010:5). A new strand of subcultural theories known as post-subcultural studies has criticized the Birmingham school for painting too static a picture of subcultures and failing to take subjective understandings and experiences seriously (Muggleton 2010 in Jensen 2010). Stanley Cohen (1972) was also sceptical of the Birmingham school's implicit functionalistic theoretical foundation inherited from earlier American subcultural theorists. Post-subcultural studies thus suggest that cultures should be viewed as non-static; 'they are not an essence to be enacted, rather they are heterogeneous, they blur, change, cross boundaries and hybridize' (Young 2011:86). However, soon a 'critique of critiques' emerged and the postmodern post-subcultural studies were criticized for neglecting issues of power and structural inequality in their analyses (Jensen 2010:7). More recent developments of subcultural theory, especially in relation to subcultural capital, are examined below.

The concept of subcultural capital latches onto the previous concept of the culture of prison, but also expands this by shedding light on the participants' reception of and resistance to cognitive behavioural programmes. Central features of subcultural theory are introduced in order to grasp some of the defining values in the culture of prison and how some of these resemble those of the subcultures outside prison, in order to analyse how they influence prisoners' reception of cognitive behavioural programmes. As an example, standing up for yourself rather than backing down when a fight is inevitable, whether the fight is then lost or won, avoids an instant loss of credibility and could be seen as a reproduction of masculine credibility from the streets (Crewe 2009:251). The cognitive behavioural programmes draw on rational choice theory that suggests that crime occurs because of choice, the availability of opportunity to commit crimes, and low levels of social (and self) control. Young (2012:105) calls this 'a desperately thin narrative, a rationality of choice where intensity of motivation, feelings of humiliation, anger and rage – as well as love and solidarity – are foresworn'. By treating poverty, for example, as an

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<sup>8</sup> In a development of the Chicago School's ideas, Merton (1938) draws upon Durkheim's theory of criminality as a result of anomie; the discrepancy between means and goals in an American society stratified by class and social background (see also Cloward & Ohlin 1960). New deviance and labelling theories emerged in the 1950s and 1960s in which subcultural theory gave meaning to deviant behaviour and was supplemented by the radical phenomenological tradition of Becker, Kitsuse and Lemert backed by Berger and Luckmann (Young 2012:104).

act of exclusion and the ultimate humiliation in an affluent society, cultural criminology stand in contrast to the theoretical framework of rational choice theory, which promotes a narrative in which people simply take the available opportunities to acquire desirable goods.

Cultural capital constitutes the embodied dispositions, objectified resources, and institutionalized qualifications that produce success in legitimate culture (Bourdieu 1986 in Shamma & Sandberg 2016). Thornton (1995) developed the concept of *subcultural* capital to capture the competencies and resources mobilized by participants in the dance club scene of the 1990s. I draw on Sandberg's (2008) definition of street capital as the cultural capital of street culture: the skills, competencies, and bodily postures that produce success there (Shamma & Sandberg 2016:206). Street capital is thus a complex set of resources and dispositions that allow successful manoeuvring in the street culture. In an attempt to bring Bourdieu's concept of the field into play in criminology, Shamma and Sandberg (2016:196) developed the concept of the '*street field*, an arena that contains criminal deviance and street culture as its focal points' with 'a set of particular competencies, values, and norms that come to be valued'. People do not pass through the street field unchanged: they are shaped and modified by it. Here, Shamma and Sandberg draw on Bourdieu's definition of habitus and Wacquant's (2002b:1493) notion of 'the relatively permanent and sometimes unconscious dispositions of individuals in the street economy that is at once valorized and produced by time spent in the field'(Shamma & Sandberg 2016:205). This has important implications for members of the street field who attempt to 'go straight', because 'there may be a mismatch between, on the one hand, field-specific bodily stances and modes of cognition and, on the other hand, expectations they encounter beyond the field' (Shamma & Sandberg 2016:205). The authors point to three types of street capital, namely *dispositional* (uses and restraints from violence and drugs, and a shared notion of what crimes are seen as legitimate), *objectified* (e.g. material objects, commodities, weapons, paraphernalia, and tattoos that are seen as belonging to and as signs of success in the field) and lastly *institutionalized* (recognition by official agencies as people set apart from a world of legitimacy that includes criminal records, imprisonment, etc.) (Shamma & Sandberg 2016:206). Drawing on Bourdieu (1986), Shamma and Sandberg defines street social capital as the 'street version' of what Bourdieu understands 'as a measure of the beneficial aggregate effects produced by relations to family, friends, and acquaintances' (Bourdieu 1986).

Importantly, street social capital is devalorized in broader social space. An investment in street social capital is simultaneously a disinvestment in honorable and valuable social networks in broader social space. For instance, street social capital may promote one's chances of carrying out a successful burglary but it comes at the expense of investments in the



kind of social capital that is helpful in other parts of society (Shammas & Sandberg 2016:206).

In essence, street capital unfolds in a specific context shared by social agents and draws upon rational and meaningful behaviour shared by the subculture. Thus, ‘subcultural responses are jointly elaborated solutions to collectively experienced problems’ (Young 2011:87). Participants in street fields draw on different resources: ‘the *savoir faire* of the street world – knowing how to deal coolly with people, how to move, look, act, dress – is a form of capital, not a form middle-class people would respect, but capital that can nonetheless be cashed in’ (Anderson 1999:134). While subcultures can transform stigma into pride, humiliation into resistance, and adversity into success, subcultures can also trap ‘lads’ into working-class jobs (Willis 1978), or both free and imprison young Puerto Rican men in a search for respect (Bourgois 2003). Subcultural capital can also help to shed light on the many negotiations between participants and instructors in cognitive behavioural programmes and help to explain the friction between the problem definitions of the two parties. In order to grasp these clashes of horizons, I will briefly introduce the concept of resistance and friction below.

## RESISTANCE OR FRICTION

Departing from Foucault’s (1978:95) thesis ‘where there is power, there is resistance’, there is a rich scholarship which examines the relationship between agency and structure within confinement<sup>9</sup> and analyses prisoners’ disruptive actions as *resistance* (e.g. Bosworth & Carrabine 2001; Crewe 2009; Ugelvik 2011, 2014). In particular, prisoners’ agentic acts that frustrate the prison’s rules, goals, or functions have been analysed, as well as the small, hidden and individually performed everyday practices of resistance or friction. Such rule-violating behaviour is important for prisoners in maintaining a sense of autonomy, identity and self-respect despite their subordination (Mjåland 2015:782). Scott (1990) argues that acts and practices that are perceived as offensive and that represent ‘slights to human dignity’ (1990:7) provide particularly fertile soil for the development of resistant and subversive practices.

Notwithstanding the importance of the studies above, resistance may not be the best term to capture the participants’ non-subversive actions. Rubin (2015) argues that prison scholars have over- or mis-used the concept of resistance, with the result that

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<sup>9</sup> An alternative research tradition, which does not take Foucault’s work as its point of departure, has been concerned with the issue of *legitimacy* (Liebling & Arnold 2004; Mathiesen 1965; Sparks & Bottoms 1995; Tankebe & Liebling 2013). These theories suggest that the degree to which prisoners comply with institutional rules, values and expectations is contingent upon how they experience the power to which they are subjected and how they perceive its legitimacy (Mjåland 2015:782).

the exercise of agency in prison has effectively become synonymous with resistance. Rubin argues that the 'term "resistance" implies *consciously disruptive, intentionally political actions*' (2015:24), and thereby intent on the resistant prisoner's behalf. She instead makes a case for using *friction* as a fitting concept to describe reactive, creative and subversive behaviours that occur when people find themselves in highly controlled environments (2015:24). Rubin draws on archival data from the American Eastern State Penitentiary in order to identify three frictional activities (a love affair, masturbation and refusal to work). These frictional behaviours are characterized by three features: first, they are normal human behaviours that happen to take place in prison; secondly, they respond to prisoners' social and physical needs and desires rather than to their understanding of autonomy, rights or justice; and lastly, they are largely apolitical and do not intentionally challenge the prison regime (Rubin 2015:24). Rubin's arguments resonate well with some of the participants' behaviour in the cognitive behavioural programmes, for example in regard to their use of humour and their horseplay in the lessons. These jocular disruptions are not necessarily politically inspired, but, rather, they are small acts of creativity and subversion enacted as a response to being in a highly controlled environment while wishing to continue to live one's life as one wants.

In order to supplement the above perspectives on frictional behaviour and in an attempt to explain why the participants do not always seem to internalize the programmatic teachings, I will draw upon Beverley Skeggs (2004, 2011) in the following. Skeggs is sceptical about the reach of governmental power, and argues that people resist negative categorizations and attribute value to their life forms in spite of negative discourses (Skeggs 2004, 2011 in Prieur 2012). Skeggs (2011) argues that theories of the good and proper self (the governmental normative subject) rely on ideas about self-interest, investment and/or 'playing the game'. She strives to develop a different perspective on value by analysing autonomist working-class sociality. Skeggs is interested in:

those who do not have access to the dominant symbolic circuits of personhood legitimation from where they can attach dominant symbolic value to themselves; those not just denied access but positioned as the constitutive limit to proper personhood: the abject, the use-less subject who only consists of lacks and gaps, voids and deficiencies (2011:503).

Skeggs shows how working-class women in the United Kingdom try to attach value to themselves in order to fight against misrecognition and devaluation, through the performance of respectability and by reversing dominant symbolic moral values (2011:503). Skeggs' research respondents are located in different time/space vectors and use their energy in a different way from the rational, self-promoting actor presented as the governmental ideal. Thus, the working-class women 're-legitimate value practices that have been de-legitimated, entering different, nearly

always local circuits of value, and generating alternative values about “what/who matters”, “what/who counts” and what is just’(Skeggs 2011:507,508). In doing so, they promote different definitions of ‘proper’ personhood and refuse ‘the nomos of the normative’ (Skeggs 2011:507). In this context, rationality and the choices embedded therein are, in terms of both goals and means, always socially situated and normatively constructed (Young 2011:168). Previous research on working-class selves (see also Duneier 1992; Willis 1978) has thus shed light on a distinct moral code focusing on personal integrity and the quality of inter-personal relationships, and a very different form of sociability that is generated from working conditions (Skeggs 2011:507). The combination of the concept of friction and Skeggs’ ideas on how people attach value to their own sentiments and life goals is fruitful for exploring the various ways in which participants object to the programmatic goals, but also the ways in which they pay lip service in order to compete the programmes but then go on to live their lives as they see fit.

## **CHAPTER 3. THE HISTORY OF REHABILITATION IN THE DANISH PENAL FIELD**

In order to situate the following in the proper context, I will present some statistics and characteristics of the Danish penal field, as well as central aspects and phases of the Danish history of prison-based rehabilitation. Finally, I will point to some of the research that has been carried out in the realm of 'Scandinavian exceptionalism' and the critique thereof that stems from Nordic prison researchers.

Denmark has thirteen prisons, of which five are closed (maximum-security) and eight are open (minimum-security). Besides these, there are 44 remand prisons or remand wings, eleven probation departments, and seven pensions. Furthermore, the Danish Prison and Probation Service runs institutions for detained asylum seekers, with 1,477 such people admitted during 2014 (DfK 2014:6). The incarceration rate is 67 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants, with 12,500 new admissions per year. Danish prison sentences are relatively short: 59 per cent of Danish prisoners serve sentences of less than four months. The maximum capacity of the state and local prisons is 4,020 prisoners. There were 2,330 prisoners serving a sentence on a given day in December 2014, and 1,454 prisoners on remand. Of these, 161 were female prisoners and nine were young offenders under the age of eighteen. 41 per cent of the prisoners have an ethnic background other than Danish (DfK 2015; Kolind 2015:800). Denmark has traditionally had strong structural and ideological ties between the welfare state and the utility-oriented criminal justice policy (Balvig 2005:180). The Danish penal system could thus be termed penal-welfarism (Garland 1985), having traditionally sought to respond to crime with measures aimed at improving the offender and thereby striving towards his or her reformation and reintegration into society. In the modern, rationally-oriented welfare state, the general explanation for crime has been social deprivation, that is, a lack of opportunities (Balvig 2005:179). This has resulted in humane prison practices and the extensive use of so-called 'open' prisons where the regime is relatively liberal. Prisoners, ideally, serve time in penal institutions located in relative proximity to their home towns in order to facilitate the possibility of contact with their families and social networks (Nielsen 2012:136). Danish prisons are also renowned (or infamous, depending on the eye of the beholder) for conjugal visits, which are allowed throughout the prison system. This means that small rooms are available for family visits. Another feature of Danish prisons is the possibility of catering for

oneself. Throughout the prison system, one finds grocery stores and kitchens, which allow the prisoners to cook their own meals (Engbo & Smith 2012).

The history of rehabilitation in the Danish penal field has been shaped by continuous inspiration from Anglo-American penal policies from the nineteenth century onwards and the development of the welfare state in the twentieth century. The historian Peter Scharff Smith (2003) describes how the leaders of the Danish Prison Service at the beginning of the nineteenth century were keen to follow their American forerunners in prison architecture and philosophy. This led to the construction of several new Danish prisons that were inspired by the so-called Pennsylvania system in Philadelphia and the Auburn prison system. These ‘state-of-the-art’ prisons were significant and unusual precisely because they were aimed at treating offenders as opposed to just warehousing them. The objects of change in the Pennsylvania system were the *mind*, *thought* and *actor*,<sup>10</sup> as opposed to the *body*, *behaviour* and *act* of the Auburn system. Inspired by the Pennsylvania system, the Danish authorities opened Vridsløselille prison in 1859, with the telling nickname ‘the moral hospital’. Vridsløselille prison operated on the principles of intense isolation, meticulous punctuality, discipline and heavy labour, as these features were seen as essential for the improvement of the prisoners (Smith 2003:29). To further strengthen the rehabilitative ideals in the Danish prison system, especially in relation to young offenders, Nyborg State prison opened in 1913 as an ‘institution of improvement’ [Forbedringshus], and in 1933 the first Danish juvenile prison, Søbysøgård, opened (Engbo & Smith 2012:68).

However, the idea of rehabilitation was introduced in earnest with the passing of the Danish Penal Code in 1930 (Balvig 2005:170). This effectively moved the aim of Danish penal policies and laws from generalized prevention to specialized prevention in the penal field (Engbo & Smith 2012:69). With this development, rehabilitation became both a means to an end (decreasing recidivism and increasing employability) and an end in itself (with hopes of improving the health, satisfaction and happiness of the individual offender) (Robinson 2008:430). This ideology resulted in a series of new measures that were ‘directed at certain groups of offenders, juveniles, mental patients, recidivists, substance abusers, etc., who were believed to be in need of special treatment aimed at preventing further offending’ (Balvig 2005:175). These measures were quite harsh, and included:

Juvenile prisons (with partly indeterminate sentences), alcohol treatment facilities (with partly indeterminate sentences), safety confinement

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<sup>10</sup> Sociologist Torsten Sellin (1993:101, quoted in Haney 2006:44) describes ‘the struggle for the individualization of penal treatment’, which focused on the inner workings of the offender rather than the nature of the offence, as ‘one of the most dramatic in the history of thought’.

(indeterminate sentences, apart from mandatory minimum sentences), confinement for psychopaths (indeterminate sentences), and special prisons (fixed sentences) (Balvig 2005:175).

Even though these measures were far from always used in actual sentences, they were seen as an essential representation of the new punishment ideology and practice. Thus in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, 50 per cent of the Danish prison population participated (or were at least supposed to participate) in treatment programmes for alcoholism, psychiatric illnesses, prostitution, etc.<sup>11</sup> (Kolind et al. 2012). The idea of punishment representing utility and rehabilitation resonated deeply with the emergence of the welfare state. It prompted an understanding of crime as a kind of disease that was curable through methods that were constantly being refined and developed by experts. This understanding was central to the criminal justice policy of the welfare state, and thrived in the general belief in social engineering after World War Two (Engbo & Smith 2012:68; Prieur 2015:258).

However, Balvig (2005:176) shows how the indeterminate sentences were increasingly debated and criticized from the 1960s onwards, because of three particular factors. First, prisoners would often serve much more time with an indeterminate sentence than a fixed sentence, even for rather petty crimes. Some offenders were held in 'psychopath custody' for years because they were classified by psychiatric experts as being at high risk of recidivism. Second, the length of punishment did not necessarily correspond with the crime committed, but was more likely to be a result of predictions/evaluations/judgments made by psychiatric experts regarding the possible future criminality of the offender. Third, and most importantly, evaluations of the indeterminate sentences showed that they did not lead to lower recidivism rates. This critique was expanded to encompass the idea of imprisonment itself. Prisons were soon seen as 'crime schools rather than reformatory institutions' (Balvig 2005:176), and for this reason it became difficult to justify imprisonment. In 1967, a former Director General of the Danish Prison and Probation service, Lars Nordskov Nielsen, introduced a process of 'normalization'<sup>12</sup> according to which 'using incarceration as punishment means that

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<sup>11</sup> The Danish welfare state is also infamous for its 'progressive' handling of certain groups. With the passing of the Social Reform Act in 1933, the Danish social service [Forsorgen] took over the responsibility for a whole range of people including the mentally ill, the mentally handicapped, foster children etc. This led to a whole range of what now appears to be inhuman and degrading treatment, such as an excessive use of lobotomies, forced sterilization, harsh methods of treating the mentally ill, children being put in foster care in dire conditions, and the placement of 'anti-social' mentally handicapped people on remote Danish islands (Kragh et al. 2015).

<sup>12</sup> 'Normalization' should not be understood in the Foucauldian sense here, but rather as the aim to make sure 'life behind bars reflects life outside to as great extent as possible' (Nowak 2009:2).

it is the deprivation of freedom itself that constitutes the punishment' (Balvig 2005:178). Thus, all measures and hindrances that were not a necessary part of depriving prisoners of their freedom were to be removed, in order to make life on the inside resemble life on the outside as much as possible (Balvig 2005:178). 'Normalization' replaced 'rehabilitation' as the core content of incarceration, and the incarceration rates went down, with the 2,747 prisoners in 1977 representing the lowest level since World War Two (Balvig 2005:178).

Although the incarceration rates continued to drop, they did not reach the low level that experts anticipated, and they then began to rise again. In fact, Balvig (2005) is astonished about the developments during the late 1990s and the early years of the twenty-first century in the Danish penal field, and writes that 'given the strong structural and ideological ties between the welfare state and the utility-oriented criminal justice policy, it is hard to fathom the short time it took for things to change radically' (Balvig 2005:180). He shows how punitive trends internationally during the 1980s and 1990s influenced Danish politicians and policy-makers, resulting in harsher punishment, 'law and order' rhetoric and a move away from the welfare-oriented penal policies of earlier days. Corresponding to international trends, the increased length of sentences, harsher punishments and punitive public debate did not reflect increasing crime rates. On the contrary, Danish crime rates have been fairly stable or have even fallen since the 1980s (Balvig 2005:170). Besides this rise in punitive measures, there has been a paradigmatic change regarding the governance of daily life in prison (Philip 2006 in Engbo & Smith 2012:64). For example, there has been an unprecedented tendency for Danish politicians to get involved with the practicalities of prison life, regarding such matters as the weightlifting materials that prisoners are allowed to have, and, most recently, discussions have arisen over the control of and punishment for the use of mobile phones in Danish prisons<sup>13</sup> (Engbo & Smith 2012:64).

Despite the changes discussed above, the idea of rehabilitation has never been abandoned in Denmark. Corresponding to changes during the 1990s in the Danish welfare state, in which economic thinking and New Public Management began to influence policy developments, the Danish prison service also began to manage, monitor and evaluate its services in order to judge their effectiveness and to estimate their economic costs (Kolind et al. 2012:555). One of the consequences of this was the launch of an accreditation panel of six external experts in 2004. This panel is charged with evaluating and streamlining all prison drug treatment and some of the cognitive behavioural treatment programmes (Kolind et al. 2012:556). As approximately 55-60 per cent of Danish prisoners are defined as 'drug abusers' (Kramp et al. 2001), drug treatment is also widely used in the Danish prison system,

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<sup>13</sup>[http://politiken.dk/indland/fokus\\_danmark/fokus\\_terror/ECE3100228/kriminalforsorgsforeningen-straf-for-mobiler-er-hul-i-hovedet/](http://politiken.dk/indland/fokus_danmark/fokus_terror/ECE3100228/kriminalforsorgsforeningen-straf-for-mobiler-er-hul-i-hovedet/)

which 'operates drug treatment wings, individual counselling, cannabis and cocaine treatment, substitution treatment, drug-free wings, detoxification, post treatment and motivational programmes'<sup>14</sup> (Kolind et al. 2012:547). Besides drug treatment and cognitive behavioural programmes, Danish prisoners can also choose to participate in 'Breathe Smart – Stress Management and Rehabilitation Training', which is a privately-run programme available in three different prisons and in the probation service. Breathe Smart consists of yoga classes, breathing exercises and meditation, as well as group conversations.<sup>15</sup> From 2004, a new penal policy has meant that prisoners are rewarded with an early release, that is, they only serve half their sentence, if they demonstrate that they are making a special effort (such as engaging in cognitive behavioural programmes or drug treatment) to start afresh without crime<sup>16</sup> (Nielsen 2012:139). Besides the above measures, the Danish government has introduced new forms of non-custodial sanctions and measures. For instance, in 2001 it launched a youth sanction [Ungdomssanktion], which is a two-year-long social pedagogical alternative to imprisonment for young people aged between 15 and 17 years who have committed a serious crime. Furthermore, the possibility of serving one's sentence with electronic tagging was made available in 2005. The reasoning behind this was that this type of sanction would improve resocialization, because the offenders would be able to continue their employment or education (Jensen & Prieur 2015b:156). With reference to the hope of reduced

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<sup>14</sup> Kolind and colleagues argue that prison-based drug treatment is framed as a cost-efficient solution 'meta-narrative for the solving of drug and crime problems in prisons', which results in a situation in which the 'political focus has moved away from the individual as a socially, financially and often psychologically deprived person in need of help and welfare services' (2012:555). However, the authors do not discuss the previous harsh indeterminate sentences, which were a previous result of a 'helping' welfare state.

<sup>15</sup> Breathe Smart has been evaluated with positive results. The evaluation consisted of participant observation in a five-day course and interviews with 15 participants. Several of the participants in Breathe Smart have previously been engaged in cognitive behavioural programmes (mostly Anger Management) and they feel that Breathe Smart helps them in a more efficient and long-lasting way (see Ahlmark 2015:18).

<sup>16</sup> However, a prisoner is not guaranteed early release. As an example, relating to the previous practice of granting early release after a prisoner had served two-thirds of his or her sentence, Engbo and Smith (2012:66) show how the number of prisoners who are denied early release had increased remarkably: 9 per cent of prisoners were denied early release after serving two-thirds of their sentence in 1985, 15 per cent in 1995, 21 per cent in 2000, 25 per cent in 2005 and 28 per cent in 2009.



recidivism, the government brought in mediation boards [Konfliktråd] across Denmark in 2010.<sup>17</sup>

Despite the somewhat mixed picture portrayed above, Nordic social democratic welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990) present themselves as exceptional with regard to many facets of their penal systems, including low incarceration rates. In general, the Danish prison regime is internationally renowned for being humane and fair, with a large emphasis on so-called ‘dynamic security’ in which a positive relationship between officers and prisoners is highly valued. The official aim of the Danish Prison Service is to strive continuously for a balance between, on the one hand, control and security and, on the other, support and motivation<sup>18</sup> (Smith 2003:327). The Danish Prison Service is guided by the following six principles: 1) Normalization 2) Openness 3) Responsibility 4) Security 5) Least possible intervention 6) Optimum use of resources (DfK 2014). A former Director General of the Danish Prison Service, Hans Jørgen Engbo, describes how prisoners should ideally have access to carry out their civil rights, so far as their restricted movement allows. Prisoners have a right and a duty to carry out work, educational or other activities while they are imprisoned (Minke 2012b). Furthermore, the Danish prison system has historically been keen to emphasize that visits, privileges and fair treatment should not be enforced with reference to instrumental goals such as reducing recidivism, but as rights in themselves (Engbo 1997:8). This stands in stark contrast to the prison system in the United Kingdom, for example, where a rather strict ‘incentives and earned privileges’ scheme is used as a behavioural tool according to which prisoners ‘earn’ visitation rights, for example, if they conduct themselves appropriately (Liebling 2008).

International scholars and practitioners have taken an interest in ‘Scandinavian exceptionalism’. Based on research from Finland, Sweden and Norway, John Pratt (2008a, 2008b) published his widely influential two-part article on ‘Scandinavian exceptionalism in an era of penal excess’. Pratt describes a particular ‘Nordic culture of control’ resulting in Scandinavian exceptionalism, with consistently low imprisonment rates, humane prison conditions, an emphasis on normalization and rights, plus a high level of social solidarity. The roots of this, according to Pratt, ‘are to be found in the highly egalitarian cultural values and social structures of these societies’ (2008a:120). Furthermore, Pratt sees the Nordic penal field as an example of expert-dominated policymaking and as being well insulated from the drivers of punitive excess. Penal and prison policies thus diverged sharply from the

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<sup>17</sup> Kyvsgaard (2016) has conducted an evaluation of Danish mediation boards. She has found no effect on the recidivism of offenders who participated in these.

<sup>18</sup> Following Stanley Cohen (1985:114), this balance or paradox could be seen as an example of the essence of a humanistic civilization: to exert power and to do good at the same time.

Anglo-American countries, especially after World War Two.<sup>19</sup> However, Nordic scholars have challenged Pratt's Scandinavian exceptionalism thesis. For instance, Smith (2012:48) points to the 'peculiar Scandinavian' phenomenon of solitary pre-trial confinement that is practised widely in Norway, Sweden and Denmark. In Norway, Mathiesen (2006) sees a controlling system with moral, technical and theoretical shortcomings, while Christie understood Norwegian prisons as part of a governmental system of legitimized delivery of pain (Christie 1981). Shammass (2014) describes the 'pains of uncertainty' on the Norwegian prison island Bastøy, which is otherwise internationally renowned and portrayed as a true exemplar<sup>20</sup> of Scandinavian exceptionalism. Vanessa Barker (2013:5) uses the phrase 'Janus-faced' for the Swedish penal regime: benign and mild on the one side, and intrusive, disciplining and oppressive on the other. Barker shows how only some citizens of the welfare state are granted rights, the promotion of individual well-being and protection, whereas criminal aliens, criminals and drug offenders, and 'perceived "others", particularly foreign nationals, [are] vulnerable to deprivation and exclusion'. Thomas Ugelvik and Jane Dullum (2012) have edited a volume on Scandinavian exceptionalism in which Nordic scholars challenge Pratt's (2008a) thesis. Among the many important questions they raise is one of particular interest to this dissertation, namely whether it is 'even possible to talk of a specifically Nordic penal model, bearing in mind the way prison service bureaucrats have eagerly imported policies, practices and programmes from the various Anglo-American jurisdictions over the last decades' (Dullum & Ugelvik 2012:2).

The next chapter aims to shed light on the programme implementation, and to give descriptions of Cognitive Skills and Anger Management, the screening and selection of instructors and participants, and the prisoners' motivations for, and the practical consequences for them of, participating in cognitive behavioural programmes.

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<sup>19</sup> However, in part two of the article, Pratt (2008b:275) examines changes in the incarceration rates in the aforementioned countries (rising, albeit from a low base) and he points to new penal values attached to crime as drivers behind this. Pratt points to the same mechanisms as Balvig (2005), which are outlined above, namely 'that erosions of security and egalitarianism, of homogeneity and solidarity – the foundation stones on which Scandinavian exceptionalism had been built – are producing this effect' (Pratt 2008b:277).

<sup>20</sup> As exemplified in the chef Hugh Fearnley-Whittingstall's 'Scandimania' TV show in which he visits Bastøy prison and in a series of articles in the Guardian: <http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/feb/25/norwegian-prison-inmates-treated-like-people>. However, Bastøy prison is also represented with a more disapproving undertone: <http://www.theplaidzebra.com/norways-prison-island-is-treats-inmates-like-theyre-at-a-resort/>

# CHAPTER 4. COGNITIVE BEHAVIOURAL PROGRAMMES

## THE ORIGINS OF COGNITIVE BEHAVIOURAL PROGRAMMES

Cognitive behavioural programmes are borne out of the renaissance of rehabilitation: the great story of rise and fall and rise again (Ward & Maruna 2007). The following paragraph traces the theoretical foundations of cognitive behavioural programmes and situates them in their societal and theoretical context.

The context for the emergence of cognitive behavioural programmes is embedded in the fall of rehabilitation, which began in earnest with Robert Martinson's infamous 1974 article: *What works?—Questions and answers about prison reform*. This article has become a symbol of the abandonment of incarceration and rehabilitation of offenders in the late 1970's and the beginning of the '*Nothing Works*' era. Martinson did not unequivocally state that *nothing* worked, but he did show strong scepticism about the effectiveness of prison-based rehabilitation when he wrote that 'with few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism' (1974:157). As Cohen points out, these results were not so different from those of many other evaluation studies in the criminological field, and Martinson mostly said that 'most things work just as well as each other' (Cohen 1985:178). However, the consequences of Martinson's article were wide-ranging. Both the legitimacy and the possibility of rehabilitation became seriously questioned (Robinson 1999). Thus, it became difficult to legitimize incarceration as a means to rehabilitation, and hence incarceration rates went down all over the Western world. Curiously, the lower incarceration rates were short-lived, and soon the unforeseen rise of incarceration in the United States and other Western countries began. O'Malley (1999) argues that two discernible currents emerged in this period, namely a neoliberal one and a neoconservative one. Whereas the neoliberal current in the penal field stresses individual responsibility, enterprise, accountability and efficiency, the neoconservative one stresses discipline, punishment and state authority. The friction between these currents offers some explanation for the volatile and rather unpredictable nature of penal policies, and, importantly, leaves

room for alternative forms of penal practices, such as rehabilitation<sup>21</sup> (Crewe 2009:19). Thus it was still possible to promote rehabilitation, and the treatment paradigm in many countries including the Nordic ones began to be aligned with the 'What Works' movement (Smith 2003).

Cognitive behavioural programmes were first developed in Canada. The Canadian research on the connections between cognitive skills and crime appears to originate with Gendreau and Ross (1979; Ross & Gendreau 1980), Ross and Fabiano (1985), Ross, Fabiano and Ewles (1988) and subsequently Andrews et al. (1990) and Fabiano et al. (1991). The Canadian psychologist Robert Ross was the founding father (Kendall 2011:71; Shaw & Hannah-Moffat 2011:113). With substantial backing from the Canadian Correctional Service, these efforts led to pre-packaged modules to be delivered by prison staff (Kendall 2011:71). The theoretical framework for the cognitive behavioural programmes is fairly difficult to trace. For instance, when describing the forerunner programme, Reasoning and Rehabilitation, Ross, Fabiano and Ewles (1988) base their own conceptual approach to criminality and rehabilitation on 'four decades of research literature'. However, they do not provide references to this scholarship, thus disabling anyone who is interested in reviewing this theoretical foundation for themselves. As argued by Polaschek, the underlying theoretical base of the programmes remains implicit and opaque, beyond their description as cognitive behavioural and as adhering to the Risk-Need-Responsivity model (Polaschek & Collie 2004). This latter model is underpinned by a large body of empirical support (Andrews et al 1990; Dowden & Andrews 1999; Cullen & Gendreau 2000), but it still remains difficult to trace its theoretical foundations (Ward & Maruna 2007). Despite these difficulties, I have been able to identify certain theoretical concepts and ideas that have inspired the developers of cognitive behavioural programmes; these are described below.

The Canadian programme developers were inspired by research and meta-analyses of large numbers of treatment programmes conducted from the 1960s to the 1980s in North America (Andrews, Bonta & Hoge 1990; Andrews et al. 1990; Ross, Fabiano & Ewles 1988). An example of this theoretical inspiration are the book by the North Americans Yochelson and Samenow entitled *The Criminal Personality* (1976), which have been a great inspiration to the 'What Works' movement (see

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<sup>21</sup> As laid out in the somewhat grandly titled Presidential Address to the American Society of Criminology '*The twelve people who saved rehabilitation: How the science of criminology made a difference*' by Francis Cullen (2005), a few scholars helped 'save rehabilitation'. Cullen (2005:12) warned that the alternative to rehabilitation – the embrace of punishment as the goal of corrections – was dangerous. Cullen also shows how the advocacy of new rehabilitative interventions proved to be a counterattack on control and deterrence-style programmes or boot-camps that were likely to be theoretically flawed and, in practice, ineffective.

Fox 1999b:440). Yochelson and Samenow held therapeutic group sessions for 'criminals' in which they discovered that there seemed to be certain patterns in the way the members of the group made excuses and blamed others for their criminality. The authors wanted to move away from 'psychological and sociological excuses', and preferred to assume a 'firm, directed stance based on a considerable body of knowledge about the criminal mind' (Yochelson & Samenow 1976:35). As a result of this, Yochelson and Samenow stopped treating the group members as 'sick' and instead began to work with their minds, while arguing that they 'cared more about the fabric of mind and less about causes for criminality' (1976:24). They asked the group members to write a 'phenomenological report' on their 'every thought', and thereafter they began to recognize the element of choice in criminal behaviour. They came to conclude that a focus on the personal deficiencies of the 'criminals' would be more constructive than a focus on their personal assets. Yochelson and Samenow had now established 'that a criminal act was the end product of specific thinking processes and personal characteristics' (1976:28) and that what was needed was to teach 'the criminal a new set of thinking processes as correctives to his thinking errors' (Yochelson & Samenow 1976:49). Yochelson and Samenow argue that the social sciences had failed by placing so much weight on environmental explanations for crime, and argue that 'a criminal is not a victim of circumstances' (1976:249). Instead they wish to 'fractionate the criminal's mind and then synthesize it' (1976:255). This rather mechanistic and highly individualized treatment approach does spill over into the present-day cognitive behavioural programmes, but the founders of these programmes do not completely disregard the importance of environmental factors, as we shall see below.

The present-day cognitive behavioural theoretical stance seems to represent a synthesis between three psychological theories: social learning theory, cognitive theory and behaviourism (Kendal 2002:187). The programmes are an example of the synthesis between behaviourism, as represented famously by Skinner and Pavlov with their respective developments of conditioning theory, and cognitivism, which includes subjectivity and the individual's thoughts. Eysenck was the leading figure in developing psychological behaviourism and, as such, was an inspiration to later developments in cognitive behavioural psychology (Kendall 2011). The two modes for framing, understanding and treating human behaviour and thoughts eventually fused in the 1970s to create a variety of programmes and approaches for a large number of 'behavioural problems', which are widely used in a whole range of areas (Kendall 2011:69; Wheeler 1973). As an addendum to earlier, Pavlovian stimulus-response theories, social learning theory posits both conditioning and operant principles, plus observational learning (McGuire 2006:71). The neo-behaviourist approach was firmly established with reference to criminal conduct in Ross and Fabiano's (1985) *Time to think: A cognitive model of delinquency prevention and offender rehabilitation* (McGuire 2006:73) and their subsequent development of the cognitive behavioural programme Reasoning and

Rehabilitation. Ross and Fabiano argued that, as a result of their lack of social skills, offenders lack social competence in areas of self-control, critical reasoning, cognitive style, interpersonal problem-solving, social perspective-taking, empathy, values and meta-cognition (Ross & Fabiano 1985 in Tong & Farrington 2006:5).

Don Andrews and James Bonta claim to have developed a psychology of criminal conduct in which they warn about getting 'trapped in arguments' that focus on 'unemployment, sexism or racism' (Andrews & Bonta 1998:363). In opposition to this, they have promoted their Risk-Need-Responsivity model (2003). This model was seen as an alternative to the dominance of sociological discourses in criminology that placed an emphasis on poverty, social disadvantage and community in understanding crime (Ward & Maruna 2007). Cognitive behavioural programmes build and draw upon the RNR model, and therefore it is interesting to examine its content briefly. Andrews and Bonta (2003) developed their RNR model on the basis of the claim that there is a 'general personality and social psychology of antisocial behavior' (Andrews & Bonta 2003:3) that can explain crime. Thus, their aim was to identify psychological correlates of offending. In the RNR model, *Risk* means that interventions should be organized according to the level of risk the offender poses to society, *Need* refers to the 'criminogenic' needs (e.g. pro-offending attitudes, antisocial personality, poor problem-solving skills, anger) or dynamic risks of the offender, while *Responsivity* means that the delivery of the programme should be matched to the characteristics of the offender (e.g. learning styles, motivation, etc.). This 'correctional model' of rehabilitation locates the causes of offending in individual offenders, rather than in external factors. This model is thus:

principally concerned with effecting change in offenders themselves, rather than in their social, economic or physical situation [...]. It assumes that it is possible to isolate or identify the causes of offending – whether they are related to the offender's character, morality, personality, psychological make-up or choices – and then intervene in ways which will remove those causes. In short, then, the correctional model of rehabilitation seeks to remove or 'undo' the causes of offending (Raynor & Robinson 2005:6).

The RNR model was promoted as a radical new intervention because of its promises of efficiency in identifying the risks and needs of offenders and thus the interventions that are able to address these (Andrews & Bonta 2003).

However, what was alleged to be radically new in cognitive behavioural programmes seemed to have a lot in common with the treatment and rehabilitation optimism of the past. Cohen (1985:143) argues that the 'dichotomies between mind and body, thought and behaviour, actor and act, Freudianism and behaviourism, positivism and classicism, are of course, hardly novel'. An important difference

between the rehabilitative attempts of the nineteenth century and those of the current day lies in the clear protestant ethics of the past and the values of the present<sup>22</sup> (Smith 2006). It is unclear what moral or ethical guidance or grounding, other than a firm faith in rational behaviour, the cognitive behavioural programmes have. However, Robinson (2008:435) argues that ‘the new rehabilitative interventions are characterized by a renewed interest in the moral consequences of offending’. Even though the sinner of pre-modern reformatory attempts is not re-invoked, the cognitive behavioural programmes do emphasize personal choice, responsibility and recognition of the moral implications of one’s choices (2008:438). This means there is an explicit focus on thought processes and attitudes that are seen to serve as key mediators of behaviour. As mirrored in the above, the offender is not just a passive recipient of treatment, but an active agent and a moral actor with capacity to re-evaluate past (anti-social) choices and, importantly, to make superior future (pro-social) choices. This is evident in the programme manuals, where a central question is: ‘What made you *decide* to commit current and past criminal acts? Did you consider the consequences before you *decided* to commit it?’ (Scheel & Sjöberg 2005:84, own translation & emphasis added). Criminality, and the bad choices that led to this, is portrayed here as more a ‘problem of agency than structure, of will as much as predicament’ (Young 2007:107). This means that re-moralization or ‘responsibilization’ of offenders has a central place in present-day rehabilitation. While Garland (1997:6) has emphasized how ‘rehabilitation is necessary for the protection of the public. It is future victims who are now “rescued” by rehabilitative work, rather than the offenders themselves’, this was not and perhaps still is not strictly the case in Denmark. New rehabilitative interventions have perhaps been cushioned by a strong welfare state, and it is this mesh of penal policies and the concrete practices of them that are explored in this dissertation.

## COGNITIVE BEHAVIOURAL PROGRAMMES IN DENMARK

The Canadian cognitive behavioural forerunner programme, Reasoning and Rehabilitation (Ross & Fabiano 1985), was first implemented and renamed as ‘Cognitive Skills’ in Ringe State prison and two other Danish prisons in 1994. Cognitive Skills was partly implemented as a result of the strong ties between the Danish Prison Service and the Canadian Prison Service which was run by the Dane Ole Ingstrup. One of the ‘founding fathers’ of the programme, Elizabeth Fabiano,

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<sup>22</sup> Hudson distinguishes between present-day rehabilitation and the reformation of former times when she uses the concept ‘reform’ to describe ‘the nineteenth-century development of regimes designed to effect change in individuals through educative and contemplative techniques, and [...] ‘rehabilitation’ to signify the more individualistic treatment programmes that became established during the twentieth century’. (Hudson 2003:27 in Raynor & Robinson 2005:7)

taught Danish prison officers the principles of the programme, and after this the education and supervision of instructors as well as the practical management of the cognitive behavioural programme was taken over by the Staff Training Centre of the Danish Prison and Probation Service (Philip 1996). Curiously, the decision to buy and implement Cognitive Skills does not seem to reflect the same sort of overall strategy in the Danish Prison and Probation Service as was seen in the United Kingdom, where the 'What Works' project was initiated by the Chief Inspector of Probation in 1996, leading to numerous conferences on 'What Works' and being further cemented in two seminal reports (Kemshall 2002:46; Robinson 1999:424). Instead, it seems that the implementation of Cognitive Skills was haphazard and reliant upon the close bonds between the Danish Prison Service and the Canadian Prison Service, although the programme implementation corresponds well to other changes in the Danish penal field as described previously. Cognitive Skills was accredited by an independent accreditation board of academics and practitioners, five of them Danish and one Swedish,<sup>23</sup> in 2006, after which the manual was revised in 2008 (DfK 2012).

Despite the branding of the programme as a 'brand new' approach to rehabilitation, Smith (2006:117) shows how five of its allegedly new aspects (thought processes, free will, categorizations, self-diagnosis and confessions, and the cultivation of self-control) have many parallels to past rehabilitative logic in the Danish penal field. Smith therefore argues that unreason has 'always' been treated with reason and morality, 'criminal' thoughts are replaced with 'normal' thoughts and so forth:

The prisoners have to learn to debate and reason morally. Nowadays it is not the chaplain and religion, but instead scientific psychological tools that are used in the name of improvement. An additional parallel to the past is that the cognitive treatment project almost rests upon a theory of 'a criminal man' who deviates from a not clearly defined normality as he or she lacks certain cognitive skills which manifest themselves in anti-social and criminal behaviour. The criminal shows in this respect a kind of pathological mental activity which allegedly can be cured through the right influence (Smith 2003:328, own translation).

The cognitive behavioural programmes thus seem to have landed in soil that is fertile for ideas on rehabilitation, and successfully intertwined themselves with a penal-welfarist emphasis on the needs of the offender. We continue to observe the importation and implementation of Canadian developments in the penal field, with

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<sup>23</sup> [file:///id.aau.dk/Users/laursen/Downloads/59612\\_nytfra\\_kriminal\\_0607\\_WEB.pdf](file:///id.aau.dk/Users/laursen/Downloads/59612_nytfra_kriminal_0607_WEB.pdf)



the latest being the implementation of the Risk-Need-Responsivity (RNR) tool<sup>24</sup> (Andrews & Bonta 2003) throughout the Danish Prison and Probation Service.<sup>25,26</sup> This tool connects interventions to the ‘risks’ and ‘needs’ of offenders, and thus is used to ‘match strategies to the learning styles and motivations of cases’ (Andrews, Bonta & Wormith 2006:7). The tool thus promises to assist with the categorization of offenders into risk categories, with the purpose of identifying those individuals most likely to benefit from rehabilitative interventions (Robinson 2008:434). Here, the Danish Prison and Probation Service is perhaps aligning itself with the Anglophone trends of distinguishing between ‘criminogenic’ and ‘non-criminogenic’ needs<sup>27</sup> of offenders or ‘cases’ as they are rather mechanistically termed.

After the restructuring of the Danish Prison and Probation Service in 2015, the cognitive behavioural programmes are now administered through the Department for Resocialisation. Currently, six different programmes are offered across the Prison and Probation Service, which are: Cognitive Skills [det Kognitive Færdighedsprogram], Booster (a short follow-up programme to Cognitive Skills), Anger Management, New Roads [Nye Veje], Violence Prevention

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<sup>24</sup> The Danish Prison and Probation Service uses the term LS/RNR (Level of Service/Risk-Need-Responsivity), but I have chosen to refer to RNR (or the RNR model) in this dissertation as this seems to be the most widespread name for essentially the same phenomenon.

<sup>25</sup> A supplement or addition to the cognitive behavioural programmes and the RNR tool is being developed by the Danish Prison Service’s Department for Resocialisation. The new programme is called MOVE (My life, my goals) and is a short cognitive behavioural programme intended for all newly inducted prisoners (personal communication with the Directorate of the Danish Prison Service 2015). This new generic programme mirrors efforts in other penal fields, where generic ‘life skills’ programmes (covering topics like parenting skills, controlling anger, personal hygiene, attitudes towards domestic violence, labour skills, integration into the community, etc.) have been or are intended to be implemented (Porporino, Fabiano & Robinson 1991:248, 249).

<sup>26</sup> An evaluation of the RNR tool is currently being carried out in a collaboration between the Danish Prison and Probation Service and the Danish Institute for Local and Regional Government Research (KORA). This evaluation aims to investigate whether the RNR tool leads to lower recidivism, better management of prisoner intake, and better collaboration between different parts of the Danish Prison and Probation Service and the municipalities.

<sup>27</sup> This increased classification and categorization might be useful and beneficial for prisoners if it does indeed lead to better courses, training or education. However, Michael Ignatieff (1984:11) shows the potential risks of ‘knowing’ the needs of strangers: ‘there are few presumptions in human relations more dangerous than the idea that one knows what another human being needs better than they do themselves’.

[Voldsforebyggelse], and, lastly, Strengthen and Win [Styrk og Vind] (<http://www.kriminalforsorgen.dk/Kognitive-programmer-5148.aspx>). In 2013,<sup>28</sup> 657 prisoners and probationers participated in the six different cognitive behavioural programmes offered by the Danish Prison and Probation Service, and 514 completed their programmes (DfK 2013:6). The completion rate is thus 78 per cent. Participants are said to drop out from the programmes as a result of several factors such as being transferred to other prisons, being released during a programme, and personal circumstances such as illness or a lack of motivation (DfK 2013:7). Since approximately 4,000 people were in prison and 8,000 were on probation/under surveillance in 2013, this may not seem to be a high number, but most sentences are too short for prisoners to engage in training programmes, so the coverage is actually quite high.<sup>29</sup>

The cognitive behavioural programmes Cognitive Skills and Anger Management follow a similar structure (Scheel & Sjöberg 2005; Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008):

- 1) Check-in
- 2) Summary of the previous lesson
- 3) Agenda for the day
- 4) Current lesson
- 5) Homework
- 6) Round-off
- 7) Closing
- 8) Evaluation

This structure is meant to create coherence and ensure programme integrity. Another similarity between the programmes is the optimal group sizes; there must be no fewer than four and no more than eight participants per group. However, Anger Management should ideally have between four and six participants rather than the eight for Cognitive Skills. These numbers are seen as optimal in relation to group dynamics and discussions, even though it is possible to go through an individual Anger Management programme if the instructor finds that the participant

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<sup>28</sup> As a result of the restructuring of the Danish Prison and Probation Service and the consequential reallocation of resources, there have been no recent annual statistical reports in regards to the cognitive behavioural programmes. However, it seems plausible to assume that the number of participants has gone up as a result of the training of new cognitive behavioural instructors and thus an intensification of this particular intervention (personal communication with programme consultant Ninnett Haubjerg Madsen of the Department for Resocialisation March 2016).

<sup>29</sup> By comparison, 1,689 prisoners went through some sort of cognitive behavioural programme in Norway in 2007, where there are 12,000 new admissions every year, which is a similar proportion to the Danish statistics (Ugelvik 2014).

is unable to participate in a group (DfK 2001 & DfK 2012). Both programmes put a strong emphasis on role play, thinking exercises, quizzes and displays of video sequences as ideal methods for learning social skills. However, there are differences between the two programmes in terms of both length and content, which are described in the following.

## COGNITIVE SKILLS

As described above, the Reasoning and Rehabilitation programme was developed in Canada by Elizabeth Fabiano and Robert Ross in 1985 and was bought, renamed Cognitive Skills and implemented in the Danish Prison Service in 1994 (Scheel & Sjöberg 2005). This programme consists of 38 lessons that are taught over a ten week period; the participants are taught for approximately two and a half hours per day, four days a week. Cognitive Skills is based upon a cognitive model of criminal conduct (Porporino, Fabiano & Robinson 1991:239). The general assumption of the programme is that offenders have *deficits* in their way of thinking, that they lack *social skills* and *self-control*, and that these skills can be taught later in life. The programme builds upon so-called *problem-solving steps* where the participants must acknowledge that they do in fact have a problem before they can move from one problem-solving step to another. Problem-solving is thus resolved by thinking through various ‘steps’ and engaging in a rational decision-making process in which repeated practices of self-assessment are thought of as instilling new habits of mind (Bottoms 1994; Cox 2011:601). The programme’s core aim is to change a participant’s behaviour through an acknowledgement of his/her problems, which allows for a cognitive restructuring of his/her thinking processes (Scheel & Sjöberg 2005).

Cognitive Skills consists of nine interdependent modules that are based upon a cognitive psychology model of criminal conduct and that build on each other in a progressive manner corresponding with stages in the ‘change process’ (DfK 2012:9). Cognitive Skills aims to teach offenders social skills, lateral thinking, critical thinking, values, assertiveness, negotiation skills, interpersonal skills and social perspectives (Ross, Fabiano & Ewles 1988). The following is my condensed translation of the content of the nine modules as they are described in the Cognitive Skills Manual (DfK 2012:11, 16).

- 1) **Problem-solving:** This teaches how to define the essence of a problem, how to find alternative solutions to problems, and the consequences of the alternative solutions. The participants learn how to distinguish between facts and opinions, and also how to gather information in order to be able to take a stance on a problem that has occurred. Furthermore, the

participants<sup>30</sup> and instructors discuss verbal and non-verbal communication.

- 2) **Assertive Communications:** In this module the participants and instructors discuss how to adjust social interactions in accordance with the participants' own and others' interpersonal and personal rights and norms. The aim is to increase social perceptiveness, trust and social interactional skills.
- 3) **Social skills:** The participants are trained in becoming more conscious about social aspects of life and, through gaining more social skills, to be able to navigate in social relations in a manner that leads to fewer problems.
- 4) **Conflict resolution:** The participants are taught to become more aware of what a problem really is, to be able to investigate alternatives when faced with a problem, to assess consequences and to react in a reasonable manner if faced with a conflict.
- 5) **Creative thinking:** The task here is to train one's brain to think creatively and to use one's imagination in order to avoid choosing simple solutions on impulse, which often leads to problems. The participants learn how to use seven different tools in order to take into consideration as many 'factors' as possible while learning how to be attentive to consequences and causes before they make a decision.
- 6) **Managing emotions:** This module concerns how it feels when a human begins to face a problem (the inner and outer signs). What makes us upset, and how are these feelings experienced? From this perspective, a range of different techniques are explored that can make the participants capable of handling strong feelings. The participants are given a journal in which they can keep track of the situations that lead to agitation.
- 7) **Values:** This module deals with the different ways in which people think, and their different values. Furthermore, the participants are trained in the acceptance of other people and their points of view through active listening, discussions and the cultivation of an open mind.
- 8) **Critical thinking:** The participants are taught how to assess their own thoughts and opinions critically, to assess ideas and thoughts objectively and to consider all options before they make a decision.
- 9) **Repetition of all the above skills** (DfK 2012:11,16)

These modules thus represent the core of the lessons, while each module has its own sub-goals and elements, which are taught in the course of the 38 lessons. I will

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<sup>30</sup> The manual for Cognitive Skills terms the participants 'students' or 'pupils' [eleven/elever], whereas I have chosen to use the term 'participant(s)' in order to avoid connotations with pupils in a school setting. This choice is further legitimized by the fact that the instructors also call the prisoners 'participants' rather than 'students' or 'pupils'.

not go into detail of every specific element of each module or lesson, but the above should serve as a foundation for understanding the framework for the content of the lessons in Cognitive Skills. As there are obvious differences between Cognitive Skills and Anger Management in terms of both length and content, I will describe the specificities of Anger Management in the following paragraph.

## ANGER MANAGEMENT

Anger Management was bought from HM Prison Service in 2000 and implemented in all Danish prisons, some detention/remand facilities and some centres of the Danish Probation Service. The implementation of Anger Management was part of governmental initiatives in regards to juvenile delinquents who had been convicted of a violent offence (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008:2). Since then, the target group has been increased to encompass all offenders who struggle to handle their anger. Participation in the programme is, in principle, voluntary, but there are ongoing trials in which young offenders (15-20 years) have had the possibility of being sentenced to participate in Anger Management instead of or in combination with a prison sentence. Anger Management represented 65 per cent of all cognitive behavioural programmes in 2013. A reason for this overrepresentation in comparison to the other five programmes is that Anger Management is a short intervention and is thus appropriate even for short-term prisoners or prisoners on remand. 95 per cent of the participants in Anger Management are men (DfK 2013:5). Anger Management consists of eight lessons lasting two hours; a total of 16 hours over the course of two weeks (DfK 2013:11). Because of the short length of Anger Management, it is defined as a 'pre-programme' and should preferably be combined with other cognitive behavioural programmes or other treatment (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008).

It is difficult to establish the theoretical foundation for Anger Management (Polaschek 2006:130). Neither the theoretical nor the methodological foundations for Anger Management are described by HM Prison Service by whom the programme was developed<sup>31</sup> (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008). However, Anger Management draws heavily on Novaco's (1977) theory in which anger is understood as an affective stress reaction. Anger Management also draws upon social learning theory (Bandura 1977) as a framework for promoting assertive, as opposed to aggressive, social interactions. The participants are thus taught non-verbal cues, eye contact, body language, and appropriate tone of voice (Perry 2013b:398). Furthermore, Anger Management is based upon Socratic dialogue, which in this context means that the programme manager is seen as a guide and the

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<sup>31</sup> Anger Management [Sinnemestring] is in use in Norway, but the Norwegian Prison Service could not provide the Danish administrators with any further evaluations or research regarding this programme (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008:3).

participant as a scientist. The two of them are seen as being on a joint venture in which they set out to explore the participant's thoughts and actions. The participant is thus expected to set his own standards for appropriate conduct through self-reflective analysis and assessment of the value of his thoughts and actions, with guidance from the programme instructor (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008:39). The following is a translated and condensed version of the eight modules of Anger Management as they are laid out in the manual. The lessons are structured as follows (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008:53, 54):

- 1) **Introduction to Anger Management including positive and negative aspects of anger.**
- 2) **Techniques for controlling anger (part one) and change of own behaviour:** The participants are taught the body language and body signals that commonly appear when one is angry. The participants often experience not being in control of their anger, but increased awareness of the bodily signals should increase their ability to control their anger.
- 3) **Techniques for controlling anger (part two) and change of own thoughts:** This lesson teaches knowledge of how the participants' thoughts affect their behaviour. The participants are taught self-calming exercises that they can use in any stage of a conflict or a tense situation. Thus, they will learn how to use self-calming thoughts to control their anger.
- 4) **Techniques for controlling anger (part three) – learning to control bodily arousal:** The participants are taught how to analyse their body signals when they experience anger. The aim is to make the participants aware of and able to handle undesired bodily arousal, and they are introduced to different relaxation techniques.
- 5) **Expressing emotions – assertive communication:** The participants are taught the differences between passive, aggressive and assertive behaviour and communication. They are also introduced to a concrete model (BUSS<sup>32</sup>) that can guide them in expressing anger in an assertive manner.
- 6) **How to handle criticism and insults:** The participants are taught how to distinguish between (constructive) criticism and insults, and strategies to handle such criticism and insults. Furthermore, the participants are taught how peer pressure can be a powerful factor in conflicts or tense situations, and methods to handle this peer pressure.
- 7) **Summary of previous lessons and how to handle future problems.**
- 8) **Evaluation.**

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<sup>32</sup> BUSS is short for Beskriv-Udtryk-Specificer-Slutresultat and is used as a tool for practising assertive communication in potential conflict situations. In (my) translation: Describe (describe your problem in a non-insulting way) – Express (express your feelings) – Specify (specify what you wish the other person to do) – End result (tell the other person, in a positive and non-threatening way, what positive effects his/her action would have for you).

Each module has its own subthemes, which are not described here. Even though I have not participated in a cognitive behavioural programme for female prisoners, I will briefly juxtapose the above curriculum and a programme curriculum for female prisoners because this highlights the gendered structure and content of the cognitive behavioural programmes.

### *Cognitive behavioural programmes for female prisoners*

The cognitive behavioural programme Strengthen and Win [Styrk og Vind] was developed especially for female offenders, and the programme curriculum is markedly different from those of Cognitive Skills and Anger Management. The aims in Strengthen and Win are to provide female offenders with enhanced insight, new social skills and a strengthened self-esteem, as well as to provide them with the ability to choose actions that could provide a better quality of life for them (reduction of criminality, drug or alcohol abuse, violence or other unwanted behaviour). Furthermore, the programme tries to promote an understanding of the interconnections between situations and actions so that female offenders will be able to assess the interrelations between different aspects of life – in particular with regards to alcohol/drug abuse and violence and crime. The central themes are thus:

- Identity – who am I?
- Communication
- Crime
- Change and choices
- Boundaries
- Financial matters
- Abuse and addiction
- Sexuality and love
- Children
- Mourning and loss
- Anger
- Violence
- Network and relationship
- Boundaries [sic] (<http://www.kriminalforsorgen.dk/Styrk-og-Vind-5155.aspx>)

The programme developers have tried to change the programmes to make them fit better with the needs of female prisoners, but these attempts have often portrayed women in fairly essentialized and stereotypical ways (for example, case studies were changed so that their examples featured secretaries rather than builders (Kendall 2002)). Notice how very private aspects of people's lives (sexuality, love and financial matters) are listed as central themes in Strengthen and Win. Furthermore, children are also a central theme. In contrast to this, there are no themes reflecting intimate topics such as love, sexuality or financial issues in Cognitive Skills or Anger Management. Parenthood seems to be considered not to

be as central for men as it is for women, and I often found that the instructor would change the subject if the participants talked about their children. The instructor naturally has a large say in what are relevant discussion topics in the programmes, and I will describe below how they are screened, trained and appointed as instructors.

## SELECTION AND SCREENING OF INSTRUCTORS

The cognitive behavioural instructors are prison officers<sup>33</sup> with varying degrees of experience in this profession. Cognitive Skills instructors are trained in a two-week course whereas Anger Management instructors are trained in a five-day course. Often the two groups overlap: Cognitive Skills instructors choose to educate themselves further in Anger Management, and vice versa. After the theoretical and practical course, the instructors are supervised and evaluated during their first two programme deliveries until they are finally certified as programme instructors. The teaching and ongoing supervision of the instructors is carried out by the Danish Prison Service's Department for Resocialisation, which also hosts biannual meetings for all the instructors (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008). In my research I found that the instructors' dual roles as controllers and helpers sometimes made the participants discuss the limits of confession in the lessons, because they were worried that the instructors had to report any breaches of prison rules or illegal behaviour. The instructors emphasized that they just had to report any *future* criminality and any very severe assaults or violence from the past. The instructors (and sometimes also the participants) found that their dual role was often beneficial because the instructors often knew the landings and wings in which the participants led their everyday life in prison, and the instructors said that they gained a better relationship with the participants during the programme. This was seen as beneficial to ordinary life on the landings and throughout the prison as well.

The accreditation reports and the manuals for Cognitive Skills and Anger Management highlight how the programme instructors are implicit role models for the participants. Thus, they should possess *above average* social competencies, particularly with regard to the specific social and cognitive skills that they aim to teach the participants. The reason for this selection of instructors is that 'social psychological research has found that if one, in a discrete and diplomatic manner, can make the participants behave in a way that they would not normally, then they will ascribe to themselves the same skills that people have who would normally

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<sup>33</sup> Although most of the cognitive behavioural instructors are prison officers, it is also possible for social workers, teachers, etc. employed in the Danish Prison and Probation Service to be trained in the programmes. The cognitive behavioural instructors in the Probation Service are social workers, whereas in the prisons they are most often prison officers (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008:78).



behave in an appropriate manner<sup>34</sup> (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008:29, own translation). The instructors are thus chosen on the grounds of their interpersonal and social skills, and not according to whether they have previous therapeutic or teaching experience. Perry (2013a:531) argues that ‘within the “What Works” discourse, the practitioner is viewed as a conduit through which the programme material can flow’. She describes how the ‘principles of effective practice’ (Andrews et al. 1990) underscore the need for ‘programme integrity’, stating that the programmes should always be delivered as specified in the manual; otherwise they will not reduce reconviction rates. As described above, the Department for Resocialisation monitors and evaluates sessions, and assesses instructors in relation to a variety of ‘delivery’ skills, including ‘adherence to the programme manual’. However, one of the key interests of this dissertation is the concrete practices of the instructors, so that I have not automatically assumed that they ‘do what they are told’, but rather that they, as well as the participants, adapt, negotiate and interpret the programmes according to their own personal beliefs, values and sentiments.

As also found by Perry (2013a:530) and Fox (1999a, 1999b), the instructors often invoked notions of ‘cognitive deficits’, ‘rigid thinking styles’ and egocentrism in order to describe the participants’ problems. Also, the participants’ ‘resistance’ to the programme or the instructor was often seen, when we discussed the participants in my interviews with the instructors, as the consequence of a ‘cognitive deficit’, rather than as a rational protest. This is obviously meaningful and understandable, and hardly surprising given that instructors’ training has involved an immersion in the ‘What Works’ literature and the appropriation of cognitive deficit theories. However, it is interesting to examine how the cognitive behavioural instructors who are both prison officers and trained in an egalitarian, welfare-oriented prison system such as the Danish one, adopt and implement penal policies from a very different penal context such as that of Canada, America or the United Kingdom.

## SELECTION AND SCREENING OF PARTICIPANTS

Prospective participants can either be referred to the programmes by their social workers or they can actively seek to enrol themselves. No matter how the prospective participants learn about the programme, they go through a two-hour interview, conducted by the programme instructor, in which their motivation to

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<sup>34</sup> The authors do not refer to the origins of this research, but it seems plausible that it derives from the RNR model in which Andrews and Bonta (2003) state that criminal behaviour is acquired and maintained through operant and classical conditioning and observational learning. In this framework, these mechanisms also work the other way around; offenders can learn ‘proper’ behaviour from non-offenders (Ward & Maruna 2007).

self-change<sup>35</sup> and to participate actively is assessed (Scheel & Sjöberg 2005:26ff). It is, in principle, a voluntary choice to participate in a programme, but this could be termed a 'coerced voluntarism' (Peyrot 1985), since prisoners are rewarded with an early release, after serving half their sentence, if they demonstrate that they have made a special effort to start afresh without crime (Nielsen 2012:139). Prisoners on remand who participate in Anger Management or other programmes could also have an instrumental motivation to participate in the programme in the hope of influencing their case in a positive manner. Besides the instrumental motivation to participate, the participants in my study did talk about a wish for self-change and a desire to 'work with themselves' in the interviews, but they never talked about a need or wish to be 'rehabilitated' (as also found in other studies, see Ward & Maruna 2007).

The Canadian developers of the RNR tool (Andrews & Bonta 2003) emphasize that neither offenders with a very high risk of recidivism nor offenders with a very low risk of recidivism should be accepted onto the programme (Scheel & Sjöberg 2005:18). However, until the implementation of the RNR tool in the Danish Prison and Probation Service, this has not been part of a systematized screening mechanism and it is still too early to say whether it will be. Instead of using the RNR tool, the instructors do their own screening, using a questionnaire that explores a prospective participant's risk of recidivism. The participants are screened according to the logic embedded in the prison system and the logic of the programmes, even though these blur and overlap in practice. An example is the exclusion of members of organized groups such as outlaw bikers [rockere] or gangs. These prisoners are seen as being unable to gain anything from participating in programmes, while their supposedly dominating behaviour can be disturbing for other participants. However, the instructors I followed had all had (mostly positive) experience of including members of these groups and/or running a programme consisting only of members of gangs or outlaw biker groups. Another reason for exclusion is the ethnicity of the participants. The programme manuals explicitly state the aim of not including 'an over-representation of participants with another ethnic background than Danish in any given group especially if said participants are

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<sup>35</sup> The assessment of motivation takes its departure from the '*the cycle of change*' (Prochaska, Norcross, & DiClementes 1995 in Scheel & Sjöberg 2005:23). The theory proposes that change is a dynamic motion between different states. The cycle of change depicts readiness to change as something circular, rendering readiness to change – even if not manifested in an individual, or expressed only in a subtle manner – an immanent potential (Karlsen & Villadsen 2008:349). Karlsen and Villadsen (2008:350) argue that this tool displaces the conflict from a social relation to a self-relation, and thus transforms the problem of governance to a problem of self-governance. In summary, motivational interviewing is a governmental technology, which works by making individuals acknowledge their need, or 'will' to change, by which they concomitantly assume a particular form of self-government.

very young' (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008:30). The manual for the Cognitive Skills programme states that the programme 'lacks efficiency in regards to cultures that differ much from the "Danish culture", especially if said culture is grounded in collective, family-oriented values' (Scheel & Sjöberg 2005:30). This prioritization of ethnicity is legitimized with the argument that participants with another ethnic background than Danish can 'take up a lot of space' in the groups, which can be difficult for the programme instructors to manage. I have experienced this prioritization of ethnicity in my fieldwork, where a number of instructors stated, quite bluntly, that they did not wish to include more than two 'dark' people in their programmes because of the above-mentioned criteria. Besides this screening in regards to ethnicity, there are other exclusion criteria such as mental illness, heavy drug or alcohol abuse, intellectual handicaps and 'psychopathic traits' (Scheel & Sjöberg & 2005:18f).

The origins of rehabilitation and its present status in the Danish Prison and Probation Service, as well as the programme implementation and the screening and selection of both participants and instructors, have been described above. While there is an extensive amount of quantitative research on cognitive behavioural programmes, limited qualitative research has been done, especially in a Scandinavian context. The following is a review of previous research in cognitive behavioural programmes.

## CHAPTER 5. PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON COGNITIVE BEHAVIOURAL PROGRAMMES

Earlier research into cognitive behavioural programmes can be divided into three different groups corresponding to the research interests and research questions. There is a large body of scholarship that asks, in an evidence-based manner, whether the programmes *work*. Second, there is a smaller research body that asks how the programmes are *experienced*, especially by the participants. Third, there is literature asking how we can or should *understand* this phenomenon in relation to overall societal trends and transformations. These three strands are presented and discussed in the following, after which I explain where this dissertation and its contribution to the previous research are situated.

### DO COGNITIVE BEHAVIOURAL PROGRAMMES WORK?

The existing effect studies of cognitive behavioural programmes are simply too numerous and also too widespread in relation to target group, programme 'brand' and geographical area to present in any detail, so therefore in the following I will present only the most influential international evaluations or meta-reviews and the few Nordic evaluations.

The 'What Works' movement argues that meta-reviews are a better method of assessing the efficiency of correctional programmes than narrative reviews or smaller evaluations (Cullen 2005:18; Lipsey & Wilson 1993, 1998; Wilson & Lipsey 2001). After conducting a narrative and quantitative meta-review of twenty distinct studies, Wilson, Bouffard and MacKenzie (2005:172) conclude that 'all higher quality studies reported positive effects favoring the cognitive-behavioral treatment program', albeit that this was 'by no means a large effect' (2005:199). Friendship, Blud, Erikson and Travers (2002) evaluated prison-based cognitive behavioural programmes in the United Kingdom using two-year reconviction rates as a measure of a programme's success. They showed a significant positive difference for 'low-medium' risk offenders (14 per cent reduction) and for 'medium-high' risk offenders (11 per cent reduction). However, one year later, researchers from the same group, Falshaw, Friendship, Travers, and Nugent (2003), found no difference between the two-year reconviction rates of a sample of 649 adult male prisoners who had participated in a cognitive behavioural programme between 1996 and 1998 and a matched control group of 1,947 adult males (Zara & Farrington 2015:25). Falshaw and colleagues suggested that this difference in effectiveness could be caused by a lower level of motivation of the instructors and

participants in comparison with those involved in the earlier programme (Falshaw et al. 2003). However, a later study by some of the same researchers, Cann, Falshaw, Nugent and Friendship (2003), also showed no significant differences between participants in cognitive behavioural programmes and the controls.

Some of the evaluations and/or meta-analytical reviews have been conducted by the developers of the Risk-Need-Responsivity model (Andrews & Bonta 2003). They conclude that programmes that adhere to all three principles can ‘anticipate a 26% reduction in the recidivism rate, those following two principles an 18% reduction, and those following only one principle a 2% reduction’ (Andrews & Bonta 2003 in Zara & Farrington 2015:13). Furthermore, the developers of the Reasoning and Rehabilitation programme (which was renamed Cognitive Skills in Denmark) conducted two early pilot studies in which they compared 22 and 40 participants with 40 and 23 unmatched controls. This study showed lower reconviction rates for programme participants over periods of 9 and 20 months (Porporino, Fabiano, & Robinson 1991; Ross, Fabiano, & Ewles 1988 in Berman 2005:87). The same authors followed up with a large randomized controlled study of 1,444 programme participants compared to 379 wait-listed controls, and showed 19.7 per cent official reconviction rates for programme participants, compared to 24.8 per cent reconvictions among the wait-listed controls. This difference was not statistically significant (Robinson 1995; Robinson & Porporino 2001 in Berman 2004:87).

Tong and Farrington (2006) did the first systematic review, using meta-analytic techniques, of the effectiveness of the Reasoning and Rehabilitation programme in reducing re-offending. Their meta-analysis of sixteen evaluations (involving 26 separate comparisons) showed, overall, a significant 14 per cent decrease in recidivism for programme participants compared with controls. The cognitive behavioural programme was effective in community and institutional settings, and for low-risk and high-risk offenders. This is an interesting and potentially problematic finding, as the Risk-Need-Responsivity model argues that high- and medium-risk offenders benefit more from treatment than low-risk offenders (Andrews & Bonta 2003). Thus, Tong and Farrington’s findings seem to contradict the RNR model. Tong and Farrington did another meta-analytical study in which they found that the Reasoning and Rehabilitation programme was effective in Canada and the United Kingdom, but not in the United States (Tong & Farrington in Zara & Farrington 2015:28). The importance of ‘programme integrity’ and ‘effective intervention’ was also found in Landenberger and Lipsey’s (2005) meta-analytical review of 58 experimental and quasi-experimental studies of the effects of cognitive behavioural therapy. They concluded that ‘the odds of not recidivating in the 12 months after intervention for individuals in the treatment group were 1.53 times as great as those for individuals in the control group’, with a decrease of 50 per cent for the most effective configurations of cognitive behavioural programmes to 25 per cent for the least effective (Landenberger & Lipsey 2005:470). They

found no difference in effectiveness between different 'brand names' of cognitive behavioural programmes.

There have been a number of Danish small-scale evaluations and Master's theses (Berger & Brauner 2009; Kyvsgaard 2014; Minke 2009; Poulsen 2012). Kyvsgaard (2014) has evaluated the trial periods mentioned above in which it has been possible for young offenders (those aged 15-20 years) to be sentenced to Anger Management instead of or in combination with a prison sentence. This evaluation showed mixed results. Kyvsgaard concludes that, in general, Anger Management seems to have a positive effect on the participants as opposed to the control group, but the results are not statistically significant (Kyvsgaard 2014:13). In a Swedish context, Berman (2004) evaluated the outcomes of the Reasoning and Rehabilitation programme for 372 male Swedish prisoners, and concluded that the programme was associated with positive short- and long-term results. More specifically, she found that 'significant differences occurred in overall 36-month reconviction rates: 48.1% for programme completers (n = 212), 60.3% for controls (n = 451) and 73.4% for dropouts (n = 64)' (Berman 2004:85, 95), but this effect was not maintained after 36 months following prison release. It is interesting that participants categorized as 'dropouts, younger and more criminally active' (Berman 2004:98) actually have a higher risk of reoffending than the control group.

Many of the meta-analytic reviews and evaluations show positive effects of cognitive behavioural programmes, but some also show no statistically significant or no positive effect (Engbo & Smith 2012:75). There are also effect-studies with mixed, contradictory, inconsistent or negative results (for a brief overview see Kendall 2011:75). A significant problem with many of the evaluations is that the follow-up periods for the studies (from 9 to 36 months) are often very short, which makes it difficult to ascertain whether the positive effects of the programmes are maintained (Mair 1995, 1997). Another 'black box' regarding the efficiency of the programmes is the oft-referenced need for 'programme integrity' or 'effective intervention' if the programmes are to be efficient, but it is not always clear how this should be interpreted,<sup>36</sup> and it seems that 'implementation issues' are too easily used as an explanation for poor outcomes (Ward & Maruna 2007).

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<sup>36</sup> Zara & Farrington (2015:2) suggest that 'programme integrity' includes: a cognitive behavioural theoretical perspective; a focus on high-risk offenders; a focus on criminogenic needs that can facilitate change in the offenders' lifestyle, thinking, and behaviour; a structured intervention with clear aims and objectives; a team of professionals trained and qualified to deliver the treatment; an organization that supports, manages and monitors the implementation of the intervention; and an evidence-based approach to evaluate the integrity of the programme.

In a Danish context, Minke (2009) has conducted a narrative evaluation of Cognitive Skills in which she draws on interview data from two Danish Master's theses (Bird 2012; Weismann 2009). Minke summarizes how some participants in Cognitive Skills find the programme beneficial and useful, but that this is not the case in a prison context where the prisoners find it difficult to communicate 'assertively' and find that they are forced to appear tough. This is also a point in Berger and Brauner's (2009) Master's thesis in which they conducted an evaluation of the effect of Cognitive Skills. They conclude that the programme does not seem to have long-term effects on recidivism, and they argue that this lack of effect is due to an 'underlying social mechanism', namely the prison context and the sociality of prisons. However, most of the above evaluations and meta-analyses do not aim to say anything about how cognitive behavioural programmes are experienced, in contrast to the studies portrayed below.

## **HOW ARE COGNITIVE BEHAVIOURAL PROGRAMMES EXPERIENCED?**

While the quantitative studies outnumber the qualitative, there is nonetheless a substantive amount of research examining the concrete workings of cognitive behavioural programmes. The following review is divided thematically into studies with an emphasis on the participants' *agency*, studies with a Foucauldian perspective on *power*, studies with a focus on *responsibilization* and lastly studies with an emphasis on the *gendered* dimensions of cognitive behavioural programmes. This division is somewhat heuristic because many of the studies overlap and discuss similar issues, but I hope that it serves as an organizing mechanism nonetheless.

Anthropologist James Waldram (2012) carried out participant observation in cognitive behavioural programmes for sexual offenders in a Canadian therapeutic prison setting. Waldram is interested in 'therapeutic pragmatics', or how the prisoners learn, accept, reject, manipulate and engage with the lessons, which is similar to my research interests. Waldram argues that the cognitive behavioural treatment illustrates a tension between, on the one hand, the prisoners' subjective experiences and agency and, on the other, a positivistic, 'science-based' therapeutic intervention on behalf of the instructors. This tension means that the participants' own world views were often dismissed as 'cognitive distortions'. Waldram also shows how the model of morality in cognitive behavioural programmes is an ideal, un-nuanced and unambiguous one in which pro-social behaviour becomes an incontestable and utopian model that it is very difficult for the prisoners to live up to. Another examination of the participants' expression of agency in a cognitive behavioural programme is found in Alexandra Cox's (2011) examination of a secure residential facility for young people in the United States. The aim of Cox's study was to 'grapple with some of the sociological puzzles about agency and structure that exist in a context which exerts an ostensibly totalizing influence over

young people's actions, yet which places strong expectations on them to govern themselves'. Cox argues that there are various 'splits' between official notions of programme compliance and the notions embodied and understood by the young people. These 'splits' are thus gaps between the instructors' programmatic goals and the young people's internalization of the goals. In opposition to this finding, Reich (2010:32) found that young men in juvenile facilities, whom he followed in and out of custody, expressed self-control in a manner that adhered to the disciplinary regime when they participated in cognitive behavioural programmes. Unfortunately, he argues, their submission to official aims results in 'consent to remaining relatively powerless within society as a whole' due to the conflicting demands for 'proper' masculinity inside and outside the juvenile facilities. As a result, the young men found it hard to navigate between the demands of the institution and the demands of the communities from which they were drawn and to which they returned.

Another strand of qualitative research in cognitive behavioural programmes uses Foucault's theories on power and governmentality and the development thereof by Rose as a theoretical lens with which to analyse how micro-level therapeutic practices craft responsible selves (Brownlie 2004; Fox 1999a, 1999b). One example of this is Kathryn Fox's work (1999a, 1999b), which investigates the 'production of forced selves' in cognitive behavioural programmes in American prisons. Fox examines the programme's rhetorical construction of prisoners as particular 'types' of beings with a particular 'criminal thinking'. This has wide-ranging consequences, namely that all personal aspects 'morals, thoughts and actions – are bound together through the rhetoric of cognitive self-change [...]. Inmates' selves – their sensibilities, actions, feelings, and values – are targets for evaluation, intervention, confession, and reconstruction' (Fox 1999a:97). Fox argues that the participants in the cognitive behavioural programmes she observed held strongly to the ideal of 'not to be a victim', a notion that was derived from their upbringing and socialization as well as the prison context (Fox 1999a:96). Importantly, Fox also shows how the prisoners must internalize or at least pay lip service to the programmatic goals in a credible way; they must not submit too easily or eagerly, but must show an authentic transformation. For example, Fox remarked to a group facilitator that some group members seemed very compliant, to which he replied 'well, you've got some guys in there who aim to please – that's their thing' (Fox 1999a:93,97). Both extreme resistance and too ready capitulation were signs of typical criminal thinking in this regard (Fox 1999b:442, 447 see also Lacombe 2008:66).

One example of the strand of studies that analyse *responsibilization* in relation to cognitive behavioural programmes is Emma Perry's (2013a) analysis of cognitive behavioural programmes for probationers in the United Kingdom. Perry (2013a:532) shows how the programme instructors continually use the phrase 'we're not trying to turn them into middle-class Guardian readers'. She argues that



this phrase reflects an aim of changing ‘offending behaviour’ rather than the personality, values, politics, class, or reading material of the individual. However, “‘offending behaviour’ cannot simply be extricated from an individual’s values, political beliefs, or newspaper of choice. Nor can it be isolated from issues of class’ (Perry 2013a:532). Perry suggests that cognitive behavioural programmes function as neoliberal regimes of governance that aim to ‘responsibilize’ offenders. Perry shows how ‘othering’ discourses relating to offenders intersect with gendered, classed and ‘raced’ social identities. Thus she argues that ‘young white, working-class masculinities were constructed within this educational environment as impulsive, irresponsible and “cognitively deficient”’ (Perry 2013a:525). Cox (2015), in a later article than that mentioned above, investigates ‘governmentality’ in an American juvenile facility, and how the young people who are governed to responsibility experience this type of governmental intervention. She shows how the young people’s narratives of complex causes of crime that go beyond a rational choice framework are deemed unacceptable. Thus, she argues, neoliberalism promotes a language of rationality, choice and individuality which pre-empts structural explanations for individual and social behaviour (Cox 2015:26,36). Laura Abrams and Charles Lea (forthcoming) use ethnographic methods in a critical examination of the underlying discourses in life skills courses for prisoners. These courses aim to assist prisoners to become ‘employable’. The authors (forthcoming: 13) identify four major themes in their data material, ‘which were all united by discourses of individual responsibility and personal change’. These themes included ‘re-examine truths and beliefs’, ‘reprogram the mind’, ‘choice is free will’, and ‘connect with a higher power’. The last discourse discusses a spiritual or religious understanding of change that is not otherwise tackled in cognitive behavioural programmes. Nonetheless these themes were focused on individual responsibility, and structural barriers to employment were thus not addressed.

A different strand of research has an emphasis on the *gendered* production of selves in correctional treatment. One example here is the work of Allison McKim (2008). She draws attention to the notion of the self in play by analysing how ‘psychological models of women’s deviance, racialized visions of motherhood, and therapeutic techniques come into tension with expectations of responsible, autonomous citizenship’(McKim 2008:304). Interestingly, McKim reports that one key aspect of treatment was ‘getting at gut-level’, which meant an emotional confession by the women. Kelly Hannah-Moffat (1999, 2000) argues that a psychologizing logic in prison-based treatment programmes obscures the role of class, race, and gender inequality. This strategy redefines needs that stem from gendered inequalities, such as domestic violence, as personal risks that the prisoners become responsible for managing. The RNR model and the consequent cognitive behavioural programmes thus subsume social conditions to ‘criminogenic needs’ that can be remedied by a change of thought and behaviour. This is an individualization of the social that has served to restrict interventions to the personal domain of individual change and thus away from social issues (Hannah-

Moffat & Shaw 1999 in Kemshall 2002:49). In the work mentioned above, Cox (2011:600, 601) describes how (young) American female offenders enter confinement through contexts that focus on notions of their pathology and dependency. Cox shows how the young women feel disconnected from the abstract programme goals designed to facilitate their autonomy. Perry (2013b), mentioned above, analyses transgressive gender performances in the cognitive behavioural programme Aggression Replacement Training (ART) for probationers in the United Kingdom. She shows how one female probationer, Michelle, is discursively constructed by the instructors as 'alpha-male' because she fails to live up to gendered stereotypes that see female offenders as fragile, caring and more emotional than male offenders. Perry (2013b:396) concludes that 'the rehabilitation of female "offenders" continues to be one of conformity to traditional "feminine" gender norms as well as a desistance from crime'.

I will draw on the above perspectives in the second, third and fourth articles, which deal with the prisoners' experiences and receptions of cognitive behavioural programmes. In the following section I examine studies of the larger implications of cognitive behavioural programmes.

## **HOW CAN WE UNDERSTAND COGNITIVE BEHAVIOURAL PROGRAMMES IN RELATION TO OVERALL SOCIETAL TRENDS AND TRANSFORMATIONS?**

A body of scholarship analyses cognitive behavioural programmes from a perspective that emphasizes personal responsibility for wrongdoing. Here strategies of responsibilization are seen as one of the dominant responses to anti-social behaviour (Kemshall 2002; Kendall 2004; Robinson 2008:438; Rose 2000). Underpinning this form of rehabilitation is 'an assumption that individuals within "free" societies are all equally socially positioned and are furthermore rational, responsible, prudent, moral and self-disciplined' (Kendall 2011:55). In this line of reasoning, cognitive behavioural programmes are thus essentially designed to reconstruct the morality of those who do not meet the expectations of these demands. Drawing on Rose (1988), Kendall argues that 'cognitive behavioural programmes lack an adequate evidence-base, but none the less have been quickly adopted as a cure-all for the problem of offending'; one reason for this is their compatibility with neoliberal rationalities (Kendall 2011:61). Offenders are dealt with by attempts either to reintegrate them through moral reconstruction or to exclude them through further punitive measures (Kendall 2011:67). Thus, the cognitive behavioural programmes fit perfectly with neoliberal governance strategies of moral reconstruction, namely the instilling of self-blame, self-control and self-surveillance, even though the programmes have been criticized for being intrusive, dehumanizing and not able to take human subjectivity into account (Kendall 2011:70).

There is also a fairly large body of scholarship using the widely influential ‘new penology’ thesis (Feeley & Simon 1992) as a backdrop for its analysis (e.g. Kemshall & Maguire 2001; O’Malley 2001, 2004). Feeley and Simon (1992:452) argue that the ‘new penology’ is ‘less concerned with responsibility, fault, moral sensibility, diagnosis, or intervention and treatment of the individual offender. Rather, it is concerned with techniques to identify, classify, and manage groupings sorted by dangerousness. The task is managerial, not transformative’. Feeley and Simon (1992:455) thus argue that the ‘new penology is neither about punishing nor about rehabilitating individuals. It is about identifying and managing unruly groups’. O’Malley argues that one key example of the ‘new penology’ is the replacement of a ‘socially oriented and explanatory criminology’ by a ‘risk oriented rational choice model’ in which social justice is replaced with an emphasis on the ‘individual responsibility of offenders’ (O’Malley 2001:89). Lacombe (2008) departs from the ‘new penology’ thesis and argues that rehabilitation of sex offenders has effectively become risk management. She draws on an ethnographic study of a cognitive behavioural programme for sex offenders and show how management of risk relies on techniques of introspection, self-discipline and reflection. The goal is thus to instil a sense of responsibility in the sex offenders and a belief that they can manage their risk of reoffending (Lacombe 2008:60). Hence, the choice to become ‘manageable’ is essentially the individuals’ own if only he learns the connection between his thoughts, behaviour, and feelings (Lacombe 2008:60). Kemshall (2002:41) argues that the dominant emphasis upon effective programmes in the probation service in the United Kingdom can be understood as ‘an example of a key mechanism of social control in advanced liberal societies’. Kemshall uses Rose’s concept of ‘responsibilization’ to examine the role of effective programmes in the re-moralization, responsibilization and inclusion of citizens. She argues that self-surveillance is achieved through the discourse of expertise (such as cognitive behavioural programmes) and ‘through the discourse of moral virtue and rational choice which the individual is encouraged to experience and operate as an autonomous form of control’ (Kemshall 2002:49). Kemshall (2002:52) concludes by arguing that these new interventions have led to ‘a subjugation of the rehabilitative and welfare ideal to an economic discourse’ of rationalization and accountability.

Following Garland (1997, 2001), Robinson (1999:427, 2008) does not see the above trends as conflicting with new rehabilitative interventions such as cognitive behavioural programmes. Actually, she views the ‘old’ (clinical, individualized, treatment-oriented) and ‘new’ (actuarial, managerial, risk-oriented) penologies as mutually supportive. In fact, Robinson (1999:427,428) describes a ‘new rehabilitationism’ (Hudson 1987) in which risk management and rehabilitation thrive; a primary principle of what works *is* risk classification, in the sense that interventions should be directed at those who pose a higher risk (see also Hannah-Moffat 1999; Hannah-Moffat & Shaw 1999, 2000). Thus, the new rehabilitative

interventions have earned their legitimacy precisely because of their contribution to the broader project of risk management:

The practice of rehabilitation is increasingly inscribed in a framework of risk rather than a framework of welfare. Offenders can only be 'treated' (in drug-abuse programmes, anger-management groups, offence-reduction programmes, etc.) to the extent that such treatment is deemed to be capable of protecting the public, reducing risk, and being more cost-effective than simple, unadorned punishment (Garland 2001:176).

Nordic researchers have also examined the cognitive behavioural programmes in relation to overall societal trends and formations. The Swedish criminologist Robert Andersson (2004) has investigated the re-emergence of the treatment idea, and argues that present-day treatment ideology has the goal of creating moralistic, responsible and reasonable citizens. Cognitive behavioural programmes stand in the forefront of this endeavour and are built upon methodological models and scientific optimism, but in a modest, specific manner; the goal is not to cure all, but to target those who are the most fit for treatment. Andersson argues that nowadays assessment of risk is fundamental to the construction of subjectivities in prison. Hence, the obvious question becomes how to reduce risk or avoid risky behaviour altogether. Furthermore, the hierarchical surveillance techniques of the old rehabilitation regime are replaced with a horizontal type of surveillance in which the participants are seen as the drivers of their own rehabilitation. Thus the aim is to make the participants see the 'obvious and crystal-clear fact that a normal person is responsible for his/her own actions' (Andersson 2004:384). Hence, the programmes seek to develop a form of self-knowledge in the participants through the confession of their faults and errors and through careful self-management. A similar line of reasoning is found in Roddy Nilsson's work (2013) in which he analyses historical developments in Swedish prison policies from the 1930s till the present day. Nilsson argues that Swedish prison policies have undergone a paradigmatic shift in which different understandings of the criminal subject push forward beliefs about individual responsibility and risk assessment. A central characteristic of the 'What Works' movement is how the '[...] discourse is overloaded by talk about scientifically evaluated and proven methods, program accreditation and evidence-based work, knowledge and practices' (Nilsson 2013:25). Furthermore, Nilsson shows how the quest for 'evidence-based' knowledge in the rehabilitative field is characterized by a strong proclivity for relying on large-scale meta-analyses. This development is closely related to an intertwining of neoliberal ideas and practices and transformations in prison policies (Nilsson 2013:32). Nilsson points to an anthropology that sees man as a rational and self-interested creature judged according to his capacity for controlling himself and for taking responsibility for his own actions.

This dissertation contributes to the above research, especially in relation to the second and third perspectives. I cannot contribute much to the question of whether the programmes work or not in an evidence-based manner, but I can possibly shed some light on some of the reasons why evaluations yield mixed results. This dissertation is thus a contribution to the many studies asking how the programmes are experienced. Here, my main contribution is to uncover frictions that arise between participants and instructors. Also, this dissertation contributes to and also expands on previous research by examining and considering the instructors', as well as the participants', perspectives and experiences. In relation to the third research area, dealing with larger societal trends and formations, my contribution is to take the participants' agency into consideration. The Foucauldian and Rose-inspired scholarship seems to lack an agentic perspective that would make it possible to analyse how the participants may or may not align themselves to the programmatic goals. The participants do not readily self-manage in an efficient manner, but on the contrary it seems that they often pay lip service in order to pass through the programmes, and then continue to live as they see fit.



# CHAPTER 6. METHODS

The soundscape of the prison is overwhelming; in fact all of my senses are bombarded. There is a sound of clinging and clanging from every corner of every locked door. I am in the official reception area of the prison where a security camera watches my every clumsy move. The prison officer in the reception area gives me shady looks – she must be able to tell what an imposter I am. Finally, the instructor, Mohammad, comes and saves me from my misery by greeting me warmly. We walk around the prison where I am introduced to many prison officers. One of them says ‘so you’re going to interview participants in Anger Management? Just be aware that many of them have deficits in their thinking styles’. With that characteristic in mind, I am introduced to the four participants and we walk towards the classroom (Field note, March 2014, closed prison).

The overall purpose of this chapter is to convey transparency in the research process, and what better way to do this than by starting with a mental picture of a novice in prison. The passage above serves as a departure point for the following descriptions of my methodology, methods, ethical considerations, description of the data analysis, and finally, a presentation of the research participants. The empirical material described below consists of:

- Ethnographic fieldwork and participant observation in one Cognitive Skills programme and three Anger Management programmes in three different prisons.
- Participant observation in a three-day educational course for cognitive behavioural programme instructors and four biannual meetings for instructors.
- Twelve semi-structured focus group and individual interviews with participants, instructors, and one programme consultant.

## METHODOLOGY

This dissertation draws upon a social constructionist framework. Following Bourdieu, the social world is socially and historically constructed; not intentionally by someone, but as a result of historical and social battles between humans. Social phenomena are thus not given, natural or inevitable, but they present themselves like they were (Prieur & Sestoft 2006:216). Ian Hacking (1999) argues that, instead of asking what social constructionism means, we should ask what the point of a

social constructionist analysis is. One main point is to raise scepticism towards the status quo. Thus, social constructions tend to argue that X need not have existed, or need not be at all; X is not determined by the nature of things, it is not inevitable (Hacking 1999:6). In this dissertation, 'X' is cognitive behavioural programmes. By asking, as I did in the introduction, what the underlying problem definitions of criminality and offenders are in these programmes and what solutions they propose, I implied that they are not determined by the nature of things. Cognitive behavioural programmes are thus not inevitable, but brought into existence or shaped by social events, forces, and history, all of which could have been different (see Hacking 1999:7). Hacking argues that any idea that is debated, assessed, applied and developed is situated in a social setting (see also Berger 1963:149). Hacking's purpose is to 'consider a kind of human behaviour that has undergone radical changes, so that we can see how human kinds are formed and molded' (1991:258). He examines the 'making and molding' of child abuse as an idea that emerged at a specific time and place and since emerging in new legislation and practices, changed many professional activities. To call child abuse an 'idea' is not to say that it is not real, but rather, to show how a 'kind' can be made and molded, how 'child abuse' and 'child abuser' denote kinds and what those kinds do to us (Hacking 1999:130). In order to relate these insights to the current analysis, I refer to the second article of this dissertation (see Appendix 2). Here, I argue that from an anthropological, constructivist stance, violence is fluid and hard to pin down. In this context, an analytical focus on how violence is attributed meaning, how it is legitimized or how attempts are made to avoid it must not be understood as a relativistic argument for the positive significance of violence. In this regard, what is 'violence' in one context does not necessarily have to be in another, and that which one person views as violence can be understood entirely differently by someone else (Laursen 2015). However, it matters how we talk about and understand violence (or criminality in general) as people are affected by the available classifications within which they can describe their own actions and make their own constrained choices (Hacking 1991:254):

Classification can change our evaluations of our personal worth, of the moral kind of person that we are. Sometimes this means that people passively accept what experts say about them, and see themselves in that light. But feedback can direct itself in many ways. We well know the rebellion of the sorted. A classification imposed from above is rearranged by the people to whom it was supposed to apply (Hacking 1999:131).

This dissertation's aim is to examine how certain problem definitions and solutions came to be; I also add to this by empirically examining how these solutions unfold in practice. I especially focus on the reception of the cognitive behavioural programmes, thus examining the 'feedback' that Hacking mentions above or the rearrangement of classifications.



One of the purposes of ethnography is to study '[...] the cultural contexts in which behaviors of interest occur [...]' (Page & Singer 2010:4). This definition is beneficial because it underscores the importance of the context for behaviour. Here, the context is the prison and all the implications for the practice of rehabilitation it carries (Mjåland 2015:84). Similar to the fact that behaviour occurs in a specific context, the ethnographer does not approach the field as a 'tabula rasa', but carries the heavy luggage of culture and preconceptions. Thus an 'ethnography of ethnography' is needed – a double awareness of the process of research (Bourdieu 2004; Geertz in Young 2011: 109). Ethnographic fieldwork directs the attention of the researcher as 'method, ideology and focus are intrinsically meshed' (Liebling 1999:149). My attention is directed towards the experiences of being a participant in or teaching in cognitive behavioural programmes. As argued by Scheper-Hughes (1984:91), ethnographers approach 'a reality that cannot be fully separated from our perceptions of it. It shifts over time and in response to our gaze. It interacts with us'. This inability to separate the researcher from the researched is somehow embedded in the oxymoron of participant observation – participating and observing –thus, being both inside and outside of the sociality (Davies & Spencer 2010). Knowledge in anthropology is reductive as it renders empirical complexity clear, but also has limited ideas about the world and is selective – knowledge has to disregard some information (Fangen 2010:251f; Hastrup 2004). However, one way of enabling the reader to judge the 'rightness' of the analyses of this dissertation is to convey the details of my fieldwork and interviews which are presented below.

## **ACCESS AND ETHNOGRAPHIC FIELDWORK**

I sought permission to conduct fieldwork and interviews in Danish prisons from the Directorate of the Danish Prison Service in June 2013, two months after this PhD project commenced. They invited me to a formal meeting, wherein the initial ideas and methods for this study were elaborated. A short while after, I was granted full permission to conduct the research as proposed. This quick approval might sound strange to some fellow prison researchers, as prison ethnography particularly in Anglo-Phone countries has been under dire conditions, and access to prisons seems almost impossible (Wacquant 2002a). However, officials' resistance towards research does not seem to be the case in the Nordic countries, where prison scholars are generally granted access surprisingly easily (see e.g. Minke 2012a:62; Ugjelvik 2014). My permission was formally granted through the Directorate of the Prison and Probation Service who forwarded my request to the Governors and Security Coordinators of the relevant prisons. I was granted permission to conduct fieldwork in both open and closed prisons. I found it potentially important to include both types of penal institutions because there are obvious differences between low security and high security prisons in Denmark in terms of restrictions of the regime, allowance to take leave, movement and free-flow, and the amount of association between prisoners. While the experience of imprisonment is contingent with the penal context (Ricciardelli et. al. 2015:509), I argue that my findings are not shaped

so much by the security regime of the prisons as by the logics embedded in the cognitive behavioural programmes across different prisons. The main differences between the different prison settings were practical; the instructors in closed prisons had to make more practical arrangements in order to make the programmes flow. This meant that they needed to carefully assess which prisoners were allowed to interact with each other and make sure that the prisoners did not move in areas of the prison that they were not allowed to be in. Another important distinction was the level of surveillance in the closed prison as opposed to the open. In one of the closed prisons, the security department had installed CCTVs in the classroom, which made the prisoners very uncomfortable in the beginning. They were confident that the prison officers were laughing while looking at the video-footages from, for example, the role-plays, while the instructor emphasized that the tapes were only watched in detail if some kind of 'trouble' were to occur.

Despite the relative ease of gaining access to the prisons, I was refused access to a particular group of participants in cognitive behavioural programmes, namely female prisoners. This confirms that even if formal access is granted, informal access from the participants in the field of study can be harder to obtain (Fangen 2010:58). My interest in the gendered experiences of participating in cognitive behavioural programmes was further sparked by an instructor saying that 'women naturally think that their problems involves and hurts other people whereas men do not' (Birthe, Cognitive Skills instructor). However, after some initial negotiation with the instructors in the open prison and in one of the maximum-security prisons that held women, I was repeatedly told that it would be too difficult for me participate. One explanation was primarily practical and due to the sheer difference in the number of female prisoners (179 female prisoners out of 4120 in total), since only 33 female prisoners participated in cognitive behavioural programmes in 2013 (DfK 2013:9). Another reason for my failure in obtaining access to conduct participant observation in programmes with female prisoners could be the fact the female prisoners tended to be protected more than males. The instructors thus talked about the women's frailty and vulnerable position which could be enforced by having an outsider participate, while they did not seem to worry about the men's psychological health in the same manner. I can obviously not tell whether this was the case in practice, as I never participated in a programme for female prisoners, but the gender specific logics and perceptions are interesting in themselves.

Stevens (2012:542) argues that it is 'impossible for any 'free world' researcher to become completely immersed in, or truly experience the realities of the prison' and suggest that prison researchers use the term 'semi-ethnographic' fieldwork as an indicator of this failure or obstacle. While I agree with Stevens that it might be impossible to truly understand the prison without actually being imprisoned, I coin my fieldwork as semi-ethnographic in the sense that I did not 'hang out' on the landings, sit in cells, or work out in the gym with the prisoners (see e.g. Crewe 2009; Ugelvik 2011). The term 'reserved participation' (Bottoms in Liebling

1999:160) or moderate participation as suggested by Spradley (1980) might be more fitting to describe my experiences in the cognitive behavioural programmes. Spradley argues that any fieldwork ‘requires the ethnographer to increase his or her awareness, to raise the level of attention, to tune in to things usually tuned out’ (Spradley 1980:56, 60), but suggests that moderate participation is a type of ethnographic fieldwork. Here, the ethnographer (tries to) strike a ‘balance between being an insider and an outsider, between participation and observation’. I navigated between participating and observing, with an overweight of observing as described in the following.

The prison-based fieldwork consisted of ‘moderate participation’ (Spradley 1980 see also Fangen 2010:74-80) in one Cognitive Skills programme and three different Anger Management programmes in one open prison and two closed prisons. In total, I conducted around 400 hours of observation in prisons and in the training, supervision and meetings of the instructors. I followed 24 participants and four instructors in total. During the participant observation, I mostly sat quiet and observed the lessons. This is similar to other researchers’ experiences of conducting participant observation in cognitive behavioural programmes (see Fox 1999a, 1999b; Waldram 2012:40). While this reserved-participation was challenging at times because I would have liked to participate more actively, Perry’s (2013b:403) experience of being placed outside of the classroom, observing lessons on a monitor seems much more challenging than mine. Depending on the instructors’ preferences, I sat either on the margins of the group, or by myself on a chair away from the participants. This placement in the room was not negotiated as I wished to respect whichever decision the instructor had made. The instructors did not wish to let me participate in the role-plays as it would ‘not have the same pedagogical effect’ (Mohammad, Anger Management instructor) if I participated. However, they invited me to participate in relaxation exercises and other types of exercises such as writing short-stories or filling out quizzes, which I happily did.

My reserved participation and the passive role that followed provided rich opportunities to write lengthy and detailed field-notes (Sanjek 1990), including many citations from the participants and the instructors’ conversations. This is otherwise quite rare in ethnographic fieldwork where researchers often have to go to the bathroom in order to write field notes (see e.g. Jensen 2007, Mjåland 2015). While my reserved participation fostered rigorous note-taking, I also paid close attention to body language throughout the lessons, especially during role-plays and other interactive exercises. Oftentimes, the flow of the lessons was disrupted by discussions between the instructors and the participants. Identifying talk which is disruptive ‘is not a straightforward task and can involve interpreting tone and visual information about interaction, as well as what is actually said’ (Brownlie 2004:524). My field notes represent these interruptions and seem quite fragmented in some places where I wrote down the discussion going from A to Z without a clear pattern. After each lesson, I would debrief with the instructors and ask them to

share their thoughts and opinions on the lesson. After leaving the prison each day, a more coherent narrative of the day was written down, followed by an analytical note on questions, peculiar observations and initial findings. These preliminary concepts, explanations, and questions served to guide the next observation. I used my field notes in systematic ways when I manually coded my observations and findings, but the field notes were also put to use in a more sensual way: as a time machine to take me back to certain interactions, feelings, smells or sounds. The field notes thus served several functions, but most importantly, they helped build an evolving analytical framework.

In some ways, my fieldwork could be coined as 'multi-sited' (Marcus 1995), at least in the literal sense of the term. Besides doing fieldwork in three different prisons, and as a supplement to the main fieldwork, I did (participant) observation in four national meetings for cognitive behavioural programme instructors from 2013-2015. Here I took part in supervision, lectures, and informal conversations about the aims and content of the programmes. Furthermore, I conducted participant observation in the education of new cognitive behavioural instructors during a three-day training course. The education of new instructors involved lectures delivered by programme consultants from the Danish Prison Service and practical exercises in which the instructors discussed their experiences with programme delivery in different prisons. The empirical material is also supplemented with notes from informal conversations with a number of other cognitive behavioural programme instructors during these meetings and training sessions. This multi-sited fieldwork and my aim to study both the participants and the instructors raised several dilemmas common in ethnographic fieldwork: the ethnographer cannot just freely choose any role or position in the field. Roles, positions and alliances are negotiated, contested, context-dependent and continuously in flux, which requires the researcher to continuously reflect on his/her role in the fieldwork (Hastrup 2004; Sandberg 2010). Perhaps this dilemma is exaggerated in prison research where two distinct positions are so juxtaposed - the position of the prison staff and the position of the prisoners. Obviously, there are different nuances within these two groups and subgroups among them, but deciding and negotiating about 'whose side to be on' (Becker 1967) are often discussed in prison research (e.g. Liebling 1999; Nilsen 2010; Ugelvik 2014). This dilemma might be more pressing in prison, but it is an often discussed theme in ethnography more broadly as a standard methodological condition:

Embedded as we are, in the field situation, and removed, as we are, from it, we find any perspective unstable. Throughout our fieldwork, we are constantly negotiating our respective identities and our understanding of the situation in which we find ourselves (Crapanzano in Davies & Spencer 2010:72).

Anthropologist Malene Molding Nielsen conducted fieldwork in Danish prisons and argues that fieldwork in a prison setting is filled with *shifting engagements* between the prisoners, guards, and the researcher, and that these shifting engagements can shed light on important notions of everyday life (Nielsen 2010). Nielsen describes how ‘the involvement of the researcher is characterized by partial impartiality and shifting engagements and positioning as an informed outsider who is constantly challenged by being discredited as an informer and potentially losing rapport and access to the people who populate the field’ (Nielsen 2010:319). I tried to navigate this terrain by expressing my loyalty towards both the participants and the instructors, which, in practice, meant that I talked to both instructors and participants, sought to understand how both groups experienced the cognitive behavioural programmes, and interviewed both groups.

## INTERVIEWS

Data from interviews are in many ways different than observational data. Fangen (2010) suggests that observational data are ‘action’ data, whereas interview data mostly reflects the interviewees’ self-representations. However, when the two different approaches are combined, interview data becomes more than self-representations (Fangen 2010:172). Interviews are valuable in their capacity to excavate and interpret emotions, but they are perhaps best guided by previous observations and interactions with the interviewees (Agar 1996:157). In my experience, the observations were essential for developing meaningful interview questions and thus shaped the conversation in interviews, while the interviews shed light on aspects which the observational data could not. Hence, I waited until after the programmes had ended with interviewing participants and instructors in order to let the observations guide the interview framework. Interviews in prison can be beneficial because they (may) enable the interviewer and interviewee to create a room wherein it is possible to talk in a different way and about other subjects than they would normally in the everyday life of the landings (Crewe & Maruna 2006:117). In my understanding, that goes for both prisoners and instructors, although the former might feel more restricted in their ability to talk about whatever they want in prison than the latter.

I aimed to interview all participants and instructors in the three different Anger Management programmes and the Cognitive Skills programme which I participated in. I succeeded in interviewing all of the instructors, but did not manage to interview all of the participants in each group due to several reasons. The first group I participated in was Cognitive Skills. While I was present and able to give further information, the instructor told the prisoners about my request to conduct a focus group interview with them. Four participants chose to stay after the lesson to participate in the interview while the other half of the group had appointments/work to attend to – or perhaps they just did not want to be interviewed. The second Anger Management group was almost dissolved at the point of the prospective interview

which I had planned to conduct after the eighth lesson where the programme was evaluated. Unfortunately for me, but fortunately for them, two of the participants had already been released and one was on leave from the prison. I chose not to request an interview with the remaining three participants as they (and the instructor) were busy leaving the classroom when the lesson ended. I managed to interview participants from both the third and fourth Anger Management groups. Besides the interviews with all four instructors, I chose to interview a programme consultant employed in the Department for Resocialisation in order to increase my understanding of the demands and expectations put on the instructors. Furthermore, I conducted a 'research workshop' in a meeting for instructors wherein I presented my initial findings on humour. The research workshop turned into a focus-group interview when I asked the 12 participating instructors to discuss the meanings of humour in small groups, after which we discussed their findings in plenum.

I have conducted twelve semi-structured interviews in total:

- One focus-group interview with four prisoners from Cognitive Skills in an open prison.
- One focus-group interview with three prisoners in the second Anger Management group in a closed prison.
- Four individual interviews with prisoners in the third Anger Management group in a closed prison.
- Individual interviews with four instructors.
- One focus-group interview with 12 instructors.
- One individual interview with a programme consultant employed in the Danish Prison Service's Department for Resocialisation.

All interviews lasted between 1-3 hours and were recorded digitally, which I later transcribed verbatim. I transcribed the interviews myself so as to enhance continual reflection and increase a developing analytical 'feel' of the material. The transcription includes non-verbalized activities such as pauses, sighs, and laughter, but I have not included these in the final versions of the articles in order to ensure readability and to avoid to make the interviewees' speech seem fragmented (Fangen 2010: 271). I have translated all field notes and interview quotes from Danish to English in the three English articles. The semi-structured interviews covered various themes including: the participants' own perception of violence, their understanding of the aims of the programme, their own perceptions of their criminality, and their perceptions of values such as respect, honour and dignity. The themes in the interviews with the professionals consisted of: the participant

selection process, teaching style, the content of the programme and their understanding of programme goals, the demands placed on instructors, the theoretical and practical foundation of the programmes, and the training and supervision of instructors. I aimed for the interviews to feel like a ‘conversation with a purpose’ (Burgess 1984 in Mason 2002:62). Hence, the interviews were relatively unstructured and consisted of many open-ended questions, which allowed space for the interviewees to talk in length about their experiences. However, I did follow an interview guide (see Appendices 6, 7 and 8) which was more or less memorized in order not to consult my paper all the time. As also found by other prison researchers (Crewe 2011:481), prisoners (or people in general) do not always have neat, linear stories to tell which can be easily guided by a fixed set of questions. Interviewees were prompted to tell me about their interpretation or experiences in the programmes (i.e., how did you experience the role-plays?), which often led to interconnected stories from prison life in general or life on the outside. One episode re-told from the programme would lead to an episode in the prison yard which would again lead to a childhood story. I did not see these side-stories as malign interruptions, but as meaningful narration of a life lived (see Chase 1995; Ricoeur 1984:402).

In the first focus group interview with the participants in Cognitive Skills, the instructor left the classroom, but did not leave the building. In the second focus group interview, the instructor did not leave the classroom due to ‘security reasons’. I accepted this, but worried that the instructor’s presence might be a disturbance and distracting for both the participants and I. As it turned out, the participants seemed relatively unconstrained by the instructor’s presence and spoke freely of their experiences of participating in Anger Management. At certain points, the instructor was drawn into the discussion and it began to feel like the instructor was a legitimate member of the group rather than an intruder (sounds familiar, said the ethnographer). One reason for the relative success of the interview despite the less than perfect circumstances could be the relatively innocent nature of the discussion; after all, we were not discussing illicit practices or rule-breaking behaviour, but the participants’ subjective experiences of engaging in role-plays, etc. However, it was a relief when I was given permission to conduct the four single-interviews with participants in Anger Management *without* the presence of the instructor. We sat in the Chaplains office in the maximum-security prison which was described by the prisoners and the instructor as the ‘nicest and most quiet place in the prison’. I agreed. Hardly any noise came through the walls and it quickly became possible to imagine that the interviews were conducted in a place completely different than a prison.

A few lines on the importance of my gender, age and ethnicity is needed. Young (2011:66) argues that sociological studies like the present occur in a world ‘which is stratified by class, gender, age, race and ethnicity’. Fieldwork includes the ‘whole being’ (Okely & Callaway 1992:16) of the ethnographer and is an embodied

experience (Okely 2007). The interviews as well as observational situations are thus, a social relationship, and the results of this encounter will vary with the gender, age, and class of the researcher and the research participants:

The positivist dream of an epistemological state of perfect innocence papers over the fact that the crucial difference is not between a science that effects a construction and one that does not, but between a science that does this without knowing it and one that, being aware of work of construction, strives to discover and master as completely as possible the nature of its inevitable acts of construction and the equally inevitable effects those acts produce (Bourdieu 1999:608)

As an ethnic Danish, female doctoral student, I do not share many demographic characteristics with the participants. These obvious differences in class, gender and educational level have obviously influenced participant observation and interview situation. Sometimes these differences were expressed loudly as jokes ('I'd rather role-play with Julie') or compliments ('It's nice to look at someone other than a bearded man in this room' or 'You're welcome back here anytime') and other times, the differences became visible in a subtler way. For example, some of the interviewees would express uncertainty about whether they could provide the 'right' answers: 'I am not sure that I know what this is about, but I guess I'll find out' and 'I don't know what you are looking for' (Michael, closed prison) when we sat down for the interview. When asked what he did for a living before his imprisonment, another interviewee said that he 'used to own a restaurant and I had a car, money; everything was alright, I did not need anything. I drove a big Mercedes, lived in a huge house and went on holiday three-four times a year' (Samir, closed prison). It seemed important to Samir that I understood the man of importance he had been before he went to prison, how he was financially afloat and could provide for himself and his family. Similar tales of financial prowess and self-reliance were present in other interviews and they shed light on the importance of understanding self-narratives and the relationship between the role and position of the interviewer and the interviewee.

## **DATA ANALYSIS AND THEMATISATIONS**

The anthropologist Daniel (1996:132) argues that an ethnographer must 'tune her ear in the field to statements, claims, accounts, and stories that – in the words of a political scientist friend [...] – have nothing to do with anything'. How is it possible to turn such 'meaningless' material as field notes into sound analyses and move from participant observation to 'participant description' (Geertz 1988:83)? The line



between data generation<sup>37</sup> and data analysis is fluent in qualitative studies, particularly in ethnographic fieldwork. Research questions, methods and analytical categories change in the meeting with the particular field of study and in a continuous dialog between these aspects of a research design (Fangen 2010:41). This is also one of Bourdieu's points, namely that the construction of knowledge should occur in a dialogue with the field of study. Hence, the construction of knowledge is not just a process embarked on before the study, but is also embedded in the analysis process (Bourdieu in Jensen 2007). Bourdieu paraphrases Kant's dictum by stating that 'theory without empirical research is empty, empirical research without theory is blind' (Bourdieu 1988:774,775). Hence, theory and empirical material is interrelated and co-dependent in the sense that theory is involved from the beginning to the end of research, but does not make sense without empirical material (Prieur & Sestoft 2006:212). For Bourdieu, the seemingly small and concrete facts says something about the larger picture, hence it makes sense to conduct 'small-scale fieldwork, but comment on large-scale issues' (Moore 2005:362). I did not enter the field with a set of hypotheses or a large theoretical framework to 'test', but rather, approached the field in an explorative manner (Fangen 2010:45) while bearing previous research in cognitive behavioural programmes in mind. I thus aimed to conduct a 'theoretically informed ethnographic study' (Willis 1997). Understanding in anthropology is linked to participation, and evidence to experience. Hence, knowledge in anthropology is partial and positioned, and, in essence, 'a social phenomenon rather than simply a substance' (Hastrup 2004:456). Thus,

The point of anthropology is not to tell the world *as it is* (which would be practically impossible), but to interpret it and suggest possible (theoretical) connections within it [...] (Hastrup 2004:468).

Hammersley and Atkinson (1983:175) use a funnel metaphor in order to describe the ethnographic research process which becomes progressively focused over its course. This resonates with my research process, where some research themes (e.g., violence, choice, rationality, respect, and humour) seemed more important than others in the course of the fieldwork, whereby future observations were shaped by this increased focus. The ideas that came to shape the four articles stem from the empirical material which was already shaped by my attention and interest at that point in time (Emerson et al 1995:9). I did not use Nvivo or other data organising tools in the data analysis process. Rather, I manually organized the interview

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<sup>37</sup> Data *generation* is used instead of data *collection* in acknowledgement of the co-constructed nature of interview data. In this regard, stories come into being as a joint enterprise between the interviewer and the interviewee, rather than existing 'inside of the narrators, waiting to be expressed' or 'collected' (Presser 2008:123 in Wright 2014).

transcriptions and the field-notes into different themes and analysed these in line with 'adaptive theory', in which themes are determined both by prior theory and literature and by emergent data (Layder 1998). The ideas for the articles thus grew out of the empirical material, after which I developed analytical ideas and concepts through theory, previous research of cognitive behavioural programmes, and discussions with my research group ESSET. The analytical processes were similar for all four articles, but they emerged out of different research questions and interests which are described in the following.

As presented in the introduction to this dissertation, current problem definitions of criminality and offenders, and consequent solutions in the shape of cognitive behavioural programmes are of central interest to me. More concretely, I was interested in the messages that the instructors send and those that the participants received - the delivery and the reception of the programmatic goals. These interests fostered a need and wish to investigate the instructors' self-perceptions, work-trajectories and their understanding of the programmatic goals in order to investigate whether the professionals themselves come to see responsabilization as a natural response to social problems (Bondi 2005). The first article '*Caught between Soft Power and Neoliberal Punitiveness – An Exploration of the Practices of Cognitive-Behavioral Instructors in Danish Prisons*' thus grew out of these interests. I mainly draw on the interviews with the instructors and programme consultant, and also on my participant observation in the education and supervision of the instructors to shape the arguments of this article.

The second article, "*Man begynder jo ikke at smadre en købmand*": *Perspektiver på vold i vredeskontrolprogrammet "Anger Management"* ["*You Wouldn't Beat up the Grocery Guy!*" *Perspectives on violence in the prison-based cognitive behavioural programme Anger Management*"], zooms in on the reception of the programme instructors' messages about violence, choice and rationality. I only draw upon field notes and interviews with participants and instructors from Anger Management in this article in order to focus on violence and anger. The article was aimed to be published in a special issue of 'Tidsskriftet Antropologi' with the theme 'Treatment'. This theme obviously helped shape my ideas, but I was free to develop the analysis as I saw fit. The rationalities of violence presented itself in two distinct ways in the material: as an erroneous choice made by a free actor, versus a rational behaviour in certain social and structural contexts. The former understanding was pushed forward by the instructors, who then sought to change the participants' thoughts, choices and behaviour while the participants fought to legitimize and contextualize their violence or conflictual behaviour as they saw fit.

The third article, '*Honour and Respect in Danish Prisons – Contesting 'Cognitive-Distortions' in cognitive-behavioural Programmes*', is co-authored by PhD student Ben Laws from the University of Cambridge. The article departs from the second article on violence, rationality and choice because I was left with a feeling that I did

not fully understand why the participants were so adamant in their resistance towards the instructors' interpretations of violence and anger as, essentially, choices. It seemed important to investigate some of the drivers behind their resistance. We suggest that they belong to subcultural definitions of respect and honour, which seemed to thrive both in and outside the prisons.

The fourth and last article '*(No) Laughing Allowed – Humorous Boundary-making in Prison*' arose out of serendipity<sup>38</sup>. I had not expected to laugh so much as I ended up doing in the fieldwork, and it surprised me that the lessons were so saturated with humour. This means that the article grew out of a surprising observation which was analysed in order to describe larger implications (Fangen 2010: 38). My laughs and giggles also put me in a dilemma; I was afraid to laugh when only the participants laughed and afraid to laugh when only the instructors laughed out of loyalty for each group. This very concrete manifestation of the dilemma of 'whose side to be on' led me to analyse the ways humour was used as a tool to create boundaries between the participants and the instructors. I originally planned to analyse humour as resistance, and conducted the aforementioned workshop with that exact theme in mind. However, it turned out that neither the instructors in the workshop nor the researchers in ESSET seemed to agree with me that humour was all about resistance. This resistance (no pun intended) from both instructors and fellow researchers led me to analyse humour through a variety of lenses instead of just one. These multiple perspectives allowed for an examination of how humour seemed to function as boundary-making, but also as a tool to object towards the sometimes infantilizing nature of the cognitive behavioural programmes. Furthermore, humour was so disruptive in the lessons that it called for a questioning of whether 'soft power' in the shape of cognitive behavioural programmes always works.

## ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

I have anonymized all prisons, participants and instructors in order to protect the identity of the individuals. I explained the aims of my research, the terms of anonymity and data use, and gained so-called 'informed consent' from each participant and instructor. However, 'informed consent' is not a green-card to conduct the research without regard to ethical considerations in the process. On the contrary, and perhaps especially so in prisons, one must continuously be aware of and consider any verbal or non-verbal clues of withdrawal or lack of approval. After the initial approval, including a check of my non-existent criminal record, the Directorate of the Danish Prison and Probation Service assisted me to contact the relevant prisons and instructors by forwarding an amended version of my PhD

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<sup>38</sup> According to the Oxford English Dictionary, serendipity is 'The faculty of making happy and unexpected discoveries by accident'.

project description and my request to participate in the cognitive behavioural programmes. The Directorate underscored that while they recommended the prisons to accept the request, the governors, managing officers and instructors would have the final say in whether the research proposal would be accepted. This letter and request to participate in the programmes was responded to quickly and positively. However, it might have been very difficult for the prisons or instructors to actually decline my request as it, and I, had already been approved of by the Directorate. This top-down approach might have influenced the initial stages of the research, but as found in other prison studies (e.g. Minke 2012a:62; Ugelvik 2011:30), it is proceeding in the 'right' order is unavoidable when one wishes to conduct research in prisons. I paid careful attention to whether the instructors expressed any reluctance towards my participant observation due to the relatively 'forced' nature of my access, and obviously, whether the prisoners did as well. One of the instructors was a little worried about my wish to participate in all lessons, and I felt a bit squeamish about insisting upon the importance of my being there in all of them. Her scepticism, I believe, can shed light on the more or less consensual elements of this fieldwork, and any fieldwork where acceptance is negotiated from 'top down'. Even though the Directorate, the Governor of this particular prison, the Security Coordinator, and the treatment manager had all agreed to my participation, she remained sceptical. While she did agree to let me participate after some negotiation, she waited quite a while to call me back after the initial conversation. This was frustrating at the time, but I understood her choice to not contact me for a while as an expression of her protest of having me 'forced upon her'. As soon as the fieldwork actually commenced, she seemed to accept my presence completely and said: 'It is nice to have someone to talk through the lessons with' (Birthe, Cognitive Skills instructor).

Another ethical dilemma is the handling of information about illegal or criminal activities among prisoners as experienced by many prison researchers (e.g. Nielsen 2010:311; Crewe 2011:481; Ugelvik 2014). They are, indeed, sometimes the topic of interest, as seen in Ugelvik's paper (2011) on illicit food practices, and in Mjåland's paper (2015) on illicit drug diversion. It is a difficult balance to maintain as a researcher; we are obliged to report any future serious crime, but out of loyalty towards the prisoners (and our data collection), we turn a blind eye to many illicit activities. Polsky (1967) defines all the rule-breaking or law-breaking activities that qualitative researchers may encounter during fieldwork or interviews as 'guilty knowledge'. He argues that one simply has to avoid guilty knowledge, ignore it, or withhold information in order to protect and respect the confidentiality of the

research participants<sup>39</sup>. However, the nature of the fieldwork (participating in the programmes rather than everyday life on the wings) made it much easier for me to avoid seeing or hearing episodes that could compromise the confidentiality I promised the prisoners, and my ‘guilty knowledge’ is, therefore, very innocent. My interviewees would tell me stories of rule-breaking behaviour such as smoking cigarettes in the bathroom during lessons or reports about contraband in their cells, but they did not share more serious reports of crime that happened or were about to happen. Thus, I felt no obligation to report back to the prison officials and was never faced with more serious dilemmas. The candidness and openness of the prisoners was challenging in other ways. It is, of course, difficult to be faced with human suffering, troubles and struggles without being able to do something to ameliorate their circumstances. These feelings are common in prison research (see Liebling 1999:150) as well as in ethnography in general (e.g. Okely & Callaway 1992; Daniel 1996).

## **PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS AND THE EMPIRICAL MATERIAL**

The following is a presentation of the research participants and the substance and reach of the empirical material. Young (2011:2) argues that researchers should aim to bridge the gap between the inner life of human actors and the historical and social setting they are placed in. While I agree with him about the importance of placing the individual actor in his/her social and structural context, the aims of this research are a bit different. While I do provide some contextual information about the research participants, my overall objective has been to situate the cognitive behavioural programmes within a certain time, context and space in prison-based rehabilitation and the broader penal field, and show how they play out in concrete practice. Also, the empirical material is too small to properly describe each participant because it would be very difficult to ensure their anonymity were I to do so.

The participants are a heterogeneous group. Out of the 24 participants I followed in total, 13 have non-Danish backgrounds. The participants were all male and between 18 and 50 years of age with a skew towards younger participants (41 per cent were between 18-25 years of age). In the closed prisons, the participants had received lengthy prison sentences of more than 5 years, and some of the participants were in

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<sup>39</sup> ‘Guilty knowledge’ has been debated heavily lately after the publication of Alice Goffman’s ethnography ‘On the Run’ (2014). One particular passage of the book, in which she describes how she rides in a car with an informant who is armed and looking to seek revenge over a murdered friend, has led to a fierce debate on liability and responsibility in ethnographic criminology (see for instance <http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/ethics-on-the-run>).

remand and therefore, had not yet been convicted, whereas the participants in the open prison were primarily serving sentences of less than 2 years. The participants have been convicted or charged with assault, manslaughter, attempted manslaughter, extortion, drug trafficking, uttering threats, robbery and so forth. The participants have various experiences with the educational system and a 'portfolio' of income possibilities (Bottoms et. al. 2004:378); a few owned their own companies, most have limited education (the Danish equivalent to High School or less), many were unemployed before imprisonment, and some were employed in various low-skilled and non-permanent jobs. Most of the participants can be characterized by relative deprivation. In a welfare state, relative deprivation characterizes individuals or groups as poor if they lack the resources to feed themselves adequately, participate in activities, and have the living standards and privileges that are considered normal or at least recognized in surrounding society (Townsend 1979 in Jensen & Prieur 2015b).

The four instructors that I observed during their teaching in the cognitive behavioural programmes are all simultaneously prison officers with different work trajectories. They are 'mature' (between 35 and 55 years of age), have children, and live in close proximity to the prisons they are employed in. They can be characterized by their large engagement with the participants and their aim to do more than 'marihuana inspections in the perches [prison cells]' (Birthe, Cognitive Skills instructor). They all want to help the prisoners by doing 'more' than their regular job as prison officers allows. This general description also seems to fit with the larger group of cognitive behavioural instructors whom I met during the annual meetings for instructors. The instructors' self-understandings, work-trajectories, and implementations of the cognitive behavioural programmes are described in more depth in the first article (see Appendix 1).

The empirical material is rich in the sense that I have had every opportunity to write 'thick descriptions' (Geertz 1973) of the interactions in the cognitive behavioural programmes and to interview participants as well as instructors about their experiences at length. However, whether I would be able to comprehend the experiences of the participants and the programme instructors in such a short time period has been a concern; would it be possible to see the world from the native's point of view (Hastrup 2004), and who are the natives exactly? Is it the participants or the programme instructors? I believe my material can shed light on both groups' experiences, but I have obviously chosen to represent certain perspectives, opinions, situations and interactions rather than attempting to represent 'everything'. I both agree and disagree with Young (2011:135) when he warns about the dangers of the author's meta-narrative. He argues that, frequently, 'the meta-narrative of the author can have a greater coherence than the narrative of the people observed and it is this meta-narrative rather than the narrative which drives the story'. While this might very well be the case for a lot of research, the argument has the inherent flaw of assuming that you can ever get it 'right' - that is, to assume

that field-notes, interviews and conversations are suddenly ‘enough’ or ‘right’ (Steinberg in Liebling 2015:11). Young’s argument also seems to obscure the fact that the meta-narrative (or class, gender, ethnicity and training) of the ethnographer is deeply ingrained into the research process, which is exactly what the postmodern turn in anthropology has taught us (Hastrup 2004:468). Hence, it is not possible to write a narrative of the people observed in a vacuum outside of the author’s narrative. The previous chapter has been my attempt to provide insight into the research process with all its methodological, practical, analytical and ethical considerations. As such, it aspires to provide a platform from which to judge whether I ‘got it right’, while bearing in mind that this judgment is not possible in a positivist sense (Hastrup 2004).





# CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION AND CORE FINDINGS

The aim of this dissertation has been to show ‘what goes on’ in prison-based cognitive behavioural programmes in Denmark. Through participant observation in Cognitive Skills and Anger Management, as well as focus group and individual interviews with the participants and instructors, I have aimed to analyse how they experienced, used, challenged, rejected and/or accepted these programmes. I wished to shed light on dominant descriptions of criminality and ‘criminals’ which come to shape specific social technologies such as cognitive behavioural programmes. I have identified the problem definition underlying the cognitive behavioural programmes (crime is essentially a choice and the result of erroneous thinking and behaviour), and the consecutive solutions (acquisition of new ‘thinking styles’ and ‘social skills’ via role-plays, thinking exercises and discussions in cognitive behavioural programmes). More specifically, I wished to provide an empirically derived description of how dominating problem-definitions and solutions play out in practice. In this regard, the articles point to the relationship between dominating descriptions of problems and solutions versus lived experience. This chapter will summarize my core findings and conclude the introductory frame of this dissertation.

As laid out in the introduction, my main research question is: *How do prison-based cognitive behavioural programmes’ problem definitions and suggested solutions play out in concrete practice?*

I have answered this main research question via four sub-questions, and I will summarize the answers provided by these. While my research is a contribution to existing research of how cognitive behavioural programmes are experienced (e.g. Fox 1999a, 1999b; Perry 2013a), I also expand and go beyond this research body. The previous research has not examined how the instructors experience and understand the concrete practice of the programmes. I fill this gap by examining both the participants *and* the instructors’ experiences in order to show how cognitive behavioural programmes are experienced, used, challenged, rejected and/or accepted.

I was interested in exploring the constraints and possibilities which guide and shape the instructors’ practices and the opportunities and obstacles for their success in reaching the programmatic goals. The following is a summarization of my findings from the first sub-question: *How do cognitive behavioural programmes affect and transform the instructors’ self-perceptions, work-trajectories and their understanding of the programmatic goals?*

I have aimed to shed light on the fusion of more traditional penal-welfarist rehabilitation and neo-liberal interventions in the shape of cognitive behavioural programmes. This theme is explored in depth in the first article: *'Caught between Soft Power and Neoliberal Punitiveness – An Exploration of the Practices of Cognitive-Behavioral Instructors in Danish Prisons'*. The cognitive behavioural instructors whom I followed and interviewed take great personal and professional interest in the participants, and they strive to help them in a manner that prison officials deem is most efficient - through cognitive behavioural programmes. Cognitive behavioural programmes are seen as an outlet for targeting prisoners' 'criminogenic needs', which is framed in opposition to an aim of addressing the prisoners' needs in a holistic manner which the instructors describe as 'just talk' and thus, not very efficient. As described in this dissertation, the instructors are screened and selected in accordance with their personal and social skills, and they must be a role-model for the participants. The instructors are, thus, also formed by the wish to transform the participants into self-reflective, self-reliable, rational and responsible individuals; they must live up to these goals themselves (see also Järvinen & Mik-Meyer 2012). I have found that the instructors walk a tight rope between respecting the participants' individual wishes, values, rationalities and desires while seeking to change erroneous or inefficient thoughts and behaviour.

Some scholars have found that instructors in cognitive behavioural programmes for female offenders seek to get to 'gut level' (Mckim 2008) to engage the participants in a 'deep' and personal manner. Interestingly, my data does not reflect this therapeutic wish of disclosure of one's emotions and painful past experiences; on the contrary, the instructors' often redirect the conversation from past experiences to current issues. The reason for this derailing of the past is an emphasis upon the importance of the here-and-now, and the thoughts and behaviour that occur in this particular moment of time. The instructors argue that 'there is never anyone else responsible for creating an emotion in you' (Jeppe, Anger Management instructor); hence, the participants cannot blame 'everyone' else for their behaviour and reactions. The image of a rational actor who can freely choose whichever action or emotion he deems best or most fitting decontextualizes the participants' experiences and frame complex past and future experiences as merely choices. This might be a reasonable assertion; after all, the instructors cannot change the participants' past experiences, class or upbringing. Nonetheless, the differences between these two understandings of crime and choice lead to many discussions between the instructors and the participants.

The discrepancies between the instructors' focus upon criminality as a choice and the participants' fierce insistence upon the context for their crime resulted in the second sub-question: *How is criminality explained and rationality and choice understood, negotiated and interpreted in the cognitive behavioural programmes?*

The second article, *"Man begynder jo ikke at smadre en købmand": Perspektiver på vold i vredeskontrolprogrammet "Anger Management"* [“*You Wouldn’t Beat up the Grocery Guy!*” *Perspectives on violence in the prison-based cognitive behavioural programme Anger Management*’], examines how understandings of violence are produced and negotiated in Anger Management. The instructors’ framing and interpretation of violence, conflict and anger and the participants’ understandings diverged in important ways. I analysed violence from a constructionist perspective, where ‘violence is always a *social* fact; it belongs to the domain of intersubjectivity’ (Jackson 2002:44), but in cognitive behavioural programmes, violence is torn out of its context and presented essentially as a choice. I found that the Anger Management programme and the instructors reject the relevance of the context for aggression and violence, which the participants typically emphasize as being highly relevant. In that manner, the programme and the instructors sketch an image of violent actions not just as illegitimate, but actually irrational. Violence is thus portrayed as occurring in a vacuum, where certain thoughts lead to certain choices and behaviours. This individualization of violence and anger results in ongoing clashes between the participants and the instructors. The participants draw on subcultural assessments of specific behaviour as a necessary and expected aspect of urban street life and life in prison that does not resonate in an individualized method of treatment. The borders between perpetrator and victim are often fluid and volatile with respect to violence within sub-cultures or in the nightlife. The participants thus have experiences with street violence and violence in prison – as victims and offenders alike. The participants’ narratives on violence are contextualized in specific social situations and are thus filled with other people’s (re)actions in conflict and potential violent situations. The participants’ aggression and violence seem to bear their own rationale, maintaining or defending a kind of masculine self-respect and dignity in everyday life inside and outside the prison.

I wished to further examine why the participants were as adamant in their resistance towards the instructors’ interpretations of violence and anger as essentially choices. The above observation led to the formulation of the third sub-question, namely: *How does the participants’ subcultural belonging influence the workings of the programmes?*

The importance of respect (and honour) in prison is analysed in depth in article number three: *‘Respect and Honour in Prisons: Contesting “Cognitive Distortions” in Cognitive-Behavioural Programmes’*. Here, the concept of ‘respect plus’ is introduced in an attempt to bridge the gap between the concepts of respect and honour. This is needed to analyse how these concepts merge with the ‘prisoner code’ into a form of subcultural capital. The meanings of respect and honour in prison can be understood more fully in relation to the framework of subcultural capital (Bourdieu 1990; Bourgois 2003; Jensen 2006; Sandberg 2008). The masculine ideals of being ‘tough’, ‘standing your ground’ and being loyal merge

with honour and respect into a certain 'code of honour', which dictates particular rules and rituals that prisoners feel obliged to follow, or at least not contest too openly. Prisoners' subcultural capital shapes reception of and responses to demands for 'cognitive self-change'. Subcultural capital is valued by street and prison cultures, but cannot be cashed in (Anderson 1999) in a context of neoliberal expectations of efficient self-government. In order to analyse how prisoners' distinctive relationships to subcultural capital, masculinity, and respect, intersect and often undermine the programming goals, this article draws upon studies of prisons and total institutions (Cohen and Taylor 1972; Goffman 1961; Mjåland 2015; Sykes 1958; Ugelvik 2011).

The analysis shows that often, when the participants vociferously mentioned the importance of honour, respect and loyalty, these values were seen as confirmations of participants' 'distorted thinking' or 'criminal values'. This 'normative imperialism' (Crewe 2011: 516) or dismissive incredulity to subcultural norms was pervasive in the cognitive behavioural programmes. The cognitive behavioural programmes attempt to create accountable and rational actors (Bosworth 2007) who efficiently self-manage, but this line of reasoning neglects participants' contextualized interpretations of their lives (both in and out of prison). Non-utilitarian aspects of care, loyalty and affection (Skeggs 2011) seem more important to the participants in cognitive behavioural programmes than neo-liberal, self-interested rationales. The neoliberal language of rational calculation and interest maximization embedded in the cognitive behavioural programmes do perhaps not resonate with the participants' own world-views and moral reasoning. I found that the self-reliant and responsabilized individual stand in opposition to the participants' perceptions of 'proper' personhood in cognitive behavioural programmes; they weigh their loyalties towards their friends and family as heavier than their loyalty towards their employer or society in general. However, an idealization of self-reliant individuals need not stand in opposition to weighing family and friends above anything, but these two rationales clash when the friends and families also orient themselves towards subcultural values and/or commit crimes, which is often the case in this context.

The participants do take responsibility for their lives, although in ways that are foreign to the penal system and its moral ideals. Subcultural values such as the importance of self-defence are dismissed as being regressive in the cognitive behavioural programmes (Fox 1999a:449). However, the alleged discrepancy between rational choices and defence of honour is directly challenged by the participants; that is, they view defence of honour as *the only* rational choice to make. The models proposed in prison treatment programmes seem 'undignified and at times unfeasible' (Irwin 1987:37 in Fox 1999b:97) for prisoners who orient themselves towards subcultural values. These values were often deemed 'cognitive distortions' by the instructors and thus seen as thoughts, values and behaviour that needed to be corrected or changed. This is in line with Garland's reasoning when he

states that a prisoner ‘who enjoys criminal behaviour, or who embraces the consequences of crime, or for whom a law-abiding life is not a viable option, will be deemed ‘irresponsible’ no matter how self-aware and autonomous his or her actions are’ (Garland 1997:152).

The fourth sub-question is inspired by a surprising observation, namely that the lessons were saturated with laughter and humour. This observation inspired the question: *How does humour saturate the lessons and what uses does humour have in the programmes?*

The fourth article, ‘(No) Laughing Allowed – Humorous Boundary-making in Prison’, argues that the participants’ use of humour serves as disruptions of role-plays and exercises that take place during the cognitive behavioural programmes. I argue that the use of humour enables the participants to object in subtle ways that do not call for reprimands. Furthermore, the participants’ use of humour functions to transform a supposedly problematic being into an asset. Thus, they manage to object towards the embedded ‘cognitive deficit’ lens that their behaviour is understood through by humorously negotiating with the premises for identity construction. Jocular gripes and stories of masculinity, violence and crime also serve as frictional behaviour which can remedy the otherwise ‘forced production of selves’ (Fox 1999b) in cognitive behavioural programmes. The jokes and comments made by the participants might seem silly, puerile, or chaotic, but they could also be understood as attempts to restore autonomy and dignity in an otherwise infantilizing and emasculating institution and programmatic setting. In this regard, humour can neutralize uncomfortable but repeated experiences, such as asymmetrical power relations and infantilizing situations. Humour is embedded in the ‘defences of the weak’ (Mathiesen 1965:148) and may help alleviate the pains of imprisonment by creating a humorous distance in order to protect oneself.

My findings in this article also touch upon the subject of power and friction by asking whether ‘soft power’ in the shape of cognitive behavioural programmes actually work. When the participants continuously interrupt, twist and disturb the lessons by joking, horse-playing and turning the role-plays into comedy shows, they actively contest the power at play here. As shown by Foucault (1988) and Rose (1999), self-technologies are most (or perhaps only) efficient when groups or individuals are central and active actors in their own self-government. This includes self-discipline, self-scrutiny and self-control. However, my examination of a social technology in practice, the cognitive behavioural programmes, has found that the participants do not readily engage in this self-work. The analysis of how cognitive behavioural programmes are experienced, used, challenged, rejected and partly accepted, reveals that not everyone self-governs as efficiently as wished for. Humour seems to allow the participants in cognitive behavioural programmes to create friction (Rubin 2015) against the psychological power imbedded in this type of ‘treatment’ while avoiding serious repercussions.

After this presentation of the core findings and answers to the four sub-questions, I will now return to the main research question: *How do prison-based cognitive behavioural programmes' problem definitions and suggested solutions play out in concrete practice?*

A central finding is that the instructors' problem definitions of criminality diverge in significant ways from the participants' definitions of problems. The participants explain their criminality in a framework of structural and social factors, whereas the instructors understand criminality in the sphere of agency - a rational actor who freely chooses that action he sees best fit. The theory behind cognitive behavioural programmes understands criminality as a result of the individual's cognitive deficits, erroneous choices and lack of self-control (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008; Yochelson & Samenow 1976). The aim of the instructor is thus to teach participants how to change their thoughts and actions, but the manual-based structure of the cognitive behavioural programmes fails to take the prisoners' experiences into account. For example, the role-plays used are often rooted in rational-choice models, which assume that actors are unconstrained by, or resistant to the kinds of pressures that dominate the (street) cultures to which the participants return (Crewe 2009; Laursen & Laws in press). The participants emphasize perspectives on criminality that are justified in specific social contexts and a particular social milieu, whereas the instructors argue that criminality should be viewed as a principled *choice* and as an expression of the lacking ability of the participants to control themselves. Oftentimes, the participants resist and object when the instructors claim that crimes or doubtful moral rationalizations are an expression of a lack of accountability or erroneous thought. The participants' narratives are thus often deemed irrelevant, while the instructors' problem definitions and rationales are pushed forward. This results in ongoing clashes between the two parties.

Another central finding is that the participants actively contested the normative guidelines and presented alternative models of 'good and proper' behaviour. They engaged in a range of frictional behaviours which illustrate a whole spectrum of non-engagement (Brownlie 2004:519). While there might be consequences of choosing not to be rehabilitated through the forms prescribed by the prison, or not to conform to institutional demands, Scandinavian prison practices seem to allow for fairly large amounts of friction as long as it is well-meant, rational, and eventually leads to compliance (Shammas 2014; Ugelvik 2011). The participants used humour to disrupt the lessons, engaged in a variety of discussions about the format and content of the programmes, and used bodily movements such as yawning, moving around in their chair, leaning against each other, or simply standing up and walking around in the room. While these frictional behaviours do not always seem like hostile attempts to undermine the instructor or the cognitive behavioural programmes, they illustrate the ways prisoners struggle to maintain their dignity and autonomy. These moments of friction point to a central finding, namely that the 'soft power' in cognitive behavioural programmes does not seem to

work efficiently; the participants do not always steer or govern themselves in the wanted direction. On the other hand, they seem to, to a greater or lesser degree, pay ‘lip service’ to the programmatic goals in order to pass the programme. These findings also raise a number of theoretical issues which are discussed below.

### ***Theoretical and analytical implications***

My findings contribute to discussions on agency and power by showing how participants in cognitive behavioural programmes exercise frictional behaviours such as using humour to disrupt the lessons. The participants seemed to object more by means of humorous interruptions to the programmatic goals than they internalize them. These findings help to shed light on the many ways in which subjects of power resist oppression and subordination, even when greater resistance such as refusing completely to participate in cognitive behavioural programmes is not present. Drawing upon these findings, I supplement the large scholarship investigating neo-liberal responsibilization, risk and governmentality in relation to current rehabilitative interventions (e.g. Andersson 2004; Feeley & Simon 1992; Garland 2001; Kendall 2011; Nilsson 2013). These studies often operate on a macro-level (Hannah-Moffat & Lynch (2012), which calls for a study of ‘localized on-the-ground processes’ (Hannah-Moffat & Lynch 2012:119f). I also supplement the body of prison research that draw upon Foucault when they analyse prisoners’ acts of resistance (e.g. Ugelvik 2014) even though they rightly point to the productiveness in Foucault’s conceptualizations of power. Digeser’s (1992:995) argument that ‘the self will not completely fit into whatever form it is pushed, there will always be some resistance, some friction’ resonates, but the concept of resistance seems too open and vague. This vagueness may result in the concept of resistance potentially losing its analytical power (Rubin 2015). Hence, we might need a conceptual framework to analyse what this resistance, or better yet, friction actually entails and latches on to.

Power is an omnipresence in a Foucauldian framework; hence, ‘power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere’ (Foucault 1978:93). Resistance is intrinsic in subjectification processes and there does not appear to be a space outside of power. Some scholars argue that Foucault treats resistance as a ‘black box’ (see Brownlie 2004). In order to address this problem, I have analysed the participants’ resistance, or rather, friction, by drawing on the concept of subcultural capital to show how they align themselves with different and subcultural values, which shapes and orients their frictional behaviour. In order to explain how the participants ascribe values to their own lives, norms and behaviour, I have drawn upon Skegg’s (2004, 2011) ideas of how people who are marginalized from a wider moral community attach value to themselves despite the negative representations of them. I draw on these perspectives to argue that the acts of friction in the cognitive behavioural programmes should be understood as active attempts of subscribing value to the participants’ own values,

sentiments and understandings of good and 'proper' behaviour in the prison, as well as the subcultures they draw upon outside of prison. Many of the participants in cognitive behavioural programmes do form an alliance with institutional ideals, such as demonstrating a special effort to start afresh without crime (Nielsen 2012:139). However, these prisoners often dodge the moral project while, simultaneously using institutional stimuli to pursue individual ends. Against this background, it seems fair to ascertain that 'prisoners deflate institutional power and appear to escape the regime and its ideals without leaving it' (Nielsen 2012:141). I have shown how the participants in cognitive behavioural programmes engage in frictional behaviour in order to avoid subversion to middle-class values. This finding is similar to Rubin's (2015:14), who showed how 19<sup>th</sup> century prisoners' frictional behaviours in the shape of love affairs, masturbation, and refusal of work 'frustrated reformers' attempts to indoctrinate prisoners with middle-class values'.

Some concluding lines of precaution are needed to further strengthen the arguments above and re-contextualize this analysis. The 'exceptional' Danish penal field, with its emphasis on humane prisons, rights to education and vocational training and a holistic approach to prisoners (Engbo & Smith 2012) also challenges whether it makes sense to interpret cognitive behavioural programmes as evidence of neo-liberal risk management. While it seems likely that we have seen and continue to see a fusion of former welfare-oriented goals with neo-liberal risk management strategies (Kolind et. al. 2015; Prieur 2015; Prieur & Laursen in process), cognitive behavioural programmes are not the only rehabilitative efforts in Danish prisons, but they merge with previous ideals and interventions. An explicit goal under the headline 'Reducing Recidivism' in the 2013-2016 strategy<sup>40</sup> of the Danish Prison and Probation Service is education and vocational training of prisoners, as well as drugs and alcohol treatment and cognitive behavioural programmes. This implies that educational and vocational training initiatives continue to be in the forefront of activities offered Danish prisoners<sup>41</sup>. Penal-welfarism<sup>42</sup>, thus, hopefully continues to guide governing of and policy implementation in Danish prisons in order to ensure that the primary goal of punishment should not go beyond deprivation of liberty (Engbo 1997) while a simultaneous goal continues to be motivating and supporting prisoners.

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<sup>40</sup> <http://www.faengselsforbundet.dk/media/74557/hvidbog.pdf>

<sup>41</sup> These initiatives were also emphasized in a speech by the Director General of the Danish Prison and Probation Service, Johan Reimann, during an annual meeting for the cognitive behavioural instructors that I attended.

<sup>42</sup> Or, what Bourdieu calls the 'left hand' side of the state (Bourdieu 1998).



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# LIST OF APPENDICES

## **Appendix 1**

First article: 'Caught between Soft Power and Neoliberal Punitiveness – An Exploration of the Practices of Cognitive-Behavioral Instructors in Danish Prisons'

## **Appendix 2**

Second article: “‘Man begynder jo ikke at smadre en købmand’: Perspektiver på vold i vredeskontrolprogrammet “Anger Management””.

## **Appendix 3**

Third article: 'Honour and Respect in Danish Prisons – Contesting “Cognitive Distortions” in Cognitive-Behavioural Programmes’.

## **Appendix 4**

Fourth article: '(No) Laughing Allowed – Humorous Boundary-making in Prison’.

## **Appendix 5**

Translated version of the Danish article "Man begynder jo ikke at smadre en købmand": Perspektiver på vold i vredeskontrolprogrammet "Anger Management" into “‘You Wouldn’t Beat up the Grocery Guy!’ Perspectives on violence in the prison-based cognitive behavioural programme Anger Management’.

## **Appendix 6**

Focus group interview guide Cognitive Skills.

## **Appendix 7**

Interview guide Anger Management.

## **Appendix 8**

Interview guide Instructors.

# „MAN BEGYNDER JO IKKE AT SMADRE EN KØBMAND“

Perspektiver på vold i vredeskontrolprogrammet „Anger Management“

JULIE LAURSEN

Det er torsdag morgen i et åbent, dansk fængsel, og tredje lektion af i alt otte i programmet „Anger Management“ er i fuld gang. Dagens tema er „Teknikker til at kontrollere vrede“, hvor deltagerne skal fortælle om deres tanker under en såkaldt risikoepisode. Pointen med lektionen er at vise deltagerne, at de kan kontrollere deres tanker og ændre måden, de tænker på, for dermed at ændre måden, de handler på. Deltageren Khazar fortæller en historie fra sin skoletid om Rune og hans slæng, som konstant var ude efter ham, fordi han ikke var „deres type“. En dag til morgensamling sparkede Rune gentagne gange til Khazars stol, hvorefter Khazar sagde: „Stop, nu er det sidste gang!“ Rune stoppede ikke, så Khazar „knaldede ham én“. Khazar fremhæver, at han ikke blev smidt ud af skolen, selv om alle lærerne så, hvad der skete. Han er derfor sikker på, at de forstod, hvorfor han slog. Khazar omtaler endvidere episoden som positiv, fordi Rune endte med at forstå hans grænser. Instruktøren udfordrer dette og spørger resten af holdet, om det ikke var bedre *ikke* at slå. Amin svarer straks, at „hvis du ikke havde gjort noget, så ville du have været en gulvmåtte“. Jesper tilføjer, at „mobning er et ømt punkt – der er folk, der begår selvmord på grund af mobning, og hvis det kunne være stoppet med en flad, så var det måske fint“. Instruktøren spørger igen, om det ikke var bedre *ikke* at slå. Haadi svarer instruktøren, at nej, det synes han ikke. Jesper mener, at det er bedre at slå med det samme end at vente et år og så gå amok. Omar: „Vi bliver aldrig enige [henvendt til instruktøren, der fortsat protesterer] – for nogen er det bedst at slå!“

Ovenstående er blot et af mange eksempler på uoverensstemmelser mellem instruktører og deltagere i det fængselsbaserede program Anger Management. Artiklen er forankret i etnografiske data fra feltarbejde i et åbent og to lukkede fængsler, hvor jeg har foretaget deltagerobservation og interviews med såvel deltagere som instruktører i programmet.<sup>1</sup>

Antropologen Steffen Jöhncke har introduceret begrebet *treatmentality* som en beskrivelse af, hvordan behandling er et sine qua non, når der diskuteres løsninger på diverse problemer (Jöhncke 2009:15). Behandling er et politisk og kulturelt passende svar, uanset om den forbedrer livet for de implicerede eller ej. Behandling bliver et gode, der står i kontrast til straf som et onde – behandling er det rationelle, humanistiske svar på problemer (op.cit. 14) som vrede og vold i dette tilfælde. Det er derfor svært at være imod eller sågar kritisere behandling, da behandling bliver en slags magisk amulet, der automatisk er eksistensberettiget. Behandling i fængsler er dog præget af paradokser, som opstår i krydsfeltet mellem rehabilitering og kontrol, i balancen mellem Kriminalforsorgens dobbelte princip om hensynet til kontrol og sikkerhed versus hensynet til støtte og motivation til den indsatte. Den viden, der ligger til grund for behandlerblikket, er afgørende for, hvordan mennesker i behandling taler om vold, og hvorvidt de oplever at kunne handle anderledes (Henriksen 2013:223; Pawson & Tilley 1997). Det er derfor interessant at undersøge, hvad der sker, når deltagere og instruktører diskuterer vold i Anger Management.

Anger Management hviler på en kombination af behavioristiske og kognitions-psykologiske teorier, hvor voldelige handlinger begrundes i individets kognitive mangler (deficits), fejlagtige valg og mangel på selvkontrol (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008; Samenow & Yochelson 1976; Fox 1999; Andersson 2004). Artiklen tager i modsætning til denne voldsforståelse afsæt i en konstruktivistisk forståelse af vold, hvis identifikation og definition afhænger af konkrete sociale kontekster og relationer (Zizek 2008; Kilby 2013). Artiklen knytter an til antropologisk voldsforskning ved at inddrage deltagernes perspektiver og positioneringer og fokusere på henholdsvis instruktørernes og deltagernes forståelser af vold og konflikt. Det bærende spørgsmål i artiklen er dermed, hvordan vold fremstilles og forhandles i programmet Anger Management. Afledt af dette spørgsmål vil artiklen vise, hvordan deltagerne positionerer sig efter bestemte maskulinitetsnormer, som står i opposition til programmet.

I det følgende beskrives først metode, derefter gives en kort oversigt over behandling i fængsler, hvorefter jeg præsenterer forskning i vold med relevans for den empiri, artiklen bygger på. Afslutningsvis samler jeg op på hovedpointerne fra artiklens analysedel og diskuterer kort, hvilke implikationer artiklens resultater kan have for vredeskontrolprogrammer i fængsler.

## Metode

Artiklen bygger på mit feltarbejde fra 2013 og 2014 i danske fængsler,<sup>2</sup> hvor jeg har deltaget i Anger Management, som er et såkaldt forbehandlingsprogram, der

varetages af Kriminalforsorgen og forløber over 2 uger med 8 lektioner af ca. 2 timers varighed. Artiklen tager afsæt i feltnoter og interviewtransskriptioner fra min deltagelse i 3 programafviklinger med 3 forskellige instruktører, hvilket vil sige 24 lektioner i 3 forskellige fængsler. Min deltagelse i programmet er i lighed med sociologen Kathryn Fox (1999, 2000) karakteriseret ved observation og noteskrivning, men jeg har deltaget aktivt i afslapningsøvelser, snak og gruppeaktiviteter, når det har været muligt og passende. Mine feltnoter er nedskrevet så ordret som muligt, hvilket min observationsrolle gav rig mulighed for. Feltnoterne har dermed karakter af mange citater fra instruktører og deltagere samt udførlige beskrivelser af rollespil, videosekvenser og andre øvelser. Jeg har talt med deltagerne i talrige pauser, hvor jeg har fået et indblik i deres hverdagsliv, familiære omstændigheder, livet i og uden for fængslet og dermed etableret en relation til deltagerne, men ikke så tæt som den, et længerevarende feltarbejde i et fængsel kan give anledning til (jf. Crewe 2011; Ugelvik 2014). Ud over feltarbejdet har jeg foretaget 1 semistruktureret fokusgruppeinterview med 3 deltagere af ca. 1 times varighed. Efterfølgende foretog jeg enkeltinterviews af 1½-2 timers varighed med 4 andre deltagere med henblik på at få nuanceret og perspektiveret nogle af de temaer, som fokusgruppeinterviewet havde rejst. Interviewtemaerne centrerede sig om deltagernes oplevelser af forbehandlingsprogrammet Anger Management, deres selvforståelse i relation til vold og konflikt samt deres perspektiver på mulig forandring af egen adfærd. Jeg har desuden foretaget semistrukturerede enkeltinterviews af 1-2 timers varighed med alle 3 instruktører, hvor jeg forsøgte at forstå, hvilken forandring de forsøger at igangsætte hos deltagerne, og hvilke forståelser af vold og aggression der ligger bag deres praksis.<sup>3</sup>

Mine informanter har forskellige fængselsdomme. I det ene lukkede fængsel havde deltagerne længere domme på over 5 år, enkelte deltagere var varetægtsfængslet og derfor (endnu) uden dom, hvorimod deltagerne i det åbne fængsel primært afsonede domme på under 2 år. Deltagerne er dømt eller sigtet for vold, manddrab, forsøg på manddrab, afpresning, handel med narkotiske stoffer, trusler, røveri mv. Deltagerne er alle mænd i alderen 18-36 år med en overvægt af yngre mænd i starten eller midten af 20'erne. Ud af de 16 deltagere i de 3 Anger Management-kurser,<sup>4</sup> som min empiri er baseret på, har halvdelen af deltagerne anden etnisk baggrund end dansk. Deltagerne har forskellige erhvervs- og uddannelsesmæssige erfaringer; 4 har udelukkende folkeskolens 9.-klasseseksamen, 3 driver selvstændig virksomhed uden for fængslet, 3 er under uddannelse, mens flertallet var uddannelses-/arbejdssøgende før fængslingen, hvilket de forsat vil være, når de løslades.<sup>5</sup> Instruktørerne er typisk uddannede fængselsfunktionærer, der har suppleret deres uddannelse med et 2 uger langt praktisk og teoretisk kursus i Anger Management. Instruktørerne superviseres

løbende af de programansvarlige hos Kriminalforsorgens Uddannelsescenter og certificeres endeligt som instruktører efter 1 års undervisning samt godkendelse af videooptagelser af undervisningen (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008:1). Instruktørernes forskellige perspektiver, forståelser, udførelse og repræsentation af programmet er interessante, men uden for denne artikels fokus. Instruktørerne har generelt et stort engagement, og en af dem beskrev sin motivation for at videreuddanne sig til instruktør således: „Jeg vil gerne gøre en forskel og ikke bare lave hashvisitationer på pindene [fængselscellerne].“ Balancen mellem kontrol og rehabilitering i fængsler er genopstået i nye og interessante former i løbet af de seneste 20 år, hvilket jeg diskuterer i det følgende.

## Fornyet, men beskeden tro på rehabilitering i fængsler

De kognitive færdighedsprogrammer, der er en aktuel del af fængselsvæsenets rehabiliteringsforsøg, skal ifølge historiker Peter Scharff Smith forstås i lyset af fortidens forsøg på forbedring og rehabilitering af indsatte. Forbedringstanken, der slog igennem med det 19. århundredes nye fængsler, overlevede frem til 1970'erne, hvor den moderne form for indespærring kom i modvind, fordi recidivprocenten ikke faldt, og de forsøgte rehabiliteringstiltag tilsyneladende ikke virkede (Smith 2003:22, 2006; Cohen 1985). De kognitive færdighedsprogrammer er dermed affødt af den såkaldte „what works“-bølge inden for rehabilitering i fængsler, der efterfulgte den nedslående „nothing works“-æra (Martinson 1974). Fra slutningen af 1980'erne og frem opstod en række nye, specialiserede behandlingsprogrammer, der var målrettet lovbyggere. Den canadiske kriminolog Elizabeth Fabiano og psykolog Robert Ross (1985) udviklede programmet „Reason and Rehabilitation“, der blev implementeret i danske fængsler i 1994 under navnet „Det Kognitive Færdighedsprogram“ og er forløber for mere specialiserede programmer som Anger Management. Programmerne hævder at være evidensbaserede og har været udsat for talrige metaevalueringer i en positivistisk model (for eksempel Tong & Farrington 2006; Lipsey et al. 2007; Wilson et al. 2005; Porporino, Fabiano & Robinson 1991; Porporino & Robinson 1995; Porporino & Fabiano 2000). Der findes et mindre antal kritiske, kvalitative studier af programmerne (for eksempel Perry 2013; Crewe 2011; Fox 1999, 2000; Andersson 2004; Waldram 2012; Nilsson 2013; Kramer et al. 2013). Der er hidtil ikke foretaget egentlig forskning af Anger Management i Danmark (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008:12), men der findes evalueringer og kandidatspecialer (Berger & Brauner 2009; Bird 2008; Poulsen 2012; Jørgensen 1999; Kjær 2009; Weismann 2009; Pedersen 2012).

Anger Management er importeret fra den britiske kriminalforsorg i 2000 og benyttes nu i alle danske fængsler samt i Kriminalforsorgen i Frihed (Pedersen



2012).<sup>6</sup> Anger Management benyttes ikke længere i England. Den britiske kriminalforsorg har dog ikke opgivet at benytte sig af kognitive programmer, men tilbyder hele 47 specifikke programmer under paraplybetegnelsen „Offender Behavior Programmes“, hvoraf 3 omhandler vrede og vold. Der foreligger ingen engelske manualer for Anger Management eller uddannelse af instruktører, og programmets teori, metode og underliggende forandringsmodel er heller ikke beskrevet (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008:2). Programmet blev dog akkrediteret i Danmark i 2008 (ibid.), og ifølge akkrediteringen hviler programmet på adfærdskognitionsmodellen, hvor adfærd opfattes som indlært gennem betingning, hvilket henviser til individets oplevelse af negative og positive konsekvenser af en bestemt adfærd. Denne behavioristiske forståelse af adfærd suppleres med viden fra kognitionspsykologien, som hævder, at individets erfaringer lagres og genkaldes i hjernen i form af kognitioner. Vrede, og ikke mindst håndtering af samme, er i denne forståelsesramme en konsekvens af individets tankemønster. Kognitive adfærdsprogrammer ønsker dermed at identificere, analysere og omstrukturere tankemønstre og indlære nye interpersonelle og adfærdsregulerende færdigheder gennem betingning og modellering. Modellering skal i denne kontekst forstås som træning i at „ændre den impulsive, egocentriske, ulogiske og rigide tænkning“ (op.cit.4f.), for eksempel ved at iagttage egen eller andres adfærd ved hjælp af videooptagelser af situationsspil, gennem øvelser og/eller ved hjælp af instruktørens eksempler på, hvordan en given situation kan tackles uden vold.

Undervisningen i Anger Management er varieret og består, ud over introduktion og opsummering, af modulerne „Teknikker til at kontrollere vrede del 1, 2 & 3“, „At udtrykke følelser – assertiv kommunikation“, „Håndtering af kritik og fornærmelser“ og „Højrisikosituationer“. Indlæringen af „prosocial“ adfærd sker gennem rollespil, videosekvenser om vrede/konflikter, gennemgang af „vredesdagbøger“ og afslapningsøvelser (op.cit.82). De indsatte visiteres til Anger Management af fængslets socialrådgivere og instruktører eller tager selv initiativ til at deltage. Mange af dem nævner, at deres primære motivation for at deltage er et ønske om at opnå prøveløsladelse.<sup>7</sup> De er dog ikke udelukkende motiveret af et instrumentelt behov for løsladelse, men også af et ønske om forandring og om at modtage hjælp.

Den kognitionspsykologiske og behavioristiske teori, som ligger til grund for Anger Management, repræsenterer en anden voldsforståelse end et antropologisk, konstruktivistisk perspektiv. Præmissen om, at kognitive mangler såsom forvrænget tænkning resulterer i vold, udfordres blandt andet af, at det ikke kun er kriminelle, som undskylder, kontekstualiserer eller forsvare deres handlinger, men at dette er et almenmenneskeligt forhold (Thomas-Peter 2006:36; Ugelvik 2012; Presser 2008; Maruna & Mann 2006). Et antropologisk perspektiv på vold

kan måske bidrage til at forstå nogle af de uoverensstemmelser mellem deltagere og instruktører, der opstår undervejs i programmet. Jeg vil derfor kort opridse nogle centrale perspektiver.

## Voldens flertydighed, kontekstafhængighed og positioneringskraft

Vold som empirisk og teoretisk begreb er svært at definere, og netop voldens flydende karakter udgør et signifikant karaktertræk (Vigh 2004; Stanko 2003; Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois 2004:1). Det, som er vold i én kontekst, er det ikke i en anden, og det, som for én person udgør vold, opleves helt anderledes for en anden. I et antropologisk, konstruktivistisk perspektiv er vold ikke bare et spørgsmål om rå, fysisk handlekraft, men indbefatter magt, social differentiering og fratagelse af handlerum. Artiklens problemstilling indbyder til at analysere vold ud fra nedslag i 3 teoretiske og analytiske pointer: 1) Vold som begreb er ontologisk flertydigt og flydende, 2) voldens legitimitet er kontekstuel/situeret, og 3) vold kan være redskab til positionering i relation til begreber som ære og respekt. Disse pointer er centrale i antropologisk voldsforskning, der i modsætning til kognitive teorier hævder, at vold er indlejret i social praksis. Vold kan derfor ikke meningsfuldt studeres som individuel afvigelse, men skal undersøges som et produkt af det sociale liv (Henriksen 2013:33). Et analytisk fokus på, hvordan vold tillægges betydning, legitimeres eller forsøges undgået, skal ikke forstås som et relativistisk argument for den positive betydning af vold, men som en henvisning til konteksten for volden og dens kommunikative budskaber (Abbink 2000).

Antropologen Ann-Karina Henriksen (2013) beskriver vold som meningsfuld social praksis indlejret i kulturelle logikker, der både fremmer og hæmmer brugen af vold. Henriksen diskuterer selvrespekt og betydningen af personlig oprejsning med udgangspunkt i feltarbejde blandt unge, marginaliserede og voldelige piger i København (op.cit.111). Hun pointerer, at nok søger pigerne efter en form for kønnet respekt, men pigernes handlinger skal også forstås som en stræben efter at få værdi i sociale verdener, der ellers rutinemæssigt devaluerer dem. Dette indebærer ikke et normativt standpunkt om, at vold er positivt, men derimod et forsøg på at forstå pigernes handlinger som meningsfulde (op.cit.454).

En lignende pointe kan findes hos antropologen David Riches (1986, 1991). Riches argumenterer for, at voldsudøvere sjældent selv benytter begrebet vold om deres skadevoldende handlinger, da vold konnoterer illegitimitet (Riches 1986: 3f., 1991:285). Voldsudøvere distancerer sig således fra vold ved for eksempel at omtale deres handlinger som uundgåelige eller som nødvendigt selvforsvar. Riches (1991:286) argumenterer for at inddrage udøvers eget perspektiv på skadevoldende handlinger snarere end at tage for givet, at der er enighed om,

hvornår vold er vold. Antropologen Anton Blok (2000) stiller sig ligeledes kritisk over for et entydigt voldsbegreb og argumenterer for, at vold ikke er et naturligt faktum, men derimod et historisk udviklet begreb, som er indlejret i kulturelle kontekster, og at forskning i vold derfor skal stille spørgsmål til voldens form, kontekst og betydning. Blok kritiserer dermed en a priori-definition af vold som meningsløs eller irrationel og fremhæver, at vold skal forstås som en meningsfuld form for interaktion og kommunikation.

Artiklens pointe om, at vold (også) kan forstås som et positioneringsredskab, bekræftes af psykiateren James Gilligan, som argumenterer for, at vold motiveres af en søgen efter respekt og/eller kan ses som en respons på fornærmelser mod én selv eller ens nærmeste (Gilligan 2003:1149). Og sociologen Lucas Gottzén, som beskæftiger sig med mænds narrativer om (hustru)vold, pointerer, at mænds vold kan være et forsøg på at leve op til bestemte maskulinitetsnormer, når andre magtressourcer ikke opleves som tilgængelige. Gottzén fremhæver, hvordan hans informanter forsøger at kontekstualisere volden og beskriver sig selv som normale mænd, som på grund af omstændighederne bliver voldelige (Gottzén 2013:82).

Deltagerne i Anger Management giver udtryk for, at de bliver mødt med en manglende forståelse for deres motiver og begrundelser for at handle, som de gør. At instruktørerne fastholder en normativ betragtning om, at voldsudøvelse er forkert, og søger at fremme en ikke-voldelig adfærd, er ikke overraskende. Men programmets og instruktørernes insisteren på, at vold skyldes en forkert tankegang og en tvivlsom moral, kan muligvis betyde, at deltagerne modarbejder undervisningen.

## Erfaringer med vold

Succesfuld behandling må blandt andet handle om at skabe et terapeutisk rum, hvor der er en fælles forståelse og et fælles udgangspunkt for problemet, der søges behandlet (Kolind, Asmussen & Holm 2014). Deltagerne giver alle udtryk for, at de gerne vil have hjælp til at kontrollere deres temperament og håndtere konflikter uden brug af vold. Eksempelvis udtrykker Michael fortrydelse i forbindelse med de røverier, han har begået: „Altså, jeg er godt klar over, at det er for meget, det jeg har gjort, ikke? Men det kunne jeg aldrig finde på at gøre, som jeg har det nu. Jeg har jo været påvirket og presset, og det er jo ikke noget, man er stolt af.“ Michael forklarer sin kriminalitet ud fra sit behov for stoffer samt sin oplevelse af pres som et resultat af netop manglen på samme. Dømte rationaliserer ofte deres kriminalitet på den måde, hvilket skaber en distance mellem en forståelse af deres moralske selv og de handlinger, de har begået: Michael har gjort noget voldeligt, men han *er* ikke voldelig i egen optik (jf. Copes, Hochstetler & Sandberg 2015:

33). I modsætning hertil bygger Anger Management på ideer om en essentiel kriminel personlighed med mangler i tankegange og handlingsmønstre, hvor det kognitive behandlingsprojekt:

[...] nærmest hviler på en teori om et 'kriminelt menneske', der afviger fra en ikke klart defineret normalitet, idet han eller hun savner visse kognitive færdigheder, der giver sig udslag i antisocial og kriminel opførsel. Den kriminelle udviser i den forstand en form for patologisk tankevirksomhed, der angiveligt kan kureres via den korrekte påvirkning (Smith 2003:326).

I denne individualiserede model kan kriminel adfærd altså påvirkes og forandres, ved at der hos den dømte sker en identificering og bearbejdning af tanke- og adfærdsmønstre knyttet til kriminalitet samt indlæring af nye prosociale færdigheder (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008:5). Denne behandlingsagenda indeholder nogle modsætninger, da deltagerne på en og samme tid bliver beskrevet som et rationelt selv, der er i stand til at forandre sig, mens selvet også beskrives som kognitivt forstyrret og på sin vis essentielt kriminelt (Fox 1999; Rhodes 2010).

I informanternes fortællinger udviskes og sløres grænserne mellem udøver og offer for vold. Deltagerne afviser ikke, at de har begået handlinger, som har skadet andre, men måske skal man ikke forstå deres gerninger i et individuelt patologisk perspektiv, men snarere som en art social navigation (se Henriksen 2013:232 om dette begreb). Deltagerne fremhæver perspektiver på vold, der begrundes i konkrete sociale sammenhænge og personer, hvorimod instruktørerne argumenterer for, at vold udelukkende skal ses som et principielt *valg* og som et udtryk for deltagernes manglende evne til at kontrollere sig selv. Grænserne mellem udøver og offer er ofte mere flydende og omskiftelige, hvad angår vold inden for subkulturelle og kriminelle grupperinger eller i nattelivet, end de er i forhold til vold i nære relationer. Mange af deltagerne har endvidere personlige erfaringer med vold i hjemmet, som Andreas, der siger: „Jamen, jeg er altid blevet tævet af min far, så ...“ Eller Michael, der holder af sin stedfar, fordi „han aldrig har slået min mor, og det gjorde min far jo“. Deltagernes erfaringer med voldsudøvelse eller det at være voldsoffer relaterer sig også til at sidde i fængsel. Fængselsforskeren Gresham Sykes identificerede 5 såkaldte „pains of imprisonment“,<sup>8</sup> hvoraf den ene er frygt for egen sikkerhed (Sykes 1958). Disse 5 forhold er siden videreudviklet (Crewe 2011), men indsattes frygt for vold og beredskab over for vold er fortsat høj i fængsler (Liebling & Arnold 2012). Nadim siger da også: „Herinde har du skudsikker vest på, er kampklar. Fængslet er en base, hvor man er en kriger. Alle er ens herinde.“

Deltagerne har desuden erfaringer med gadevold – både som offer og gerningsmand. Denne dobbelthed understøttes af offerundersøgelserne 2005-2013 (Balvig et al. 2012), som viser, hvordan ofre for vold ofte har samme demo-

grafiske profil som gerningsmanden. De registrerede ofre for vold er typisk unge, enlige mænd med etnisk minoritetsbaggrund, grundskole som højeste uddannelse, arbejdsløse og med lav indkomst. Vold er ydermere typisk situationsbetinget og sjældent noget, der planlægges og kræver, at ofret opsøges (op.cit.133f.). En dikotomisk forståelse af vold, hvor man enten *er* voldelig eller *ikke* voldelig, alt efter hvilke valg man foretager, giver ikke megen genklang i analysen af deltagerne fortællinger. De former for vold, der italesættes (jf. Bosworth & Carrabine 2001: 508) af deltagerne i Anger Management, udfolder sig *ikke* i de nære relationer, men derimod oftest i nattelivet, fængslet samt i kriminalitetsprægede, subkulturelle grupperinger. Det er dog ikke til at vide, om deltagerne afstandtagen fra vold i nære relationer er udtryk for en moralsk positionering, eller om den er en korrekt gengivelse af deres virkelighed. Eksempelvis argumenterer voldsforskeren Jeff Hearn for kompleksitet og selvmodsigelser i narrativer, idet han viser, hvordan mænd *siger*, at de ikke udøver vold mod kvinder, men så alligevel opremser talrige episoder, hvor de har udøvet fysisk og psykisk vold mod deres kvindelige partner (Hearn 1998:71, 2012:599f.). Fortællinger skal måske ikke forstås som sandhedsnarrativer, men derimod som processer, hvor identitet og selvforståelse produceres og forhandles (Henriksen 2013:48; Presser 2008, 2012; Sandberg 2010). Vold i nære relationer stigmatiseres og fordømmes, her eksemplificeret af Kasper:

Prøv og hør, jeg kunne aldrig drømme om at slå på nogen, jeg holder af [...] Folk, der ikke er i fængsel, det er jo typisk folk, som gør vold mod deres koner eller kærester, og i det miljø, hvor jeg kommer fra, der er det jo totalt tabu! Det gør du bare ikke! Jeg skal jo have noget mod mit temperament altså i al almindelighed!

Kaspers udsagn kan måske ses som en form for moralsk skillelinje, hvor han samtidig positionerer sig som et ordentligt og anstændigt menneske. Kaspers skelnen mellem vold i hjemmet og hans egen form for voldsudøvelse i nattelivet og subkulturelle miljøer kan også forstås som en narrativ betydningsdannelse, hvor Kasper forsøger at pege på folk, der er værre end ham selv, fordi de bruger vold uden for situeret legitime områder såsom nattelivet (Ugelvik 2012). Deltagerne navigerer også i et krydsfelt af relationer, som indbyder mere eller mindre til vold, hvor vold og truende adfærd kan være et redskab til positionering. Deltagerne positionerer sig ydermere både i og uden for fængslet samt over for hinanden og instruktøren, hvilket jeg diskuterer i det følgende.

## Forhandlinger om voldens betydning og legitimitet

Deltagerne i Anger Management protesterer generelt, når instruktørerne hævder, at forbrydelser eller tvivlsomme moralske rationaliseringer er udtryk for manglende ansvarlighed eller tankefejl. Måske er begreber som moral, etik og loyalitet kontekstafhængige og uforståelige uden for den sociale og strukturelle virkelighed, de befinder sig i (Mattingly 2013; Henriksen 2013). Et kontekstafhængigt og situeret perspektiv på nødvendigheden af vold eller selvforsvar er i hvert fald et tilbagevendende diskussionsemne i undervisningen, hvilket eksemplificeres gennem nedenstående diskussion om, hvorvidt man kan forsvare at medbringe en kniv i nattelivet:

Instruktør: 'Det handler hele tiden om valg, I har hele tiden et valg. Kniven i lommen; den brænder. I har magten, I skal tænke over det, før I tager kniven med. Den er jo ikke kun til forsvar!'

Khazar har i pausen fortalt om sin barndomsven, der blev stukket ned med en kniv og døde: 'Det er en helt normal reaktion. Hvis en er blevet stukket, så er man nødt til at have en kniv med.'

Instruktør: 'Så må man lade være med at tage i byen!'

Hamza: 'Du skal holde dig væk fra Strøget, fordi hvis I kommer fire indvandrere, der ser godt ud, og I vil gerne lave damer, der kommer problemer. Sid derhjemme og ring til damerne!'

Instruktør: 'Det er jo ekstremssituationer med knive.'

Khazar: 'Nej, det er ikke så ekstremt. Folk stikker hinanden ned, fordi de kigger skævt til hinanden.'

Instruktør: 'Det er en dårlig undskyldning, for *jeg* har ikke brug for en kniv, når *jeg* går ud!'

Instruktøren refererer til sine egne oplevelser af nattelivet, men Khazar accepterer ikke denne forståelse af de omstændigheder, som han oplever i sit hjemmemiljø, som er en dansk ghetto med betragtelige problemer med arbejdsløshed og kriminalitet.<sup>9</sup> Det er forventeligt, at instruktøren udfordrer Khazars forsvar for at medbringe en kniv, når han bevæger sig ud i nattelivet, men Khazars egen opfattelse af sit kvarter vil givetvis være betydningsfuld for den måde, han oplever at kunne agere på (jf. Copes, Hochstetler & Sandberg 2015:38). En anden deltager, Mikkkel, fortæller ligeledes om en gammel episode med nogle større drenge, som over en periode truede Mikkkel og hans venner med en kniv. Mikkkel endte med at „slå dem“ i sidste ende, og han ser denne oplevelse som en form for socialisering, „en læring i at klare sig, når man er en lille knægt“. Mikkkel mener tilmed, at hvis man har „styr på sit eget“, holder de andre op med at genere én, hvorefter han henkastet siger, at „sådan er det at være ung i en ghetto“. Måske skal unge mænds involvering i gadeslåskampe hverken forstås som en mangel på normativ selvkontrol eller en fejlagtig moral, men som en integreret

del af et marginaliseret liv, som nogle hævder (Wacquant 2008; Bengtsson 2012). Manualen bag Anger Management hævder i modsætning hertil, at et fokus på strukturelle faktorer udelukkende får mennesker til at *tro*, at deres muligheder er begrænsede, hvilket deltagelse i programmet kan afhjælpe, da man dermed bliver i stand til at ændre sine tanker og som følge heraf sine handlinger (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008; Kramer et al. 2013:538). Anger Management tilstræber at virke i et socialt vakuum, fordi deltagerne bliver bedt om at fjerne konteksten fra narrativer om det skete, hvilket resulterer i, at den voldelige handling står alene og forekommer helt irrationel (jf. Fox 2001:181). Dette er i tråd med Riches' pointe om, at fortællinger om vold fastfryses i perspektiver, som udelukker den hverdagslige kontekst for volden (Riches 1991:286). Deltagernes voldsudøvelse bærer sin egen form for kontekstualiseret rationalitet, hvorfor det eksempelvis ikke er meningsfuldt at „smadre en købmand“ i fængslet, men derimod rationelt at slå Rune, som kontinuerligt overskrider Khazars grænser.

Artiklens pointe er ikke, at vold er acceptabel, men at deltagerne handlinger giver mening i et antropologisk perspektiv på vold og krænkelse som social praksis, som udøves på linje med andre handlinger. En socialt situeret forklaring stemmer ikke overens med forestillingen om kognitive mangler, så kontekstafhængige narrativer bliver dømt som tankefejl eller manglende ansvarstagen. Deltagerne trækker derimod på subkulturelle vurderinger af specifik opførsel som en nødvendig og forventet del af et urbant gadeliv og fængselstilværelsen, hvilket ikke finder genklang i en individualiseret behandlingsmetode. Nedenstående eksempler stammer fra et enkeltinterview med Nadim, et rollespil i undervisningen samt en nedfældet episode fra Ahmads vredesdagbog, der danner grundlag for en samtale mellem ham og instruktøren. Eksemplerne understreger pointen om, at brugen af vold ikke nødvendigvis skyldes mangel på sociale kompetencer, men derimod en særlig forståelse af organiseringen og kommunikationen i det sociale miljø (jf. Henriksen 2013:76f.).

Nadim: 'Det [Anger Management] har været godt. Men det er lidt svært, jo. Det kommer an på situationen, hvad for nogle situationer man kommer ind i. Jeg er kommet i en situation, hvor personen truer med at hoppe på mig i morgen på gårdtur [motion i fængslet]. Hvad fanden skal jeg gøre oppe i mit hoved, hvad fanden skal jeg tænke på? Skal jeg tage boksehandskerne på i morgen og gå på gårdtur, eller skal jeg slet ikke gå på gårdtur eller ...? Hvad har jeg af andre muligheder? Jeg *har* bare ikke andre muligheder. Enten kan jeg blive låst inde, eller også kan jeg gå på gårdtur og så tage, hvad der nu kommer. Fordi jeg tænker, at hvis der er én, der slår mig, så slår jeg tilbage. Jeg ved ikke, hvad fanden jeg skal gøre ... det var derfor, at jeg blev så ked af det og sur [...] Jeg sidder inde jo, og jeg vil ikke slås for ingenting, hvorfor skal jeg slås? Men hvis der er én, der slår mig, så bliver jeg nødt til at slå tilbage.'



Ahmad og Viktor rollespiller en købmandssituation, hvor fængslets købmand siger, at Ahmad ikke har bestilt varer, hvilket Ahmad er sikker på, at han har, og han skal bruge dem til sin datters forestående besøg. Det går ikke så godt med spillet, som egentlig skal illustrere en potentiel voldelig konflikt. Ahmad siger, at det er et dårligt rollespil, fordi han jo ikke kan blive sur på købmanden over *det*! De to bytter roller og får omsider spillet færdigt. Viktor siger afsluttende, at ‘man begynder jo ikke at smadre en købmand’.

Samtale mellem Ahmad og instruktør på baggrund af oplevelse nedfældet i Ahmads vredesdagbog: Ahmad var ude at køre med en ven og stødte på en fremmed mand, der råbte ‘perker’, mens han stod sammen med en masse piger og ‘spillede smart’. Ahmad kørte bilen voldsomt derhen, steg ud og stak en pistol [med løse skud] ind i munden på manden og spurgte: ‘Hvad fanden snakker du om?’ Manden blev bange og tissede i bukserne foran pigerne, der grinede. Instruktør: ‘Hvad skulle du have gjort?’ Ahmad: ‘Gået hen stille og roligt, sige, at han skulle snakke ordentligt, eller måske bare pande ham én.’

Interviewet med Nadim illustrerer både hans manglende tolerance over for fornærmelser og hans nervøsitet og ambivalente forhold til at tackle den potentielt voldelige konflikt på gårdturen. I det sidste eksempel med Ahmad reagerer han på det nedladende, racistiske tilråb og positionerer sig ved at reagere voldsomt. Ahmads kommentar om, at han måske i stedet bare kunne have „pandet ham én“ kan måske ses som en form for småflabet positionering over for instruktøren, men instruktørerne anerkender til tider, når deltagerne foreslår at vælge mindre voldelige løsninger: „[Det er] fint nok, hvis man har været helt vild og så lærer bare at stikke en flad“. Ahmad kan til gengæld ikke hidse sig op over de hypotetisk manglende købmandsvarer, så rollespillet med en lige så uforstående Viktor går i vasken. Det fejlslagne rollespil skyldes måske, at der ikke er noget på spil for deltagerne såsom ære eller maskulinitet, hvilket samtidig understreger kontekstens betydning for deltageres positionering.

Deltagerne beskriver, hvordan de føler skam over deres voldelige handlinger, men det virker vanskeligt for dem at overføre de konstruerede eksempler på vold fra undervisningen i fængslet til situationer uden for fængslet. Dette blev diskuteret i fokusgruppeinterviewet, hvor Kasper netop sætter spørgsmålstejn ved, at instruktøren kontinuerligt irettesætter deltagerne, når de bruger eksempler på vold, der er sket uden for fængslet. Denne modstand kan måske forstås som et forsøg på at dirigere opmærksomheden væk fra Kaspers egne voldshandlinger, men Kasper peger også på elementer i programmet, som han finder kontraproduktive. Kasper diskuterede nemlig åbent sine voldshandlinger i løbet af programmet, men han ønskede at tale om dem i den kontekst, de foregik i, nemlig i socialiteten uden for fængslet:



Kasper: 'Jamen, vi skal ud på et tidspunkt, og det skal jo ikke kun være ting, vi kan bruge inde i et fængsel, det skal også være noget, vi kan arbejde med udenfor! Man skal jo også kunne se et positivt resultat ved ikke at gå amok på taxachaufføren over, at han har kørt en omvej på 100 km eller et eller andet. [...] Vi sidder her jo alle sammen af en grund, jo. Ahmad, han sidder her, fordi han har afpresset nogen, du ved, så han kunne jo godt have kommet med et negativt eksempel på det. Viktor har været inde at sidde for vold før, så han kunne også godt have kommet med et negativt eksempel på, at han mistede besindelsen, og jeg har jo et *hav* af voldsdomme, så jeg kunne også sagtens have kommet med eksempler fra udenfor!'

Instruktør: 'Hvis I bruger eksempler fra livet uden for fængslet, kan jeg ikke henvise til de positive og negative konsekvenser. For eksempel hvis I henviser til et vellykket tyveri, så var det positive, at I fik jeres penge, og hvad var så de negative konsekvenser? „Jamen, der var ikke rigtigt nogen, fordi jeg slap – jeg fik jo mine penge.“ Og det er jo ikke derfor, jeg er her! Det skal være sådan, at den negative konsekvens ved at miste kontrollen, den skal altid opveje det positive. [...] Hvis I bruger eksempler udefra, så kan jeg jo ikke bruge det positive i logbogen. Der var ingen isolation, der var ingen ekstrastraf og alt det der, så hele det her med slutresultatet og de positive ting, der er sket, ved at du håndterede din vrede på den der måde, det ryger jo væk!'

Viktor: 'Jamen, hvis man ser helheden i det med pengene og inden for de fornuftige normer og sådan noget, så er der jo en negativ konsekvens! Han går måske og er bange og sætter et rygte i gang om, at ham der [Viktor] han smadrer dig altså, hvis du ikke giver ham pengene. Så der er jo en negativ konsekvens – i det lange løb er der jo negative konsekvenser, selv om der ikke er fængselsrelaterede konsekvenser som isolation eller ekstrastraf.'

Den manualbaserede undervisnings fokus på negative og positive konsekvenser tager ikke højde for en hverdagslig kontekst, som ikke altid er sort-hvid. Dette eksemplificeres af Viktor, som påpeger, at uanset straffens formelle karakter er der moralske konsekvenser ved at afpresse andre, mens Kasper søger redskaber til at undgå at „gå amok“ på taxachaufføren. Måske positionerer deltagerne sig også over for instruktøren, hinanden og undertegnede ved at understrege deres autonomi ved hjælp af modsigelser og lettere provokerende udsagn. Deltagerne er i hvert fald optaget af at positionere sig ud fra en forestilling om maskuliniseret respekt, hvilket jeg diskuterer nedenfor. Det maskulinitetsideal, som deltagerne fremhæver, skaber forhindringer i behandlingen, men kan også være med til at øge forståelsen for deres egne opfattelser af vold, konflikter og fornærmelser. Maskulinitetsidealer er præget af diversitet og kompleksitet samt indlejrede i sociale og strukturelle forhold, hvorfor en hegemonisk maskulinitetsforståelse møder kritik (Connell & Messerschmidt 2005). Deltagernes maskulinitetsideal handler dog blandt andet om at sætte sig i respekt, ikke tabe ansigt, forsvare sin ære og at positionere sig i forskellige sociale sammenhænge både i og uden for fængslet.

## Vold som (potentiel) positioneringskraft

Ifølge sociologen Eva Illouz er ære ildeset i en terapeutisk sammenhæng, hvor voksne personer forventes at handle rationelt i en nytteorienteret optik, og folk, som hellere forsvare deres ære, bliver derfor set som følelsesmæssigt inkompetente (Illouz 2008:84). I antropologisk (volds)forskning er der dog ikke noget modsætningsforhold mellem rationalitet og forsvar for ære ved brug af vold. Vold kan både betragtes som en defensiv mekanisme, en (potentiel) kilde til magt og som et middel til at opnå noget, eksempelvis en form for respekt. Dermed fremstår voldelig adfærd som et „handlingsmønster, der er motiveret af et forsvar af mennesker, muligheder, integritet eller værdier, der opleves som truede“ (Vigh 2004:4). Deltagerne i Anger Management er meget optaget af, hvor betydningsfuldt det er for dem ikke at underkaste sig en anden eller acceptere fornærmelser, men at de derimod må sætte sig i respekt på forskellig vis. Sådanne maskulinitetsnormer (Gottzén 2013) er muligvis kontraproduktive i en behandlingslogik, hvor man søger at ændre moral, værdier og tankemønstre. Instruktørerne underviser i hvert fald i, hvordan man skelner mellem og håndterer fornærmelser eller kritik på en hensigtsmæssig måde, så deltagerne undgår at reagere aggressivt. Deltagerne lader ikke til at have problemer med at skelne mellem nuancerne i henholdsvis kritik og fornærmelser, men de er ikke nødvendigvis enige i, hvordan man tackler sådanne situationer. Nedenstående eksempel er fra en diskussion om, hvordan man kan eller bør håndtere potentiel kritik og konflikt, som visitationen af ens fængselscelle indebærer:

Instruktør: 'Hvad kan man gøre [i stedet for at slå]?'

Makin: 'Latterliggøre den anden.'

Instruktør: 'Der er vi ikke helt enige [...] Hvis du kører på én, så kan det være, at den anden mister kontrollen.'

Makin: 'Fedt!'

Instruktør: 'Vi skal ikke tænke planlagt vold, vi skal tænke i konsekvenser. Vi skal ikke ud i, at I tænker kriminelle tanker ... og vælger at slå. For det er ikke hensigtsmæssigt at køre den anden op!'

Makin: 'Det er dig, der afbryder, du kan jo ikke forstå det, hvis du afbryder mig. Det er forskelligt fra situation til situation. Fordi jeg ikke har noget magt i mine hænder, så tager jeg bukserne langsomt af [under visitationen]. Det var bare et eksempel, du tager det som kernen i emnet. Jeg kan ikke lide at underkaste mig nogen, som jeg ikke har lyst til at underkaste mig.'

Kasper: 'Det er et spørgsmål om selvrespekt.'

Makin: 'Man bliver meget konfliktsky, synes jeg [ved at følge Anger Managements tankegang].'

Disse diskussioner om oprejsning og respekt handler både om personlige grænser, kontekstualiseret rationalitet og ikke mindst om forestillinger om

maskulinitet og ære. Eksempelvis argumenterer Kasper for, at „det er vigtigt, at man ikke nedværdiger sig selv – man skal holde fast i det, man mener“. Deltagerne trækker på bestemte forståelser af ære og opfattelser af rimelige niveauer for tolerance, hvilket betyder, at det er væsentligt at løse problemer på „den mandlige måde“, <sup>10</sup> som eksempelvis betyder, at en slåskamp kan afslutte en konflikt én gang for alle (jf. Copes, Hochstetler & Forsyth 2013:771f.; Jewkes 2005). Som Kasper udtrykker det: „Det er simpelthen, fordi jeg har en stolthed, der siger spar to, og jeg kan simpelthen ikke klare, at nogen træder på den, og så bliver der bare reageret med det samme!“ Denne indstilling og de medfølgende konsekvenser er naturligvis problematiske, hvilket Kasper også medgiver og uddyber undervejs i programmet. Anton Blok argumenterer for, at fornærmelser kan opleves som en seriøs form for verbal vold, hvilket kan forklare Kaspers stålfaste manglende accept af fornærmelser. Blok beskriver ligeledes, hvordan følsomhed over for fornærmelser varierer inden for forskellige kontekster, og folk har forskellige følsomhedsgrænser (Blok 2000:25). Makins historie fortælles i en fængselskontekst, hvor den indsattes agens og handlerum er vældigt indsnævret (Crewe 2011; Liebling & Arnold 2012), hvilket kan forklare, hvorfor det bliver væsentligt selv at bestemme tempoet for afklædning i forbindelse med en obligatorisk celleinspektion. Samir fortæller ligeledes, hvordan han oplever, at det er svært blot at acceptere fornærmelser eller trusler i fængslet:

Samir: ‘Du forklarer det lidt dårligt. Hvis der er en, der taler grimt til mig – jeg hopper på ham! Det gør alle herinde. Jeg tror, at jeg ville sige, at han skulle tale pænt.’

Instruktør: ‘Men hvad kunne du gøre?’

Samir: ‘Du tænker ikke så meget over det, du svarer bare tilbage, som han har startet. Det handler også om gruppepres. De andre vil tro, at du er en kylling, hvis du ikke gør noget.’

Instruktør: ‘Og hvad så?’

Samir: ‘Det er ubehageligt, det er ligesom at blive mobbet.’

Eksemplet, som indledte artiklen, hvor Khazar fortæller sin historie om mobning og vold, omhandler både en søgen efter respekt og oprejsning og viser, hvilke forestillinger om maskulinitet der er på spil for deltagerne i Anger Management. Fortællingen om Khazar, der følte sig presset til at slå for at undgå ydmygelsen i at blive drillet af Rune og hans venner, kan belyse, hvordan vold er indlejret i komplekse sociale processer og dermed kan forstås som et produkt af en bestemt situeret dynamik og rationaler (Henriksen 2013). Voldelige handlinger kan måske forekomme i en acceptabel eller forståelig form, hvor udøverens motiv er moralsk genkendeligt, som hvis man bliver udsat for noget, som man opfatter som en krænkelse (Vigh 2004). Episoden med Khazar kan også ses som et spørgsmål om

positionering, ære og respekt, idet Khazar følte sig krænkede og trådt på, men det væsentligste er måske, hvor betydningsfuld konteksten er for at forstå episoden. Uden konteksten ville tilhøreren formodentlig ikke kunne acceptere volden, der ville forekomme meningsløs og irrationel, men fordi vi kan genkende Khazars motiv for at slå, bliver episoden meningsfuld eller i hvert fald forståelig. Khazars historie er ligeledes et eksempel på den forhandling af vold, der diskuteres i Anger Management, og de sammenstød og positioneringskampe mellem deltagere og instruktører, som de forskellige voldsperspektiver resulterer i.

## Konklusion

Artiklen har rejst spørgsmålet om konstruktion og forhandling af vold i vredeskontrolprogrammet Anger Management og om deltagernes positionering i forhold til instruktørernes dagsorden. Programmet udfordres af, at deltagerne positionerer sig ud fra bestemte maskulinitetsnormer (jf. Gottzén 2013; Connell & Messerschmidt 2005; Hearn 2012) både i og uden for fængslet og derfor kontinuerligt udfordrer instruktørerne. På den anden side tillægger programmet og de tilknyttede instruktører ikke deltagernes perspektiver legitimitet, og al vold opfattes som et udslag af fejlagtige tankemønstre, hvilket udelukker kontekstuelle, sociale og strukturelle forklaringer. Ved at benytte prædikater som antisocial personlighed, manglende selvkontrol og fejlagtigt tankemønster formaliseres og institutionaliseres personligheden i de kognitive programmer, hvilket betyder, at deltagernes egne narrativer ofte overhøres og negligeres (jf. Crewe 2011:515). Anger Management-programmet og de tilknyttede instruktører afviser relevansen af den kontekst for aggression og vold, som deltagerne typisk fremhæver som relevant. På den måde får programmet og instruktørerne tegnet et billede af voldshandlinger som ikke bare illegitime, men irrationelle. Dette er i tråd med de kognitive færdighedsprogrammer, hvor der findes forkerte eller problematiske tankemønstre, der resulterer i fortsatte kriminelle handlinger.

Vi kan måske forstå deltagernes fortællinger som en form for narrativ menings-skabelse frem for at forstå dem som undskyldninger for kriminalitet (jf. Ugelvik 2012). Deltagernes aggression og vold bærer ofte deres egen rationalitet, som blandt andet kommer til udtryk i ønsket om at bevare eller forsvare en form for maskuliniseret selvrespekt og værdighed i hverdagslivet både i og uden for fængslet. Det er muligt, at disse opfattelser i højere grad skal inddrages bevidst, hvis et program som Anger Management skal fungere bedre. Sammenstødet mellem forskellige rationaliteter og instruktørernes insisteren på at arbejde med konstruerede eller irrelevante situationer fra fængslet kan være en begrænsning for programmernes mulighed for at kunne „behandle“ og forebygge vold.

## Noter

1. Ph.d.-projektet og dermed denne artikel er en del af et større forskningsprojekt ESSET (Education in Social Skills and Emotional Training), Aalborg Universitet. ESSET handler om de krav, der stilles til sociale kompetencer i børnehaver, skoler, arbejdsliv, socialt arbejde og i Kriminalforsorgen, hvilket undersøges af fire forskellige forskere. Se [eset.aau.dk](http://eset.aau.dk). Tak til Kriminalforsorgen samt instruktører og deltagere i Anger Management for samarbejdsvilje, interesse og engagement i projektet.
2. Fængslerne forbliver unavngivne af hensyn til instruktører og deltagere. Deltagernes navne er anonymiseret på en måde, der afspejler deres etniske baggrund. Instruktørerne kaldes blot for instruktør, da datamaterialet er så småt, at det ville være vanskeligt at bevare anonymiteten, hvis de blev navngivet i forhold til køn.
3. Både instruktører og deltagere er blevet informeret om anonymitet, retten til at stoppe eller forlade interviewet samt orienteret om formålet med studiet.
4. I 2013 blev der afviklet 162 forløb af de 6 forskellige kognitive programmer i Kriminalforsorgens institutioner. Anger Management udgør samme år 65 procent af det samlede antal forløb, der afvikles. I 2013 var der i alt 657 deltagere, der påbegyndte et kognitivt program, og 514 der gennemførte (Årsrapport fra Programvirksomheden 2013).
5. Klientundersøgelsen af alle indsatte (Clausen 2011) viser, at 68 procent af de fængselsdømte og 69 procent af de varetægtsfængslede har grundskole som højeste fuldførte uddannelse. 15 procent af fængselspopulationen er indvandrere, og 7 procent er efterkommere. 62 procent af fængselspopulationen er registreret som værende „øvrige uden for arbejdsstyrken“ (op.cit.71). Kriminalforsorgen publicerer så vidt vides ikke statistik om, hvorvidt indvandrere og efterkommere udgør en større andel af de indsatte med voldsdom. Det er derfor vanskeligt at vide, hvorfor deltagere med etnisk minoritetsbaggrund er overrepræsenteret i Anger Management.
6. Kriminalforsorgen i Frihed (KiF) har ansvaret for tilsyn og kontakt med Kriminalforsorgens dømte uden for fængsler og arrester. Desuden er det KiF, der udarbejder personundersøgelser af sigtede, før deres sag behandles i retten, samt fører tilsyn med fodlænkeafsonere.
7. Ifølge § 40a i straffeloven kan en indsat blive løsladt på prøve, hvis hensynet til retshåndhævelsen skønnes ikke at tale imod det, og den dømte har ydet en særlig indsats for ikke på ny at begå kriminalitet, herunder ved at deltage i behandlings- eller uddannelsesforløb, eller hvis den dømtes forhold taler herfor (Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008:28).
8. Sykes definerede følgende fem såkaldte „pains of imprisonment“: 1) afsavn af [deprivation of] frihed, 2) afsavn af varer og services, 3) afsavn af heteroseksuelle forhold, 4) afsavn af autonomi, 5) afsavn af personlig frihed (Sykes 1958:65f.).
9. Ghetto er defineret i forhold til de såkaldte ghettokriterier for 29 særligt udsatte almene boligområder, som den daværende regering udviklede i 2010. Disse kriterier har været meget omdebatterede – en kritik, som artiklen ikke beskæftiger sig yderligere med.
10. Antropologen Lorna Rhodes diskuterer ligeledes maskulinitet og oprejsning (Rhodes 2004: 53), men med fængselsbetjente i USA som eksempel. De henviser nemlig til at gøre tingene på „den mandlige måde“, hvis der er optrapning til konflikt med en fange, hvor de ønsker at sætte sig i respekt. Denne parallel kunne være interessant at udforske.

Søgeord: Anger Management, vold, behandling, fængsler, kognitive færdighedsprogrammer

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## Focus group interview guide: Cognitive Skills

Thank you all for agreeing to participate in this interview. We can discontinue the interview at any point if you do not wish to continue or if you do not have time to go on. I will use a digital recorder if that is alright with you, but I will be the only one listening to the recording and I will transcribe it myself. As you all know, my PhD is about the cognitive behavioural programmes and what goes on in them. I am interested in what the instructor is trying to teach you and what you think you gain from participating. The point of this interview is to learn a bit more about why you chose to participate and how you have experienced the programme.

- Could you please tell me your age, your occupation before your imprisonment and a bit about your personal situation (are you married, do you have children, etc.)?
- Why did you choose to participate in Cognitive Skills?
- How were you accepted into the programme?
- Was it difficult to be accepted into the programme?
- How do you find the lessons in general?
- Do you think that the programme is too long, too short or the right length?
- How do you find the format and structure of the programme? For example, how do you find the role-plays or the story-telling exercises? Do the exercises make sense to you?
- How do you feel about being in a group with five other prisoners, whom you may or may not know? Does it matter who the other participants are?
- What is it, in your own words, which the instructor is trying to teach you?
- What skills do you find useful?
- What skills are most important to you? (For example problem-solving skills, verbal/non-verbal communication, alternatives, assessment of consequences, creative thinking, assertive communication, facts/opinions, social skills, values, critical thinking, etc.)
- Do you think you will be able to use the programme anywhere else than the classroom? (For example in prison, with your families, in relations to friends, in an encounter with the Prison and Probation service, in relation to criminality, etc.)
- Is it possible to use assertive communication in prison?
- Would it be possible/easy for you to use the skills in a future situation if a conflict or a problem should arise?
- Would you please finish the sentence: Cognitive Skills would be much better if only...?

# Interview guide: Anger Management

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. We can discontinue the interview at any point if you do not wish to continue or if you do not have time to go on. I will use a digital recorder if that is alright with you, but I will be the only one listening to the recording and I will transcribe it myself. As you know, my PhD is about the cognitive behavioural programmes and what goes on in them. The point of this interview is to learn a bit more about why you chose to participate and how you have experienced the programme.

- Could you please tell me your age, your occupation before your imprisonment and a bit about your personal situation (are you married, do you have children, etc.)?
- How long have you been imprisoned/on remand?
- Have you been imprisoned before? And/or have you participated in cognitive behavioural programmes in other prisons or probation settings?
- Why did you choose to participate in Anger Management?
- How were you accepted on to the programme? Was it difficult to be accepted?
- How do you feel about being in a group with five other prisoners, whom you may or may not know? Does it matter who the other participants are?
- How do you find the format of Anger Management? For instance the role-plays, the video-recordings, the discussions?
- Which kind of impact does the instructor have in regards to your experiences of the programme?
- How did you experience the individual conversation(s) that you have had with the instructors? Are it/they important?
- I would like to talk about violence and/or anger. Do you find that there is a connection between your temper or anger and the conviction/sentence you have received?
- I am interested in how Anger Management and the instructor understand and interpret anger and violence versus your understanding. Do you think of yourself as violent? Do you think that you have problems controlling your temper? Or how do you perceive of yourself in this regard?
- Can you give me an example of an episode or a situation which ended up with violence or anger? What happened?
- And the other way around; can you mention a situation which did not end with a conflict or an episode of violence? How did you solve this? Did you use the techniques or tools that you learned in Anger Management?

- How would you define honour or respect? What do these concepts mean to you if anything?
- Can you give me an example where someone protected your honour or made you feel respected? And the contrary; can you give me an example where you did not feel respected?
- Have you tried to use the tools that are taught in the programme such as BUSS or self-calming exercises or relaxation exercises in order to avoid a conflict or to avoid that a conflict would lead to violence?
- The instructor talked about how you can change your behaviour by changing your thoughts. For example, if you think differently or choose differently when you encounter other people or particular situations then you would be able to avoid problems? Does that make sense to you?
- Could you imagine using the tools outside of the prison? For example in relations to your family, friends, work, encounters with the Prison and Probation Service, or in regards to criminality?
- Is there anything I forgot to ask you? Or anything else that you would like to tell me?

## Interview guide: Instructors

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. We can discontinue the interview at any point if you do not wish to continue or if you don't have time to go on. I will use a digital recorder if that is alright with you, but I will be the only one listening to the recording and I will transcribe it myself. As you know, my PhD is about the cognitive behavioural programmes and what goes on in them. I am interested in to learn a bit more about why you chose to become a cognitive behavioural programme instructor, your perception of the programmatic goals, and the purposes of the programme as you understand them.

- Why did you choose to become a cognitive behavioural instructor? How did you find the education? What, in your opinion, is valued during the selection of future cognitive behavioural instructors (why were you chosen, do you think?)
- Have you found it difficult to change occupational identity from prison officer to cognitive behavioural programme instructor? How did your colleagues react to your new role?
- How do you screen and select the participants? What is important to you during the screening interview?
- Do you use a scheme or a scale (for measuring anger/motivation) in the interviews?
- What are the most important factors in screening participants and forming a group?
- Could you describe a really well-functioning group and a not so well functioning group? What are the consequences in both cases?
- If you should describe, in your own words, what it is that you are trying to teach or tell the participants, what would you say?
- What skills/lessons/concepts are most important in your opinion?
- Could you give an example of a success story? (For example a participant who gained a lot from participating, a good experience with a particular group, a really valuable lesson, etc.?)
- On the contrary; can you give an example of a participant/a group/a situation which did not work well?
- You said, following the programme manual, that it is important to make the lessons relevant to the participants. Could you please say a little more about that?
- Could you also say something more about the difference between thoughts and feelings/behaviour that are pushed forward in the programme?
- Have you ever tried to exclude someone from the group? What happened?
- What is, in your opinion, the difference between instrumental/planned violence and impulsive violence? Why is it not possible to work with the former in Anger Management?

- How do you react to and handle resistance from the participants? Both the explicit (negotiation/disruptions) and the implicit (disturbances, bodily movements, jokes, etc.)
- Do you think that the participants will be able to use the skills that they are taught anywhere else than the particular classroom (in prison, in relations to their friends/families, work, the Prison and Probation Service, in relations to criminality, etc.)?
- Is it possible to use assertive communication in prison?
- Did I forget to ask you anything? Or do you have something to add to this discussion?

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